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Abstract
Large-scale data processing prompts a number of important challenges,
including guaranteeing that collected or published data is not misused, pre-
venting disclosure of sensitive information, and deploying privacy protection
frameworks that support usable and scalable services.
In this dissertation, we study and build systems geared for privacy-friendly
data processing, enabling computational scenarios and applications where po-
tentially sensitive data can be used to extract useful knowledge, and which
would otherwise be impossible without such strong privacy guarantees. For
instance, we show how to privately and efficiently aggregate data from many
sources and large streams, and how to use the aggregates to extract useful
statistics and train simple machine learning models. We also present a novel
technique for privately releasing generative machine learning models and entire
high-dimensional datasets produced by these models. Finally, we demonstrate
that the data used by participants in training generative and collaborative
learning models may be vulnerable to inference attacks and discuss possible
mitigation strategies.
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Impact Statement
The results presented in this dissertation will likely facilitate the design,
development, and evaluation of innovative techniques for privacy-aware data
collection and machine learning. Stakeholders and practitioners will thus be
able to overcome the increasingly relevant tension between the utility of ex-
tracting knowledge from data and the responsibility to protect individuals’
privacy. More specifically, this dissertation introduces novel techniques for
privacy-preserving collection of statistics, allowing providers to instantiate pro-
tocols and build systems addressing “real-world” applications. To this end, we
have designed and developed a scalable and easy-to-integrate framework sup-
porting privacy-preserving computation of analytics based on large-scale and
private data aggregation. Further, in a first-of-its-kind attempt to build a
private generative machine learning model based on neural networks, our re-
search will allow companies to generate and share synthetic high-dimensional
data without incurring risks of privacy breaches.
This dissertation also sets out to study how machine learning models may
lead to information leakage, thus addressing important academic and policy
challenges. Our research identifies a few important gaps in the academic liter-
ature related to the evaluation of membership inference in both collaborative
learning and generative machine learning models, as well as to the investiga-
tion of property inference in collaborative learning. In particular, membership
inference can directly violate privacy if inclusion in a training set is itself sensi-
tive. For example, if synthetic health-related images (generated by generative
models) are used, e.g., for research purposes, discovering that a specific record
8 Impact Statement
was used for training leaks information about the individual’s health. There-
fore, regulators can use membership inference to support the suspicion that
a model was trained on personal data without an adequate legal basis, or for
a purpose not compatible with the data collection, e.g., to detect violations
of data protection regulations such as the new EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). Machine learning as a service (MLaaS) providers can use
our inference attacks as a benchmark before allowing third parties access to
the model; providers may restrict access in case the inference attack yields
good results.
Finally, the academic community at large can benefit from our work, in
that it advances the state of the art in studying and addressing the challenges
of privacy-preserving analytics in innovative and more effective ways, as well as
motivating the need for future research on investigating better defenses against
inference attacks. Therefore, we are confident our research will promote inter-
disciplinary collaborations at the intersection of security/privacy and machine
learning.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the widespread deployment of complex Internet-based services, large
amounts of data, including sensitive information, are being constantly pub-
lished, collected, and processed [45, 117]. This abundance of contextual in-
formation makes it increasingly possible to extract value and knowledge from
data. Examples include tracking GPS locations reported by mobile devices to
generate live traffic maps (Google Traffic) and suggest more efficient routes [40];
analyzing social media content for disaster management [206], consumer confi-
dence [161], and urban neighborhoods [181]; tracking disease incidence through
geographic analysis of web search queries on the use of specific key words over
time [121]; generating artificially created multimedia content from real data,
e.g., images [112] and videos [182]; enabling endpoint devices to jointly learn
a common predictive model while keeping all the raw data in the device [143].
This dissertation focuses on the privacy challenges presented by two novel
and demand-driven technological trends in data processing: (1) data collection,
which is the process of gathering information from different input sources,
and (2) machine learning (ML), which gives artificial intelligence systems the
capability to acquire their own knowledge by extracting patterns from raw
data [86].
First, the large-scale collection of user data raises serious privacy, confiden-
tiality, and liability concerns, thus motivating the need for efficient and scalable
techniques allowing providers to privately gather statistics. Rather than re-
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leasing only specific aggregate statistics, such as certain counting queries or
histograms, entities are often willing or compelled to publish their datasets,
e.g., aiming to monetize it or allow third parties with the appropriate ex-
pertise to analyze it. For instance, Call Detail Records (CDRs) collected by
telecommunication companies are not only useful to capture interactions be-
tween customers, but also to understand their behavior, e.g., for infectious
disease spreading or migration patterns.1 As a result, telecommunications
companies are often interested in releasing them in the form of “anonymized”
datasets, which replace the original records in any data analytics without re-
quiring any further interaction with the publisher.
However, as individuals usually have a unique combination of attribute
values in these high-dimensional datasets, their exploitation and sharing are
hindered by potential privacy breaches as well as implied monetary penalties.
For instance, AOL released a detailed search logs dataset for research purposes,
and Netflix released users’ ratings to allow an open competition for the best
ML algorithm designed to predict user ratings for unseen movies. Personal
identifiers such as names were removed from these datasets as a guarantee for
the users in the datasets to remain anonymous. Nonetheless, Narayanan and
Shmatikov [157] were later able to identify individual users by cross-referencing
their data records, and both companies were sued for privacy breach.2,3
Second, over the past few years, ML has played a increasing role in
data processing systems due to its capability of efficiently discovering valu-
able knowledge and hidden information. Companies like Google, Microsoft,
and Amazon provide customers with access to APIs that allow them to easily
embed ML tasks into their applications. For instance, organizations provide
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) engines to outsource complex tasks,
such as training classifiers, performing predictions, clustering, etc. They can
also let other users query models trained on their data, possibly at a cost.
1See, e.g., http://www.flowminder.org
2https://www.wired.com/2009/12/netflix-privacy-lawsuit/
3https://www.cnet.com/news/aol-sued-over-web-search-data-release/
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Among these techniques, generative models are an important emerging area in
ML, as recent developments are paving the way for artificial generation of per-
fectly plausible images and videos. They are used in a number of applications,
e.g., compression [198], denoising [23], inpainting [221], super-resolution [125],
semi-supervised learning [183], clustering [197], and deep neural networks pre-
training [79] in cases where labeled data is expensive.
However, if malicious users can infer sensitive properties of data used
to train these models, this leads to dangerous information leakage. More
specifically, the ability of an adversary to ascertain the presence of a specific
data point in a training dataset constitutes an immediate privacy threat if the
dataset is sensitive per se. For instance, if a model was trained on the records
of patients with a certain disease, learning that an individual’s record was part
of the training data directly affects their privacy. On the one hand, users do
not have much control over the kind of models and training parameters used
by MLaaS platforms, and this might lead to overfitting (i.e., the model does
not generalize well outside the data on which it was trained), thus making it
easier for an attacker to perform inference attacks. On the other hand, this
type of inference can also help enforce individual rights such as the “right to
be forgotten”, demonstrate inappropriate uses of data (e.g., the use of health-
care records to train ML models for unauthorized purposes [20]), and/or detect
violations of data protection regulations such as the GDPR [81].
More recently, collaborative ML has emerged as an alternative to conven-
tional MLaaS methodologies where all training data is pooled and the model
trained on this joint pool. It allows two or more participants, each with his
own training dataset, to work together to construct a joint model. More specif-
ically, each participant trains a local model on his own data and periodically
exchanges model parameters, updates to these parameters, or partially con-
structed models with the other participants. Many architectures, systems,
and protocols have been proposed for distributed, collaborative, and federated
learning [63, 51, 215, 154, 129, 228]: with and without a central server, with
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different ways of aggregating and averaging models, etc. Their typical goal is
to improve the training speed and reduce overheads, but protecting the privacy
of participants’ training data is an important motivation for several recent col-
laborative learning systems [143, 190]. Because the training data never leaves
the participants’ machines, collaborative learning may be considered as a good
match for the scenarios where this data is sensitive (e.g., health-care records,
private communications, personally identifiable information, etc.), and the par-
ticipants want to construct a joint model without disclosing their datasets.
Collaborative training, however, does disclose information via model updates
that are indirectly based on the training data.
Together, these scenarios prompt a number of crucial challenges, including
how to guarantee that the collected or published data are not misused; how to
ensure that data processing does not lead to disclosure of sensitive information;
and how to define privacy protection frameworks that allow usable and scalable
services.
1.1 Research Questions
The broad goal of this dissertation is to tackle the following research
problem:
Can we build and evaluate systems geared for privacy-friendly data process-
ing, while enabling computational scenarios and applications where potentially
sensitive data is needed to extract useful knowledge with strong privacy guar-
antees?
Such goal entails addressing several open research questions, including:
1. Training ML models based on aggregate statistics gathered from many
data sources without disclosing fine-grained information about single
sources and in an efficient manner.
2. Releasing synthetic datasets that resemble real datasets without incur-
ring privacy breaches.
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3. Evaluating if an adversary can infer information about the data used to
train ML models.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
Overall, this dissertation investigates the design and evaluation of privacy-
aware data processing mechanisms. The contributions of this dissertation in-
clude:
1. We combine privacy-preserving aggregation with data structures sup-
porting succinct data representation, namely, Count-Min Sketch [56] and
Count Sketch [44]. Private aggregation is performed over the sketches,
rather than the raw inputs. While an upper-bounded error in the ag-
gregate is introduced, this allows us to reduce communication and com-
putational complexity (for the cryptographic operations) from linear to
logarithmic in the size of the inputs. We then use the resulting private
statistics tools to instantiate protocols and build systems addressing real-
world applications, where the error does not affect the overall quality of
the computation. Specifically, we present and implement three protocols,
(i) a privacy-preserving recommender system for on-line broadcasters, (ii)
a private location prediction service, and (iii) a scheme for computing
median statistics of Tor [65] hidden services in a private way.
2. We propose a novel approach, relying on generative neural networks,
to model the data generating distribution of various kinds of data. It
provides differential privacy [75] to each individual in the training data,
thus, it can be used to effectively “anonymize” and share large high-
dimensional datasets with any potentially adversarial third party. To
this end, we present a Differentially Private Generative Model (DPGM),
where data is first clustered, using the differentially private kernel k
-means, and then each cluster is given to separate generative neural net-
works which are trained only on their own cluster using differentially
private gradient descent.
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3. We study how generating synthetic samples through generative models
may lead to information leakage, hence, to violating privacy of indi-
viduals contributing their (sensitive) data to train these models. More
specifically, given access to a generative model and an individual data
record, we assess whether an attacker can tell if a specific record was
used to train the model; this is also known as membership inference.
Aiming to perform membership inference on generative ML models, we
use Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [87] models as a method to
learn information about the target generative model, and thus create a
local copy of the target model from which we can launch the attack.
4. We demonstrate that the training data used by participants in collab-
orative learning is vulnerable to a number of inference attacks. First,
we show that an adversarial participant can infer the presence of exact
data points of another participant’s training data (i.e., membership in-
ference). We then propose passive and active property inference attacks.
These allow an adversarial participant in collaborative learning to infer
properties of another participant’s training data that are not true of the
class as a whole, or even independent of the features that characterize
the classes of the joint model.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2
provides background about notions and main tools that are used throughout
the dissertation. Then, Chapter 3 discusses relevant related work in the context
of privacy-preserving data processing. Chapters 4 to 7 contain the technical
contribution of this dissertation. In particular, Chapter 4 covers work done
on privacy-preserving collection of statistics. Then, Chapter 5 presents the
work done on the problem of automating the process of private data release.
In Chapter 6, we tackle the problem of evaluating privacy leakage in generative
ML models. Chapter 7 covers our work on the topic of inference attacks against
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collaborative ML.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation with a discussion on our
contributions, and offers some potential future directions.
1.4 Publications
The material in this dissertation has been submitted or published in con-
ferences and journals, co-authored with several researchers. Specifically, work
in Chapter 4 has been done in collaboration with George Danezis and Emil-
iano De Cristofaro, and published in the proceedings of ISoc NDSS 2016 [147].
Chapter 5 presents the results of joint work with Gergely Acs, Claude Castel-
luccia, and Emiliano De Cristofaro, and published in the proceedings of IEEE
ICDM 2017 and in the IEEE TKDE journal [3]. Chapter 6 is the outcome of
the collaborative work with Jamie Hayes, George Danezis, and Emiliano De
Cristofaro, and currently under submission [94]. Finally, Conghzeng Song, Vi-
taly Shmatikov, and Emiliano De Cristofaro have collaborated on the results
presented in Chapter 7, and currently under submission [148].
1.5 Further Contributions
Besides the research included in this dissertation, we made further con-
tributions with other researchers in the area of private network data process-
ing. The associated research works have been published in the proceedings of
the ACM CODASPY Workshop on SDN-NFV Security 2016 [149] and ACM
SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Middleboxes and Network Function
Virtualization [13], in collaboration with Hassan Jameel Asghar, Mohamed Ali
Kaafar, Cyril Soldani, Emiliano De Cristofaro, and Laurent Mathy.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter reviews concepts and tools in cryptography, succinct data
structures, and machine learning that will be used throughout this dissertation.
2.1 Cryptography
We start by outlining some cryptographic primitives used in the rest of
this dissertation.
2.1.1 Tools
Negligible function. A function f(τ) is negligible in the security parameter
τ if, for every polynomial p, it holds that f(τ)< 1|p(t)| , for large enough t.
Pairwise Independent Hash Functions. Let H be a family of random-
looking hash functions mapping values from a domain [D] to a range [R]. H is
pairwise independent if and only if ∀x 6= y ∈ [D] and ∀a1,a2 ∈ [R]:
Pr
h∈H
[h(x) = a1∧h(y) = a2] = 1
R2
.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) A fully homomorphic encryption
scheme (FHE) is a semantically secure cryptosystem that permits algebraic
manipulations on plaintexts given their respective ciphertexts. More formally,
a FHE scheme involves the following algorithms:
• Key generation: Given the security parameter k, generates public and
private key pair (pk,sk).
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• Encryption: Given plaintext m ∈ {0,1}∗, outputs ciphertext c = E(m)
encrypted under public key pk.
• Decryption: Given a ciphertext c, outputs the plaintext m=D(c) using
the secret key sk.
• Homomorphic Addition (Add): Given two ciphertexts c1 = E(m1), c2 =
E(m2), and the public key pk, produces a ciphertext c = Add(c1, c2) =
c1 + c2 such that D(c) =m1 +m2.
• Homomorphic Multiplication (Mult): Given two ciphertexts c1 =E(m1),
c2 = E(m2), and the public key pk, produces a ciphertext c as c =
Mult(c1, c2) = c1 · c2 such that D(c) =m1 ·m2.
A partial homomorphic encryption scheme only supports either addition or
multiplication.
Homomorphic encryption schemes allow arbitrarily computations to be
performed on encrypted data without decrypting it. For instance, homomor-
phic encryption can be used to process encrypted DNA sequences in the cloud,
or full text searching on encrypted data.
2.1.2 Assumptions
We now present some cryptographic assumptions used in the rest of this
dissertation.
Computational Diffie Hellman Assumption (CDH). Let G be a cyclic
group of order q (|q| = τ , for security parameter τ), with generator g. We
say that the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) problem is hard if, for any
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Aˆ and random x,y drawn from Zq:
Pr
[
Aˆ(G, q,g,gx,gy) = gxy
]
is negligible in the security parameter τ .
Decisional Diffie Hellman Assumption (DDH). Let G be a cyclic group
of order q (|q|= τ), with generator g. We say that the Decisional Diffie Hellman
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(DDH) problem is hard if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Aˆ′
and random x,y,z drawn from Zq:∣∣∣∣Pr[Aˆ′(G, q,g,gx,gy,gz) = 1]−Pr[Aˆ′(G, q,g,gx,gy,gxy) = 1] ∣∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter τ .
These assumptions are based on problems involving discrete logarithms
in cyclic groups. They are commonly used as the basis to prove the security
of many cryptographic protocols, e.g., the ElGamal cryptosystem [78]. The
DDH and CDH assumptions are related to each other. If it were possible
to efficiently compute gxy from (gx,gy), then one could easily distinguish the
two probability distributions in DDH. It is believed that DDH is a stronger
assumption than CDH. DDH and CDH are variants of the more general Diffie
Hellman problem (DHP) in which, given g, gx and gy, the problem is to find
the value of gxy. The main motivation for this problem is that many security
systems rely on one-way functions, i.e., operations that are fast to compute,
but hard to reverse. In cryptography, one-way functions enable encrypting
a message, while making it difficult to decrypt the same message without
knowing some private information. If it were possible to efficiently solve DHP,
then security systems that rely on DHP would be easily broken.
2.1.3 Differential Privacy (DP)
Differential privacy can be motivated by the impossibility result, for a
statistical database, to achieve the privacy goal of preventing disclosure about
any individual against adversaries with arbitrary auxiliary while still providing
any useful information. We can further consider the following example taken
from [69]:
Given a statistical database that provides the average height for pop-
ulation subgroups, and the auxiliary information “Terry Gross is two inches
shorter than the average Lithuanian woman”. An adversary with this auxiliary
information and access to the database is able to recover Terry Gross’ height,
whereas an adversary with only auxiliary information learns much less about
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Terry Gross’ height. However, Terry Gross is not required to be part of the
statistical database in order for this privacy breach to happen. Therefore, dif-
ferential privacy notion aims to minimize the increased risk that an individual
incurs by joining – or leaving – the database [69].
More concretely, differential privacy allows a party to privately release
a dataset: using perturbation mechanisms, a function of an input dataset is
modified, so that any information which can discriminate a record from the
rest of the dataset is bounded [75]. Hence, any information that can be learned
from the database with a record can also be learned from the one without this
record. Consequently, for a record owner, it means that any privacy breach
will not be due to participating in the database.
More formally, ε-differential privacy is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (ε-Differential Privacy [75]). A privacy mechanism A guarantees
ε-differential privacy if for any database X ∈X and X ′ ∈X differing on at most
one record, and for any possible output O ∈Range(A),
e−ε×Pr[A(X ′) =O]≤ Pr[A(X) =O]≤ eε×Pr[A(X ′) =O]
where the probability is taken over the randomness of A.
Intuitively, this guarantees that an adversary, provided with the output of
A, can draw almost the same conclusions about any individual no matter if this
individual is included in the input of A or not [75]. The following definition of
privacy loss can then be formally derived.
Definition 2 (Privacy loss). Let A be a privacy mechanism which assigns
a value O ∈ Range(A) to a dataset X ∈ X. The privacy loss of A with
datasets X ∈ X and X ′ ∈ X at output O ∈ Range(A) is a random variable
P(A,X,X ′,O) = log Pr[A(X)=O]Pr[A(X ′)=O] where the probability is taken on the random-
ness of A.
A relaxation of DP is probabilistic-DP, or (,δ)-DP, where privacy
breaches may occur with very small probability.
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Definition 3 ((,δ)-Differential Privacy [75]). A privacy mechanism A guar-
antees (ε,δ)-differential privacy if for any database X ∈X and X ′ ∈X, differing
on at most one record, and for any possible output S ⊆ Range(A),
Pr[A(X) ∈ S]≤ eε×Pr[A(X ′) ∈ S] + δ
or, equivalently,
Pr
O∼A(X)
[P(A,X,X ′,O)> ε]≤ δ.
This definition guarantees that every output of algorithm A is almost
equally likely (up to ε) on datasets differing in a single record except with
probability at most δ, preferably smaller than 1/|X|. Probabilistic-DP pro-
vides higher utilities in practice than ε-DP (Definition 1) at the cost of weaker
privacy guarantees.
A fundamental concept in DP is the global sensitivity of a function [75].
Definition 4 (Global Lp-sensitivity). For any function f : X→ Rd, the Lp-
sensitivity of f is ∆pf = maxX,X ′ ||f(X)−f(X ′)||p, for all X,X ′ differing in
at most one record, where || · ||p denotes the Lp-norm.
There are a few ways to achieve DP, including the Laplace mechanism and
the Gaussian mechanism. The Laplace mechanism (LPM) consists of adding
noise sampled from the Laplace distribution to the true output of a function.
Definition 5 (Laplace mechanism (LPM) [75]). For any function f :X→Rd,
LPM is defined as
LP(X) = f(X) + [Yˆ1(sˆ), . . . , Yˆd(sˆ)]
where Yˆi(sˆ) are i.i.d Laplace random variables with scale parameter sˆ= ∆1f/ε,
and ∆1f is the L1-sensitivity of f .
It can be proved that the above definition of LPM achieves ε-DP [75].
Instead, the Gaussian Mechanism (GM) consists of adding gaussian noise to
the true output of a function.
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Definition 6 (Gaussian Mechanism (GM) [75]). For any function f :X→Rd,
GM is defined as
G(X) = f(X) + [N1(0,∆2f ·σ), . . . ,Nd(0,∆2f ·σ)]
where Ni(0,∆2f · σ) are i.i.d. normal random variables with zero mean and
variance (∆2f ·σ)2, and ∆2f is the L2-sensitivity of f .
The above definition of GM is (ε,δ)-DP if σ ≥ ∆2f/ε for c2 >
2ln(1.25)/δ [75].
The output of any randomized algorithm remains differentially private if
all inputs are already differentially private. This is often referred to as the
post-processing property of DP. Further, DP maintains composition.
Theorem 1 (Composition property of DP [145]). Let Ai each provide εi-
differential privacy. It holds:
1. A sequence of Ai(X) over the dataset X provides
∑
i εi-differential pri-
vacy.
2. A sequence of Ai(Xi) over a set of disjoint1 datasets Xi provides max(εi)-
differential privacy.
In the case of probabilistic-DP, if each of A1, . . . ,Ak is (ε,δ)-DP, then their
k-fold adaptive composition2 is (kε,kδ)-DP. However, a tighter upper bound
can be derived on the privacy loss of the composite using a generic Chernoff
bound. In particular, it follows from Markov’s inequality that
Pr[P(A,X,X ′,O)≥ ε]≤ E[exp(λP(A,X,X ′,O))]/exp(λε)
for any output O ∈Range(A) and λ > 0. This implies that A is (ε,δ)-DP with
δ= minλ exp(βA(λ)−λε), where βA(λ) = maxX,X ′ logEO∼A(X)[exp(λP(A,X,X ′,O))]
is the log of the moment generating function of the privacy loss.
1Two datasets are disjoint if they have no common records.
2The output of Ai−1 is used as input to Ai, i.e., their executions are not necessarily
independent except their coin tosses.
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This result is referred to as the moments accountant method, which we
formally define as follows:
Theorem 2 (Moments accountant (Abadi et al. [1])). Let βAi(λ) be
max
X,X ′
logEO∼A(X)[exp(λP(A,X,X ′,O))]
and A1:k the k-fold adaptive composition of A1,A2, . . . ,Ak. It holds:
1. βA1:k(λ)≤
∑k
i=1βAi(λ)
2. A1:k is (ε,minλ exp(
∑k
i=1βAi(λ)−λε))-differentially private
where A1,A2, . . . ,Ak use independent coin tosses.
Moreover, if an increase in the δ term is tolerated, the privacy parameter ε
degrades proportionally to
√
k, and the composite is (ε ·O(
√
k log(1/δ′)),kδ+
δ′)-differentially private for all k < 1/ε2 and δ′ > 0. This result is known as
the advanced composition property of differential privacy [71].
Finally, we introduce the following useful Lemma.
Lemma 1. Let G be the Gaussian Mechanism. It holds: βG(λ) = (λ2+λ)/4σ2
Proof. Let f :X→R be a scalar function, f(X) = f(X ′)+∆1f , where ∆1f =
∆2f , and O = f(X) +x, where x∼N(0,σ). Let σˆ = ∆1f ·σ Then, it holds:
P(A,X,X ′,O) = ln
(
Pr[G(X) =O]
Pr[G(X ′) =O]
)
=
= ln
(
Pr[f(X) +N(0, σˆ) =O]
Pr[f(X ′) +N(0, σˆ) =O]
)
= ln
(
exp(−x2/2σˆ2)
exp(−(x+ ∆1f)2/2σˆ2)
)
=
= ln
(
exp(−x2/2σˆ2)
exp(−(x+ ∆1f)2/2σˆ2)
)
=
(
∆1f
σˆ
· x
σˆ
)
+ 12
(
∆1f
σˆ
)2
Since x is drawn fromN(0, σˆ), P(A,X,X ′,O) follows a normal distribution with
mean (∆1f)2/2σˆ2 and standard deviation ∆1f/σˆ, whose moment generating
function is exp
(
(λ2 +λ)(∆1f)2/4σˆ2
)
. The claim follows from the definition of
β and σˆ. For the high-dimensional case when f : X→ Rd (d > 1), the proof is
similar to that of Theorem A.1 in [75].
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Figure 2.1: Update procedure for the Count-Min Sketch.
Given βG(λ), the exact privacy cost ε (or δ) of the k-fold adaptive com-
position of G is computed based on Theorem 2.
2.2 Succinct Data Structures
This section introduces some succinct data structures, namely Count-Min
Sketch and Count Sketch, for efficient query operations. These “sketching”
data structures use minimal space to allow estimating the most frequent items
in a large set of data. They are used in a number of applications, e.g., tracking
Twitter’s most popular tweets, or counting the most visited pages of a website.
Count-Min Sketch [56] is a data structure that can be used to provide
a succinct sublinear-space representation of multi-sets. An interesting prop-
erty is that they enable aggregation of the multi-sets represented by two or
more sketches using a linear operation on the sketches themselves. Prior uses
of Count-Min Sketch include summarizing large amounts of frequency data
for sensing, networking, natural language processing, and database applica-
tions [62].
Definition 7 (Count-Min Sketch). A Count-Min Sketch with parameters (,δ)
is a two-dimensional array (table) X˜, with width w and depth d. Given pa-
rameters (,δ), set d = dlnT/δe and w = de/e, where T is the number of
items to be counted. Each entry of the table is initialized to zero. Then, d
hash functions hj : {0,1}∗→ {0,1}w, are chosen uniformly at random from a
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pairwise-independent family H.
Update Procedure. To update item i by a quantity ci, ci is added to one element
in each row, where the element in row j is determined by the hash function
hj . The update is denoted as (i, ci). More precisely, to update the count for
item i to ci ∈ N, for each row j of X˜, set:
X˜[j,hj(i)]← X˜[j,hj(i)] + ci
This procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Estimation Procedure. To estimate the count cˆi for item i, we take the mini-
mum of the estimates of ci from every row of X˜:
cˆi←min
j
X˜[j,hj(i)]
Error Upper Bound. Given estimate cˆi, it holds:
1. ci ≤ cˆi
2. cˆi ≤ ci+ ∑Tj=1 |cj | with probability 1− δ.
(where ci is the true counter).
Count Sketch [44] is a data structure which provides an estimate for an
item’s frequency in a stream. Count Sketch has the same update procedure as
Count-Min Sketch, but differs in the estimation. Specifically, given the table
X˜ built on the stream, the row estimate of ci (which is the counter of item i)
for row j is computed based on two buckets: X˜[i,hj(i)] and X˜[i,h′j(i)], where
h′j(i) is defined as:
h′j(i) :=

hj(i)−1 if hj(i) mod 2 = 0
hj(i) + 1 if hj(i) mod 2 = 1
The estimate of ci for row j is then(
X˜[j,hj(i)]− X˜[j,h′j(i)]
)
To estimate the count cˆi for item i, we take the sum of the estimates of ci from
every row of X:
cˆi← sum
j
(
X˜[j,hj(i)]− X˜[j,h′j(i)]
)
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Both Count-Min and Count Sketch are linear: the element-wise sum of the
sketches representing two multi-sets yields the sketch of their union.
Note that, although we use (,δ) to denote parameters for both Count(-
Min) Sketch and differential privacy (see Section 2.1.3), it is clear from the
context which one it relates to.
2.3 Machine Learning
In this section, we review machine learning concepts used throughout the
dissertation.
2.3.1 Recommender systems
Recommender systems are used to predict the utility of a certain item
for a particular user, based on their previous ratings as well as those of other
“similar” users [180]. Consider a set of N users and a list of M items: for
each user, a rating can be associated to each item, based, e.g., on the user’s
explicit opinion about the item (e.g., 1 to 5 stars) or by implicitly deriving it
from purchase records or browser history.
Machine learning can be used to predict the expected rating of an unrated
item for a given user. The K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) classification algorithm
finds the top-K nearest neighbors for a given item, so that ratings associated
with these are combined to predict unknown ratings. A variant of KNN is
called ItemKNN [185]. The algorithm is trained using an item-to-item simi-
larity matrix (correlation matrix), where each element expresses the similarity
between a pair of items, and the Cosine Similarity is computed between vectors
of items (e.g., user ratings for each item).
If ratings are binary values (e.g., viewed/not viewed), the Cosine Similar-
ity between items a and b is:
{Sim}ab =
Cab√
Ca ·Cb
(2.1)
where Cab, Ca, and Cb denote, respectively, the number of people who rated
both a and b, a, and b. Given the similarity matrix, we can identify the nearest
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neighbors for each item as the items with the highest correlation values. The
final model then consists of the identity of the nearest neighbors and their
correlation values (or weights) which are used in the prediction process, i.e.,
the items that should be recommended.
Note that, with ItemKNN, given the item-to-item matrix, each user could
independently compare their ratings with the nearest neighbors of each item in
the model. Upon finding a match, the weight is added to the prediction score
for that item. The items are then ranked by their prediction scores and the
top K are taken as recommendations. Predicting user ratings or interests in
general has many applications especially in e-commerce systems (e.g. Amazon
Web store).
2.3.2 Time-series data prediction
Time-series data prediction can be performed, among others, using Ex-
ponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) models [192]. EWMA can pre-
dict future values based on past values weighted with exponentially decreasing
weights toward older values. Given a signal over time r(t), we indicate with
r˜(t+ 1) the predicted value of r(t+ 1) given the past observations, r(t′), at
time t′ ≤ t. Predicted signal r˜(t+ 1) is estimated as:
r˜(t+ 1) =
t∑
t′=1
α(1−α)t−t′r(t′)
where α ∈ (0,1) is the smoothing coefficient, and t′ = 1, . . . , t indicates the
training window, i.e., 1 corresponds to the oldest observation while t is the
most recent one.
2.3.3 Kernel k-means with random features
Clustering is the task of grouping a set of objects in such a way that objects
in the same group, or cluster, are more similar to each other than to those
in other groups. k-means is one of the most popular clustering algorithms.
Given a set of samples X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, k-means linearly separates X
into k clusters C1,C2, . . . ,Ck (k ≤ N) so that it aims to minimize the error
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∑k
i=1
∑
x∈Ci ||x− ci||22, where ci =
∑
x∈Ci x/|Ci| is the centroid of cluster Ci.
Although this problem is NP-hard, there are efficient heuristic algorithms (such
as Lloyd’s algorithm) which iteratively refines clustering and converge quickly
to a local optimum. However, k-means can provide very inaccurate clustering
of linearly non-separable data, which are very common in practice.
To overcome this shortcoming, kernel k-means [187] first maps samples
from input space to a higher dimensional feature space through a non-linear
transformation Φ, then applies standard k-means on {Φ(x1),Φ(x2), . . . ,Φ(xN )}.
Hence, kernel k-means provides linear separators of clusters in feature space
which correspond to non-linear separators in input space. Kernel k-means
iteratively computes ||Φ(x)− c′i||22 for each sample x to decide which cluster a
sample belongs to, where c′i =
∑
x∈Ci Φ(x)/|Ci|. To do so, the inner product
〈Φ(x),Φ(y)〉 must be known for all x,y ∈ X. Since Φ(·) is hard to explicitly
compute due to its large, often infinite dimension, the kernel trick is applied;
〈Φ(x),Φ(y)〉 = κ(x,y), where κ is an easily computable kernel function. Still,
this approach requires evaluating κ for all pairs of samples and store the
results, which is not scalable for large datasets.
To make kernel k-means scalable, the kernel function can be approxi-
mated with low-dimensional explicit feature maps. In particular, the samples
are first mapped to a low-dimensional Euclidean inner product space using an
explicit random feature map z : Rm→ Rd so that 〈Φ(x),Φ(y)〉 ≈ 〈z(x), z(y)〉.
Then, standard k-means is applied on the low-dimensional mapped samples
{z(x1), z(x2), . . . , z(xN )} in Rd to approximate the result of the kernel k-means
with implicit feature map Φ and kernel κ. Although the approximation error
decreases as d increases, quite accurate approximations can be obtained even
for d < m. Explicit nonlinear feature maps have already been proposed for
shift-invariant kernels (e.g., generalized RBF kernels) [207] as well as polyno-
mial kernels [170] among others.
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2.3.4 Neural networks
In recent years, a family of machine learning models known as deep neural
networks (or deep learning) has become very popular for many machine learn-
ing tasks, especially related to computer vision and image recognition [186,
123]. Deep learning models are made of layers of non-linear mappings from
input to intermediate hidden states and, finally, to output. Each connection
between layers has a floating-point weight matrix as parameters. These weights
are updated during training. The topology of the connections between layers
is task-dependent and important for the ultimate accuracy of the model. To
find the optimal set of parameters that fits the training data, the training al-
gorithm optimizes the objective (loss) function L, which penalizes the model
when it outputs a wrong label on a data point.
There are many methods to optimize the objective function. Stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) and its variants (e.g., Adam optimizer [116]) are com-
monly used to train artificial neural networks. SGD is an iterative method
where at each step the optimizer receives a small batch of the training data
and updates the model parameters θ according to the direction of the negative
gradient of the objective function with respect to θ and scaled by the learn-
ing rate η ∈ R+. Training finishes when the model has converged to a local
minimum, where the gradient is close to zero.
Machine learning models include discriminative and generative ones.
Given a supervised learning task, and given the features of a data-point x ∈X
and the corresponding label y ∈ Y , discriminative models attempt to predict
y on future x by learning a discriminative function f from (x,y); the function
takes in input x and outputs the most likely label y. Discriminative models
are not able to “explain” how the data-points might have been generated. By
contrast, generative models describe how data is generated by learning the
joint probability distribution of p(X,Y ), which gives a score to the configu-
ration determined together by pairs (x,y). Generative models based on deep
neural networks, such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [87] and
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Variational Auto-encoders (VAE) [115] are considered as the state-of-the-art
for producing samples of realistic images [111].
We now briefly describe three generative neural networks models used in
this dissertation in Chapters 5 and 6.
Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM). A Restricted Boltzmann Ma-
chine (RBM) is a bipartite undirected graphical model composed of m visible
and n invisible (or latent) binary random variables denoted by, respectively,
v = (v1,v2, . . . ,vm) and h = (h1,h2, . . . ,hn). Visible variables represent the at-
tributes of x and their values are composed of records from X. Hidden vari-
ables capture the dependencies between different visible variables. As the
above model is a Markov random field with strictly positive joint probability
distribution p˜ over the model variables, p˜ can be represented as a Boltzmann
distribution defined as:
p˜(v,h) = 1
Z
e−E(v,h) (2.2)
where Z =∑v,h e−E(v,h) is the partition function, E(v,h) the energy function,
i.e., E(v,h) =−∑ni=1∑mj=1 ·Wij ·hi ·vj−∑mj=1 bjvj−∑ni=1 cihi, with Wij being
real valued weights describing the inter-dependency between vj and hi, and
bj , ci real valued bias terms associated with the jth visible and ith hidden
units, respectively. Using matrix notation, E(v,h) = −v ·W ·h− b · v− c ·h,
where W = {Wi,j}, c = {ci}, and b = {bj}. The goal is to approximate the
true data generating distribution with the Boltzmann distribution p˜, given in
Eq. (2.2). To this end, we train the RBM model on dataset X to compute
parameters (W,b,c).
There are a few algorithms to train RBMs, that approximate or relate to
gradient descent on the log-loss of the data. If θ = (W,b,c), then we want to
minimize the loss function L(X;θ) = −∏x∈X p˜(x|θ) given dataset X, where
x ∈ {0,1}m is a record from X and p˜ is the Boltzmann distribution defined
in Eq. (2.2). The model parameters are updated until the log-loss converges
using Persistent Contrastive Divergence [199].
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Variational Autoencoder (VAE). A variational autoencoder [115] consists
of two neural networks (an encoder and a decoder), and a loss function. The
encoder compresses data into a latent space z while the decoder reconstructs
the data given the hidden representation. Let x be a random vector of m
observed variables, which are either discrete or continuous. Let z be a random
vector of n latent continuous variables. The probability distribution between
x and z assumes the form pθ(x,z) = pθ(z)pθ(x | z), where θ indicates that p
is parametrized by θ. Also, let qφ(z | x) be a recognition model whose goal
is to approximate the true and intractable posterior distribution pθ(z | x).
We can then define a lower-bound on the log-loss of x as follows: L(x;θ) =
DKL(qφ(z | x) || pθ(z))−Eqφ(z|x)[logpθ(x | z)]. The first term pushes qφ(z | x)
to be similar to pθ(z) ensuring that, while training, VAE learns a decoder that,
at generation time, will be able to invert samples from the prior distribution
such they look just like the training data. The second term can be seen as a
form of reconstruction cost, and needs to be approximated by sampling from
qφ(z | x).
In VAEs, we propagate the gradient signal through the sampling process
and through qφ(z | x) using the reparametrization trick. This is done by making
z be a deterministic function of φ and some noise ξ, i.e., z = f(φ,ξ). For
instance, sampling from a normal distribution can be done like z = µ+ σξ,
where ξ ∼ N(0, I). The reparametrization trick can be viewed as an efficient
way of adapting qφ(z | x) to help improve the reconstruction. We train the
variational autoencoder using stochastic gradient descent to optimize the loss
with respect to the parameters of the encoder and decoder θ and φ.
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN). GANs [87] are neural networks
trained in an adversarial manner to generate data mimicking some distribution.
The main intuition is to have two competing neural network models. One
model, the generator, takes noise as input and generates samples. The other
model, the discriminator, receives samples from both the generator and the
training data, and has to be able to distinguish between the two sources.
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Figure 2.2: Generative Adversarial Network (GAN).
The two networks play a continuous game where the generator is learning to
produce more and more realistic samples, and the discriminator is learning
to get better and better at distinguishing generated data from real data, as
depicted in Figure 2.2.
More formally, to learn the generator’s output distribution over data-
points x, we define a prior on input noise variables pz(z), then represent a
mapping to data space as G(z;θg), where G is a generative deep neural network
with parameters θg. We also define a discriminator D(x;θd) that outputs
D(x) ∈ [0,1], representing the probability that x was taken from the training
set rather than from the generator G. D is trained to maximize the probability
of assigning the correct label to both real training examples and fake samples
from G. We simultaneously train G to minimize log(1−D(G(z))). The final
optimization problem solved by the two networks D and G follows a two-player
minimax game as:
min
G
max
D
Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)] +Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
First, gradients of D are computed to discriminate fake samples from training
data, thenG is updated to generate samples that are more likely to be classified
as data. After several steps of training, if G and D have enough capacity and
a Nash equilibrium is achieved, they will reach a point at which both cannot
improve [87].
Larsen et al. [122] combine VAEs and GANs into an unsupervised gener-
ative model that simultaneously learns to encode and generate new samples,
which contain more details, sampled from the training data-points.
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Figure 2.3: Collaborative Learning.
Recently, Lucic et al. [135] show that, despite a large number of proposed
changes to the original GAN model [141, 25, 118, 12, 90], it is still difficult to
assess if one performs better than another. They also show that the original
GAN performs equally well against other state-of-the-art GANs, concluding
that any improvements are due to computational budgets and hyper-parameter
tuning, rather than scientific breakthroughs.
2.3.5 Collaborative learning
Training a deep neural network on a large dataset can take long time.
A common approach to scale deep learning [51, 63] is to partition the train-
ing dataset, concurrently train separate models on each subset, and exchange
parameters via a parameter server which stores the global set of all model
parameters (see Figure 2.3). During training, each local model pulls the pa-
rameters from this server, calculates the updates based on its current batch
of training data, then pushes these updates back to the server, which updates
the global parameters.
Collaborative learning may involve participants who want to hide their
training data from each other. We review two architectures for privacy-
preserving collaborative learning based on, respectively, [190] and [143].
Parameter server with synchronized gradient updates. We con-
sider collaborative learning with synchronized gradient updates, as proposed
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Algorithm 1: Parameter server with synchronized SGD
1 Server executes:
2 Initialize θ0
3 for t= 1 to T do
4 for each client k do
5 gkt ←ClientUpdate(θt−1)
6 θt← θt−1−η∑k gkt . synchronized gradient updates
7
8 ClientUpdate(θ):
9 Select a batch B from client’s data
10 return local gradients ∇L(B;θ)
in [190]: see Algorithm 1. In each iteration of training, the participants down-
load the global model from the parameter server. Each participant then locally
computes gradient updates based on one batch of his training data and sends
the updates to the server. The server waits for the gradient updates from all
participants and then applies the aggregated updates to the global model using
stochastic gradient descent (SGD).
Federated learning with model averaging. We also consider the federated
learning framework proposed in [143]: see Algorithm 2. The parameter C
controls the fraction of the K participants that update the model in round t.
In each round, the k-th participant locally takes several steps of SGD on
the current model using his entire local training dataset of size nk (i.e., the
globally visible updates are based not on batches but on participants’ entire
datasets). In the algorithm description, n corresponds to the total size of the
training data, i.e., the sum of all nk. Each participant submits the resulting
model to the server, which computes a weighted average of the models. The
server evaluates the resulting joint model on a held-out dataset and stops
training when performance stops improving.
The convergence rate of both collaborative learning approaches heavily
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Algorithm 2: Federated learning with model averaging
1 Server executes:
2 Initialize θ0
3 m←max(C ·K,1)
4 for t= 1 to T do
5 St← (random set of m clients)
6 for each client k ∈ St do
7 θkt ←ClientUpdate(θt−1)
8 θt←∑k nkn θkt . averaging local models
9
10 ClientUpdate(θ):
11 for each local iteration do
12 for each batch B in client’s split do
13 θ← θ−η∇L(B;θ)
14 return local model θ
depends on the specific learning task and the hyper-parameters (e.g., number
of participants, batch size, etc.).
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Chapter 3
Related Work
In this chapter, we discuss prior work on privacy-friendly data processing,
focusing on private statistics and privacy in machine learning.
3.1 Private Statistics
This section reviews prior work on privacy-preserving techniques applied
to data aggregation, as well as efficient data structures for succinct represen-
tation.
3.1.1 Privacy-preserving aggregation
Private aggregation schemes like ANONIZE [97] and PrivStats [173] rely
on anonymizing networks, such as Tor [65], to protect privacy against net-
work adversaries. Unfortunately, Tor-based schemes are vulnerable to traffic-
analysis attacks [155]. Dining Cryptographers anonymizing networks, or DC-
nets, are instead used in [58, 60, 61]. However, DC-nets require expensive
operations at the servers side.
Other schemes [120, 39, 107, 59] provide strong privacy guarantees via
secret-sharing based methods. In particular, Kursawe et al. [120] introduce
a few cryptographic constructions to aggregate energy consumptions in the
context of smart metering, relying on Diffie-Hellman, bilinear maps, and a
“low overhead” protocol where meters’ encryption keys sum up to zero. Our
schemes for the private recommender system and location prediction – pre-
sented in Chapter 4 – rely on a protocol inspired by [120]’s “low overhead”
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protocol, but perform private aggregation using succinct data representation
rather than the raw inputs. Using Count-Min Sketch [56], we reduce com-
putation and communication overhead incurred by each user from linear to
logarithmic in the size of the input. We also show how to recover from node
failures, i.e., in our schemes, the aggregator can still retrieve the statistics (and
train models) even when a subset of users go oﬄine or fail to report data.
Then, Castelluccia et al. [39] propose a new homomorphic encryption to
allow intermediate wireless sensor nodes to aggregate encrypted data gathered
from other nodes. Jawurek et al. [107] propose a privacy-friendly aggregation
scheme with robustness against missing user inputs, by including additional
authorities that facilitate the protocol but do not learn any secrets or inputs.
However, at least one of the authorities has to be honest, i.e., if all collude, the
protocol does not provide any privacy guarantee. Corrigan-Gibbs et al. [59]
propose Prio, in which users distribute their trust across non-colluding servers.
Their proposal relies on secret-shared non-interactive proofs (SNIPs) to allow
user inputs to be validated.
A combination of homomorphic encryption and differential privacy has
been explored by Chen et al. [48], allowing third parties to gather web analyt-
ics. Users encrypt their data using the data aggregator public key and send
them to a proxy, who adds noise to the cipher-texts and forwards the results
to the data aggregator. The latter computes the aggregates after decrypting
each individual contribution. However, this scheme introduces a large overhead
both in terms of communication (one KB per single bit of user data) and com-
putation (one public key operation per single bit). In the same line of work,
Akkus et al. [7] propose a system providing differential privacy guarantees.
Their scheme scales better than [48] as it requires users to encrypt fewer bits
per query, but still relies on expensive public-key crypto operations. In [47],
the authors propose a scheme based on a similar trust model as [48] but with
an enhanced scalability by using simple exclusive-or (XOR) operations rather
than public key operations. However, their proposal still relies on honest-but-
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curious servers that do not collude with each other. Shi et al. [188] combine
private aggregation with differential privacy supporting the aggregation of en-
crypted perturbed readings reported by the meters. Individual amounts of
random noise cancel each other out during aggregation, except for a specific
amount that guarantees computational differential privacy. Their protocol is
also so that encryption keys sum up to zero, but requires solving a discrete
logarithm and the presence of a trusted dealer. Chan et al. [42] provides
fault tolerance by extending [188]’s protocol, however, with a poly-logarithmic
penalty.
Erlingsson et al. [80] introduce RAPPOR, which enables the collection of
browser statistics on values and strings provided by a large number of clients
(e.g. homepage settings, running processes, etc.), including categories, frequen-
cies, and histograms. RAPPOR supports privacy-preserving data-collection
mechanism by relying on randomized responses via input perturbation, aim-
ing to guarantee local differential privacy for individual reports. Then, Fanti
et al. [82] extend RAPPOR by providing a decoding mechanism that enables
the estimation of values which are not part of the initial dictionary. However,
RAPPOR requires millions of users in order to obtain approximate answers to
queries.
In a different line of work, Burkhart et al. [35] rely on optimized secure
multiparty computation (MPC) to allow secure summation tasks, although
incurring high bandwidth and computational costs.
Finally, other proposals [4, 106, 77, 30] leverage pairwise additive masking
with stream ciphers. Among these works, Elahi et al. [77] present a protocol for
privately computing mean statistics on Tor traffic. They introduce two ad-hoc
protocols relying, respectively, on secret sharing and distributed decryption.
By contrast, our application for gathering private statistics for Tor (presented
in Section 4.3) enables the computation of the median statistics on traffic
generated by Tor hidden services – which constituted an open problem [88] –
by relying on additively homomorphic encryption and differential privacy.
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3.1.2 Privacy and succinct data representation
Closely related to our contributions presented in Chapter 4 is prior work
on privacy-preserving data structures. Bianchi et al [26] formally investigate
the privacy guarantees provided by Bloom filters [28]. In particular, they
demonstrate that, depending on the Bloom filter parameters, the same level
of plausible deniability protection cannot be guaranteed for all elements in
the filter. Mir et al. [151] present an efficient scheme guaranteeing differential
privacy of data analyses (even when the internal memory of the algorithm
may be compromised), using a data structure similar to the Count-Min Sketch
to estimate heavy hitters. Work in [100, 41] address the problem of finding
heavy hitters’ histograms while preserving privacy using a differentially private
protocol. Then, [18] addresses the case where individual users randomize their
own data and then send differentially private reports to an untrusted server
handling reports aggregation.
Other proposals combine differential privacy and Count-Min Sketch to
obtain aggregate information about vehicle traffic [153] as well as summaries
of sparse databases [57]. Ashok et al. [14] present a privacy-preserving proto-
col for computing the set-union cardinality among several parties using Bloom
filters. However, their proposal is insecure, as shown by [200], who also in-
troduces a novel Bloom filter based protocol for set-union and set-intersection
cardinality. Lin et al. [130] improve the performance of [158]’s protocol for
private proximity testing by reducing the problem to simple equality testing
(instead of the more expensive private-preserving threshold set intersection).
They use a concise representation of “location tags”, by generating, via shin-
gling, concise sketches—in their context, short strings representing the set of
broadcast messages received. Recently, Alaggan et al. [9] propose a sanitiza-
tion mechanism for approximate distinct counting for Wi-Fi analytics based
on perturbed Bloom filters. Their work rely on a variant of differential pri-
vacy called Pan-Privacy [73] to expand the range of applications enabled by
privacy-preserving Bloom filters [8, 205].
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To the best of our knowledge, our work, presented in Chapter 4, is the first
to show how to combine Count-Min Sketch and privacy-friendly data aggre-
gation to build a private estimated model used for recommendations as well
as prediction of future locations. Also, our scheme for Tor hidden services
statistics, which combines Count Sketch, additively homomorphic threshold
decryption, and differential privacy, is the first to tackle the problem of effi-
ciently computing the median statistics.
3.2 Privacy in Machine Learning
Over the past few years, privacy in machine learning and data mining
has received a lot of attention from the research community. In this section,
we review prior work on privacy-preserving mechanisms applied to machine
learning along with inference attacks against machine learning.
3.2.1 Learning with privacy
Privacy-enhancing tools based on secure multi-party computation (MPC)
and homomorphic encryption have been proposed to securely train supervised
machine learning models, such as matrix factorization [160], linear classi-
fiers [31, 89], decision trees [32, 131], linear regressors [68], and neural net-
works [30, 67, 133, 152].
Among these works, MPC has been used to build privacy-preserving neu-
ral networks in a distributed fashion. For instance, SecureML [152] starts with
the data owners (clients) distributing their private training inputs among two
non-colluding servers during the setup phase; the two servers then use MPC
to train a global model on the clients’ encrypted joint data. Then, Bonawitz
et al. [30] use secure multi-party aggregation techniques, tailored for feder-
ated learning, to let participants encrypt their updates so that the central
parameter server only recovers the sum of the updates. In Chapter 7, we show
that inference attacks can be successful even if the adversary only observes
aggregated updates.
Due to its generality, differential privacy has served as a building block
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in several recent efforts at the intersection of privacy and deep learning [1,
171, 172, 190]. In general, the majority of privacy-preserving learning schemes
focus on convex optimization problems [19, 46, 211], whereas, training neural
networks typically requires to optimize non-convex objective functions – as
with Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) [38] and Variational Autoencoder
(VAE) [115] – which is usually done through the application of Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) with poor theoretical guarantees. For instance, Wu
et al. [211] propose a private technique which runs SGD for convex cases for a
constant number of iterations and only adds noise to the final output.
In the non-convex setting, Shokri and Shmatikov [190] support distributed
training of deep learning networks in a privacy-preserving way. Specifically,
their system relies on the input of independent entities which aim to collabora-
tively build a machine learning model without sharing their training data. To
this end, they selectively share subsets of noisy model parameters during train-
ing. However, their approach incurs high levels of privacy loss per entity, i.e.,
the ε parameter is in the order of thousands, using the strong composition the-
orem [71]. Then, Abadi et al. [1] introduce an algorithm for non-convex deep
learning classifiers with strong differential privacy guarantees. They present
a privacy accounting method, called the moments accountant, which guar-
antees a tighter bound of the privacy loss for the composition of multiple
gaussian mechanisms when compared to the strong composition theorem [71].
In Chapter 5, we rely on the moments accountant to measure privacy loss,
but we train generative models and with an improved gradient descent, where
the noise is carefully adjusted and injected in each iteration. Other schemes
only focus on learning private autoencoders [171] and convolutional deep be-
lief networks [172] by perturbing their loss functions through the functional
mechanism [224].
In the distributed setting, recent proposals [144, 85] tackle the problem
of training deep learning models with user-level differential privacy guarantees
for the tasks of training language models [144] and digits classification [85].
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As opposed to record-level differential privacy (as done in [1]), in user-level
differential privacy the aim is to hide whether a client participated during
decentralized training. However, these approaches require a large number of
users (in the order of thousands) for the training to converge and achieve an
acceptable trade-off between privacy and model performance.
In [168], Pathak et al. present a differentially private global classifier
hosted by a trusted third-party and based on locally trained classifiers held by
separate, mutually distrusting parties. Hamm et al. [91] use knowledge transfer
to combine a collection of models trained on individual devices into a single
model, with differential privacy guarantees. Transfer learning approaches, in
combination with improved differentially private techniques tailored for deep
learning [1], have also been applied in [167, 166]. These privately train a
“student” model by transferring the knowledge of an ensemble of “teachers”
trained on the disjoint subsets of training data, through noisy aggregation.
Finally, few proposals attempt to learn flexible representations of per-
sonal users’ data via adversarial machine learning [109, 139, 76], transfer
learning [163] or Denoising Autoencoders [140], aiming to provide only desired
features to a third-party analytics service, while protecting against undesired
inference of sensitive tasks (e.g., person identification). However, it is not
clear whether these proposals can be applied to the federated training of deep
learning networks.
3.2.2 Private data release
In the private data release problem, a database owner wishes to release
a “sanitized” version of a database, which can be used for data-mining and
preserves the privacy of the individuals in the database at the same time.
To this end, several techniques for data anonymization have been proposed
over the years, including k-anonymity [196] and the related mechanisms of l-
diversity [137] and t-closeness [128]. These paradigms aim to protect data by
generalizing and suppressing certain identifying attributes, but they cannot
be applied to high-dimensional datasets [6, 34]. In fact, Brickell et al. [34]
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show that modest privacy gains require almost complete destruction of the
data-mining utility.
Therefore, rather than pursuing input sanitization, prior work has pro-
posed techniques to produce plausible synthetic records with strong privacy
guarantees, e.g., focusing on differentially private release of data [2, 43, 49,
105, 138, 142, 210, 93]. Alas, these can often support only the release of suc-
cinct data representations, such as histograms or contingency tables. In par-
ticular, Hardt et al. [93] introduce MWEM, a differentially private algorithm
producing synthetic datasets supporting any set of linear queries. MWEM re-
lies on the Exponential Mechanism (EM [146]) to select only the queries most
informative to the Multiplicative Weights algorithm [92], which iteratively im-
proves an approximate version of the dataset to better resemble the real one.
Instead, several mechanisms protect privacy by adding noise directly to a gen-
erative model [33, 127, 132, 225]. In Chapter 5, we follow this approach, while,
in a first-of-its-kind attempt, focusing on building private generative machine
learning models based on neural networks.
Other approaches [27, 179, 178] generate data records first, and then at-
tempt to test their privacy guarantees, i.e., decoupling the generative model
from the privacy mechanism. For instance, Bindschaedler et al. [27] rely on
graphical probabilistic models to learn a transformation between real data
points (seeds) into synthetic ones. Then, a privacy test filters synthetic data
points using a plausible deniability criterion. By contrast, in Chapter 5, we
attempt to achieve privacy during the training of the model, thus avoiding
eventual high sample rejection rates due to privacy tests.
Recent proposals [21, 202] focus on training differentially private Gener-
ative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [87]. Beaulieu et al. [21] apply the noisy
gradient descent from [1] to train the discriminator of a GAN under differential
privacy. The resulting model is then used to generate synthetic subjects based
on the population of clinical trial data. Similarly, Triastcyn et al. [202] per-
turb the output of the discriminator of a GAN by clipping the L2 norm of the
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second-to-last layer of the network and then adding Gaussian noise. However,
their approach only provides approximate bounds on the expected privacy
loss for the generated dataset, thus failing to achieve strict differential privacy
guarantees. Moreover, differentially private GANs proposals exacerbate the
existing weaknesses of GANs, such as mode collapse and training instability,
due to the injection of additional noise into the model during training.
Privacy-aware adversarial training of neural networks, seeking to attain
an information-theoretically optimal tradeoff between minimizing distortion
of useful data and hiding sensitive information, has also been applied in [101,
203]. However, unlike differential privacy, this approach requires knowledge of
the underlying statistical distribution of the data.
Prior work has also attempted to combine clustering with deep learning,
albeit with no privacy guarantees. Some proposals [227, 103, 216] jointly
train an autoencoder neural network with a clustering algorithm, and use the
internal representation provided by the autoencoder, i.e., the encoder output,
as features for clustering. A different training method is followed in [126, 66,
214], where autoencoders are initially pretrained, and then fine tuned using
the cluster assignment loss, while [99, 220] combine clustering with standard
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for representation learning of images.
Finally, differentially private clustering with k-means has been addressed
in prior work [195], however, aiming to find linearly separable clusters and
add noise which is proportional to the data dimension or the L1-norm of
data records. Kernel k-means clustering with random Fourier features (RFF)
has been considered in [53], albeit without any privacy guarantee. Our work
in Chapter 5 somewhat combines [53] and [29], and applies DP k-means on
Fourier features to ultimately achieve better accuracy than [29].
3.2.3 Membership inference attacks
Membership inference is the problem of deciding, given a data point,
whether or not it was included in the training dataset. Prior work demon-
strated membership inference from aggregate statistics, e.g., in the context
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of genomic studies [98, 17], location time-series [174], or noisy statistics in
general [74].
Membership inference against black-box machine learning models has
been studied in [189, 222, 134]. Shokri et al. [189] demonstrate membership
inference against black-box supervised models. Their approach exploits dif-
ferences in the model’s response to inputs that were or were not seen during
training. For each class of the targeted black-box model, they train a shadow
model, with the same machine learning technique. By contrast, our member-
ship attacks, presented in Chapter 6, target generative models and rely on
GANs to provide a general framework for measuring the information leakage.
Membership inference on generative models is much more challenging than on
discriminative models: in the former, the attacker cannot exploit confidence
values on inputs belonging to the same classes, and therefore it is more diffi-
cult to detect overfitting and mount the attack. In fact, detecting overfitting in
generative models is regarded as one of the most important research problems
in machine learning [212].
Then, Long et al. [134] and Yeom et al. [222] study the relationship be-
tween overfitting and information leakage. In particular, Yeom et al. [222]
assume that the adversary knows the distribution from which the training set
was drawn and its size, and that the adversary colludes with the training algo-
rithm. Their attacks are close in performance to Shokri et al.’s [189], and show
that, besides overfitting, the influence of target attributes on model’s outputs
also correlates with successful attacks.
Truex et al. [204] extend [189] to a more general setting and show how
membership inference attacks are data-driven and largely transferable. They
also show that an adversary who participates in collaborative learning, with
access to individual model updates from all other honest participants, can
boost membership inference performance compared to a centralized model.
To the best of our knowledge, membership inference in generative models
has not been studied before.
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3.2.4 Other attacks on machine learning models
Attacks targeting distributed recommender systems [36] have focused on
inferring which inputs cause output changes by looking at model’s temporal
patterns.
Model inversion techniques infer class features and/or construct class rep-
resentatives if the adversary has black-box [83, 84] or white-box [15] access to
a classifier model.
In particular, Fredrikson et al. [84] show how an attacker can rely on out-
puts from a classifier to infer sensitive features used as inputs to the model
itself: given the model and some demographic information about a patient
whose records are used for training, an attacker might predict sensitive at-
tributes of the patient.
These techniques are sometimes described as violating privacy of the train-
ing data, even though the inferred features characterize an entire class and not
specifically the training data, except in the cases of pathological overfitting
where the training sample constitutes the entire membership of the class.
Then, Hitaj et al. [96] show that a participant in collaborative deep learn-
ing can use GANs to construct class representatives. This technique has been
evaluated only on models where all members of the same class are visually
similar (handwritten digits and faces). Thus, there is no evidence that it pro-
duces actual training images or can distinguish a training image and another
image from the same class. In fact, class members produced by model inversion
and GANs are similar to the training inputs only if all members of the class
are similar, as is the case for MNIST (the dataset of handwritten digit used
in [96]) and facial recognition. This does not violate privacy of the training
data; it simply shows that machine learning works as it should. A trained
classifier reveals the input features characteristic of each class, thus enabling
the adversary to sample from the class population. For instance, Figure 3.1
shows GAN-constructed images for the gender classification task on the LFW
dataset, which is one of our experiments (see Section 7.2). These images show
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Figure 3.1: Samples from a GAN attack on a gender classification model where
the class is “female”.
a generic female face, but there is no way to tell from them whether an image
of a specific female was used in training or not.
Therefore, the informal property violated by the attacks of [83, 84, 15, 96]
is: “a classifier should prevent users from generating an input that belongs to
a particular class or even learning what such an input looks like”. However, it
is not clear why this property is desirable or whether it is achievable.
Aono et al. [11] show that, in the collaborative deep learning protocol
of [190], an honest-but-curious server can partially recover participants’ data
points from the shared gradient updates in a greatly simplified setting where
the batch consists of a single data point. Furthermore, the technique is evalu-
ated only on MNIST where, as mentioned above, all class members are visually
similar. Again, it is not clear if the technique can distinguish a training image
and another image from the same MNIST class.
Song et al. [193] engineer a machine learning model that memorizes the
training data, which can then be extracted with black-box access to the model,
without affecting the accuracy of the model on its primary task. Carlini et
al. [37] show that deep learning-based generative sequence models trained on
text data can unintentionally memorize specific training inputs, which can then
be extracted with black-box access. Even though the models are trained on
text, extraction is demonstrated only for sequences of digits (artificially intro-
duced into the text), which are not affected by the relative word frequencies
in the language model.
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Finally, other attacks focus on model stealing [201, 209, 162]. A stolen
model can reveal training data points that are explicitly incorporated or oth-
erwise memorized in the model.
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Chapter 4
Efficient Privacy-Preserving
Computation of Statistics
As discussed in Section 3.1, prior work has proposed a few cryptographic
tools for privacy-enhanced computation that could be used for private collec-
tion of statistics. For instance, by relying on homomorphic encryption and/or
secret sharing, an untrusted aggregator can receive encrypted readings from
users and only decrypt their sum [120, 77, 188]. However, these require users
to perform a number of cryptographic operations, and transmit a number of ci-
phertexts, linear in the size of their inputs, which makes it impractical for some
scenarios in which inputs to be aggregated are quite large. This motivates the
need for efficient and scalable techniques allowing providers to privately gather
statistics, and to use such statistics to train models and facilitate predictions.
In this chapter, we present efficient mechanisms that combine traditional
linear aggregation with succinct data structures, for efficiency, and, when
needed, differential privacy to limit information leakage. Specifically, we show
how to use our techniques to instantiate real-world privacy-friendly systems,
supporting recommendations for media streaming services, prediction of user
locations, and computation of median statistics for Tor hidden services.
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4.1 Private Recommender Systems For Stream-
ing Services
Media streaming services are becoming increasingly popular as numer-
ous dedicated providers (e.g., Netflix, Amazon, Hulu) as well as “traditional”
broadcasting services (e.g., BBC, CNN, Al-Jazeera) offer digital access to
TV shows, movies, documentaries, and news. One of the providers’ goals
is often continuous user engagement, thus, new content should periodically
be suggested to users based on their interests. These recommendations are
usually provided by means of recommender systems [95, 5] like ItemKNN
(cf. Section 2.3.1), which typically require the full availability of users’ rat-
ings, whereas, we focus on a model where a provider like the BBC provides
recommendations to its users, e.g., on iPlayer, without tracking their prefer-
ences and viewings.
4.1.1 Overview
We present a novel privacy-friendly recommender system where the
ItemKNN algorithm is trained using only aggregate statistics. Aiming to build
a global matrix of co-views (i.e., pairs of programs watched by the same user)
in a privacy-preserving way, we rely on (i) private data aggregation based
on secret sharing (inspired by the “low overhead protocol” in [120]), and (ii)
the Count-Min Sketch (see Section 2.2) data structure to reduce the com-
putation/communication overhead, trading off an upper-bounded error with
increased efficiency.
Recommendations are derived, based on ItemKNN, as follows: users’
interests are modeled as a (symmetric) item-to-item matrix I = {0,1}M×M ,
where Iab is set to 1 if the user has watched both programs a and b and to 0
otherwise. Iaa is set to 1 if the user has watched the program a. The Cosine
Similarity {Sim}ab between programs a and b can be computed from item-
to-item matrices (see Equation 2.1 in Chapter 2). The Cosine Similarity is
then used by each user to derive personalized recommendations as described
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in Section 2.3.1.
System model. Our system involves a tally (e.g., the BBC) and a set of
users, and no other trusted/semi-trusted authority:
1. Users, possibly organized in groups, compute their (secret) blinding fac-
tors, based on the public keys of the other users, in such a way that
they all sum up to zero. They encrypt their local Count-Min Sketch
entries (representing their co-view matrix) using these blinding factors,
and send the resulting ciphertexts to the tally.
2. The tally receives the encrypted Count-Min Sketch from each user,
aggregates the encrypted counts, and decrypts the aggregates. These
are broadcast back to the users, who use them to recover an estimate
of the global similarity matrix and derive personalized ItemKNN-based
recommendations.
Notation. In the rest of this section, we denote with N the number of users,
with M the total number of items, and with L = d ·w the number of items
in a Count-Min Sketch table X˜. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q
for which the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) is hard and g be
the generator of the same group. H : {0,1}∗ → Zq denotes a cryptographic
hash function mapping strings of arbitrary length to integers in Zq. Finally,
“||” denotes the concatenation operator and a ∈r A means that a is sampled
at random from A. We assume the system runs on input public parameters
G,g,q, where g generates a group of order q in G.
4.1.2 Protocol
We now present the details of our proposed protocol. Its cryptographic
layer is also summarized in Figure 4.1.
Setup. Each user Ui (i ∈ [1,N ]) generates a private key xi ∈r G, and com-
putes and publishes public key yi = gxi mod q. Public keys of all users are
distributed to each other, using a public bulletin board or the tally itself.
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User Ui (i ∈ [1,N ]) Tally
(1)xi ∈r G,yi := gxi mod q yi -
(2) ∀`= 1, . . . ,L, ki` :=
∑
j 6=i
H(yxij ||`||s) · (−1)i>j mod 232 ﬀ
{yj}j∈[1,N ]
∀`= 1, . . . ,L, bi` := X˜i` +ki` mod 232
{bi`}L`=1- (3) Fault recovery (if needed)
ﬀ U
on
(4) ∀` k′i` :=
∑
j 6=i,
j 6∈Uon
H(yxij ||`||s) · (−1)i>j mod 232
{
k′i`
}L
`=1- (5) ∀`= 1, . . . ,L, C ′` :=
( ∑
i∈Uon
bi`−
∑
i∈Uon
k′i`
)
mod 232
Figure 4.1: Cryptographic layer of our private recommender system for online
streaming services. At setup (1), users compute their secret share and send their
public key to the tally, who broadcasts them to the other users. During the en-
cryption phase (2), each user computes the blinding factors, encrypts their Count-
Min Sketch and sends it to the tally. In case not all users have sent the data, the
tally broadcasts Uon, the subset of users that did (3). These compute new blind-
ing factors and send them to the tally (4). Aggregate sketches are then recovered
by the tally (5).
As discussed later in this section, users might be organized in groups in
order to facilitate aggregation. To ease presentation, we discuss the protocol
steps for a single group of users, as combining aggregates from different groups
is trivial and can be done, in the clear, by the tally.
Count-Min Sketch construction. We assume each user Ui holds an input
vector of data points I = {Ic ∈ N, c= 1, . . . ,T}, which represents Ui’s co-view
matrix (i.e., T = M ·M/2). First, Ui initializes a Count-Min Sketch table X˜i
with all zero entries. In the following, we represent Ui’s Count-Min Sketch
table X˜i ∈ Nd×w as a vector of length L = d ·w. Then, Ui encodes I in the
Count-Min Sketch using the update procedure described in Section 2.2, where
the following pairwise-independent hash function is employed:
h(x) = ((ax+ b) mod p) mod w
for a 6= 0, b random integers modulo a random prime p. At the end of this step,
Ui has built a Count-Min Sketch table X˜i = {X˜i`}L`=1 (with L = d ·w as per
Definition 7).
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Encryption. To participate in the privacy-preserving sketch aggregation,
each user Ui first needs to generate blinding factors. At round s, for each
`= 1, . . . ,L, user Ui computes:
ki` =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
H(yxij ||`||s) · (−1)i>j mod q
where
(−1)i>j :=

−1 if i > j
1 otherwise
Note that the sum of all ki` ’s equals to zero:
N∑
i=1
ki` =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
H(yxij ||`||s) · (−1)i>j = 0
Then, for each entry X˜i` , Ui encrypts X˜i` as bi` = X˜i` + ki` mod 232, as only
32 bits of bi` are enough for our application, and sends the resulting ciphertext
to the tally.
Aggregation. The tally receives the ciphertexts from the N users and
(obliviously) aggregates the sketches. Specifically, for `= 1, . . . ,L, it computes:
C` =
N∑
i=1
bi` =
N∑
i=1
ki` +
N∑
i=1
X˜i` =
N∑
i=1
X˜i` mod 2
32
where C` denotes the `-th item in the aggregate Count-Min Sketch table.
{C`}L`=1, are broadcast back to the users (but can obviously be used locally
at the tally too), who use them to recover an estimate of the global matrix
and derive personalized recommendations via the ItemKNN algorithm.
Fault tolerance. If, during the aggregation phase, only a subset of users
report their values bi` to the tally, the sum of the ki` ’s is no longer equal to
zero and the aggregate items C` cannot be decrypted. However, it is possible
to recover as follows: Let Uon denote the list of users who have submitted the
data in the aggregation phase. The tally sends Uon to each Ui ∈ Uon. Then,
Ui computes, for each `= 1, . . . ,L,
k′i` =
N∑
j=1
j 6=i,j 6∈Uon
H(yxij ||`||s) · (−1)i>j mod q
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and sends these values back to the tally. Note that |Uon| should be at least 3,
otherwise there would be no privacy guarantees for the users in Uon. Assuming
all users in Uon submit the values k′i` , the tally can recover the entries in
the aggregate sketches (for users in Uon) by computing:
C ′` =
 ∑
i∈Uon
bi`−
∑
i∈Uon
k′i`
 mod 232
Groups. Although the protocol can cope with faults, we should nonethe-
less minimize the probability of missed contributions. Moreover, as discussed
in Section 4.1.4, the protocol’s complexity also depends on the number of
users and, in the case of iPlayer, there can be peaks of hundreds of thousands
of users per hour1. Consequently, we need to organize users into reasonably
sized groups. As mentioned earlier, combining aggregates from different groups
is straightforward and can be done, in the clear, by the tally.
We argue that a good choice is between 100 and 1,000 users per group,
as also supported by our empirical evaluation presented later. There could
be a few different ways to form groups: for instance, the tally could group
users in physical proximity and/or select users that are watching/listening a
video with at least a couple of minutes left to watch. Also note that users not
involved in the protocol (or having limited “history”) can get recommendations
too as the tally can still provide them with the global co-view matrix, which,
even though it does not include their own contribution, can be used by the
ItemKNN algorithm to derive recommendations.
Security analysis. The security of our scheme, in the honest-but-curious
model, is straightforwardly guaranteed by that of the “low overhead” private
aggregation scheme by Kursawe et al. [120], which is secure under the CDH as-
sumption. We modify it to cope with users faults and to aggregate Count-Min
Sketch entries, rather than the actual data, and this does not affect the privacy
properties of the scheme. In case of passive collusions between users, the con-
fidentiality of the data provided by the non-colluding users is still preserved.
1http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/iplayer/iplayer-performance-may17.
pdf
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Finally, note that malicious active users could report fake values in order to
invalidate the final aggregation values, however, protocol’s integrity could be
preserved using verifiable tools such as zero-knowledge proofs and commit-
ments, an extension we leave as part of future work, along with considering a
malicious tally.
4.1.3 Prototype implementation
We have implemented the tally’s functionalities as a web application run-
ning on the server-side JavaScript environment Node.js (or Node for short).2
We also use Express.js3 to organize our application into a Model View Con-
troller (MVC) web architecture and Socket.io4 to set up bidirectional web-
socket connections. Integrating our solution is as simple as installing a Node
module through the Node Package Manager (NPM) and importing it from any
web application, thus requiring no familiarity with the inner workings of the
cryptographic and aggregation layers.
The module for user’s functionalities is modeled as the client-side of the
web application and can be run as simple JavaScript code embedded on a
HTML page. Therefore, it requires no deployment or installation of any addi-
tional software by the users, but runs directly in the browser, transparently,
when users visit tally’s website. Our JavaScript implementation is also com-
patible with smartphone browsers (e.g., the Android version of Chrome), nev-
ertheless, we have also implemented a stand-alone Android application using
Apache Cordova.5
Cryptographic operations. The cryptographic layer of the protocol is also
written in JavaScript, using the Ed25519 curve [24] implementation available
from Elliptic.js,6 which supports 256-bit points and provides security compa-
rable to a 128-bit security parameter. SHA-256 is used for (cryptographic)
2https://nodejs.org/
3http://expressjs.com/
4http://socket.io/
5https://cordova.apache.org/
6https://github.com/indutny/elliptic
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Figure 4.2: Execution time for increasing number of users (with 700 programs).
hashing operations.
4.1.4 Performance evaluation
We now analyze the performance of our system, both analytically (report-
ing asymptotic complexities) and empirically.
Asymptotic complexities. The setup phase carried out by the user requires
O(N) random group points (where N is the number of total users) and O(N)
messages need to be sent for all the users to distribute the public keys. To
generate the blinding factors, each user then needs to perform O(N) exponen-
tiations in G and O(L ·N) hashing operations. Count-Min Sketch encryption
(at user’s side) requires O(L) integer additions in Zq, one for each of the
L = O(log(M2)) Count-Min Sketch entries, while communication complexity
amounts to O(L) 32-bits integers for each user. To complete the aggregation,
the tally computes O(L ·N) linear operations.
The use of the Count-Min Sketch significantly speeds up the efficiency
of the system. In fact, without them, each user would need to perform
O(N(M2)) hashing operations and send O(M2) 32-bit integers, while the
tally would need to compute O(N(M2)) operations.
Computation overhead. We have also simulated the execution of our pri-
vate recommender system and measured execution times (averaged over 100
iterations) for all operations. Simulations have been performed on a machine
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Figure 4.3: Execution time for increasing number of programs (with 1,000 users).
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Figure 4.4: Execution time for increasing number of programs (with 1,000 users)
without Count-Min Sketch.
running Ubuntu Trusty (Ubuntu 14.04.2 LTS), equipped with a 2.4 GHz CPU
i5-520M and 4GB RAM.
In Figure 4.2, we plot running times of protocol’s client- and server-side
for an increasing number of users, fixing the number of programs to 700 (the
average number of programs available on iPlayer) and the sketch parameters
to  = δ = 0.01 (see Definition 7). Using this setting, the number of rows d
and columns w of the Count-Min Sketch amounts to d = 18 , w = 272 leading
to a Count-Min Sketch of size L = d ·w = 18 · 272 = 4,896. Running times
grow linearly in the number of users. As illustrated in Figure 4.2(a), the
encryption, performed by each user (see step (2) in Figure 4.1), takes 2.7
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seconds with 100 users and 27 seconds with 1,000 users, while Figure 4.2(b)
reveals that tally completes the aggregation (step (5) in Figure 4.1) in 78ms
(resp., 780ms) with 100 (resp., 1,000) users.
We then measure the execution time for an increasing number of programs
and a fixed number of users, i.e., 1,000. Figure 4.3(a) illustrates running times’
logarithmic growth for encryption, ranging from 21 seconds with 100 programs
to 28 seconds with 1,000 programs. Figure 4.3(b) illustrates tally’s execution
times for the aggregation, which approximately range from 600ms to 800ms.
Note that the “stair” effect of the plots in Figure 4.3 is due to the fact that
the Count-Min Sketch size can be the same with close numbers of programs,
and thus leads to the same execution times for both user and tally. On the
contrary, the number of users does not affect the size of the Count-Min Sketch
(see Figure 4.2)
Without the compression factor of the Count-Min Sketch, the running
times for both user and tally would grow linearly in the size of the co-view
matrix (i.e., M ·M/2), yielding remarkably slower executions. As illustrated
in Figure 4.4(a), with 1,000 users and 1,000 programs, running time for each
user amounts to almost 50 minutes instead of 28 seconds using the sketch,
whereas, the aggregation at the tally completes in almost one and a half
minute (versus less than one second using Count-Min Sketch). Finally, exe-
cution time of the ItemKNN operations carried out at user’s side, with 700
programs, amounts to 850ms for each user.
Communication overhead. In Table 4.1, we report the amount of bytes
exchanged between all parties for different number of users and Count-Min
Sketch sizes (for different choices of sketch parameters  and δ), fixing the
number of programs to 700. Note that, without the compressing factor of the
sketch, with 700 programs, each user would have to send 960KB instead of
20KB.
Accuracy estimation. Finally, we evaluate the accuracy loss due to the
use of Count-Min Sketch, specifically, over the most 50 frequent items, using
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#Users Bytes Sketch Size Bytes
(Tally to User) (User to Tally)
100 3,200 4,896 19,584
200 6,400 2,448 9,792
300 9,600 1,638 6,552
400 12,800 1,224 4,896
500 16,000 972 3,888
600 19,200 810 3,240
700 22,400 702 2,808
800 25,600 612 2,448
900 28,800 540 2,160
1000 32,000 486 1,944
Table 4.1: Bytes exchanged by user and tally for different #users and size of
the Count-Min Sketch, considering 700 programs.
a synthetic dataset sampled from a zipfian distribution simulating a million
users. We set the Count-Min Sketch parameters to be = 0.01 and δ= 0.01 as
we have measured an acceptable accuracy loss level introduced by the Count-
Min Sketch (see below). Once again, we fix the number of programs to M =
700, leading to a Count-Min Sketch of size L= 4,896. Figure 4.5(a) shows that
the Count-Min Sketch estimation over the most 50 frequent items is almost
indistinguishable from the true population.
We also plot, in Figure 4.5(b), the average error, defined as |cˆi−ci|/∑j |cj |,
over the most 50 frequent items with an increasing number of users, while
fixing M = 700, δ = 0.01 (yielding a total number of items to update on the
Count-Min Sketch of T = M ·M/2 = 245,000) and three choices of the  pa-
rameter, i.e., 0.01,0.05, and 0.1. The average error decreases with more users
and smaller values of . Standard deviation values are infinitesimal, thus, we
do not include them in the plot as they would not be visible.
4.2 Private Aggregate Location Prediction
In this section, we instantiate a mobile application enabling users to re-
port, to a service provider (tally), their locations over time. Users’ privacy
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(a) True vs estimated counters (b) Average error for different values
of 
Figure 4.5: Visualizing the accuracy of the Count-Min Sketch for the most 50
frequent items (with 700 programs and sketch size 4,896).
is protected as only aggregate (over many users) location statistics are dis-
closed. We then show how these statistics can be used to train a model and
predict future movements, and support private computation and prediction of
“heat maps” relying on the aggregate counts of people in a given area over a
period of time. Location heat maps are useful in many different applications
as they provide a graphical representation of congestion, using different colors
to represent the “popularity” of geographical areas.
System model. We operate in the same model as our privacy-friendly rec-
ommender system (see Section 4.1.2), involving a tally that privately aggre-
gates location statistics contributed from a set of users, and re-use the same
cryptographic layer. Once again, we support efficient computation of private
statistics using (i) Count-Min Sketch’s succinct data representation and (ii)
privacy-preserving aggregation with users’ blinding factors summing up to
zero.
Overview. We assume a 2-D space territory R is partitioned into a grid of
|S| = p× p cells (S = {S[1,1],S[1,2], . . . ,S[p,p]}), and t finite intervals (time
slots) [tj−1, tj ], where j ∈ N+. Let S(tj)i be the grid containing, for each cell,
the number of times the user Ui has logged her position (using a GPS mea-
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Figure 4.6: Number of taxi locations over time.
surement) within that particular cell over t ∈ [tj−1, tj ]. User Ui, for each time
slot [tj−1, tj ], builds the grid S
(tj)
i with locations logged over time, maps the
grid into a Count-Min Sketch, and sends the encrypted sketch to the tally.
This aggregates and decrypts them, reconstructing the grid containing the
(estimated) aggregate locations.
The location statistics can be used to display ‘heat maps” (e.g., a graphical
representation of congestion), or to perform time-series based prediction over
a sequence of heat maps. Using an Exponential Weighted Moving Average
(EWMA) model (cf. Section 2.3.2), we can predict the future popularity of a
cell, by relying on the past (approximated) observations for that cell. Other
machine learning techniques, e.g., Multivariate Support Vector Machines or
Logistic Regression, could also be used for the prediction, but we consider it
to be beyond the scope of this work to investigate new predictors.
The San Francisco Cabs dataset. To evaluate the feasibility of our in-
tuition, we use a publicly available dataset containing mobility traces of San
Francisco taxi cabs.7 The dataset contains 11 million GPS coordinates, gen-
erated by 536 taxis over almost a month in May 2008. We group the taxi
locations in time slots of one hour, leading to a total of 575 epochs. Figure 4.6
shows the presence of weekly and daily patterns in the number of taxi loca-
7http://cabspotting.org/
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Figure 4.7: Average error introduced by the Count-Min Sketch on the aggregate
statistics for the top-100 locations.
tions over time (i.e. hourly time slots) and peaks of roughly 25,000 total hourly
contributions.
Succinct data representation. We investigate whether succinct data rep-
resentation could be applied to the problem of collecting location statistics,
and measure the accuracy loss introduced by the Count-Min Sketch’s com-
pact representation. In Figure 4.7, we plot the average error defined as
|cˆi− ci|/∑j |cj | and the relative standard deviation over the most 100 pop-
ular cells for each time slot, while fixing  = δ = 0.01 and the total number
of cells to |S| = 100× 100 (yielding a Count-Min Sketch of size L = 3,808).
Observe that the average error is infinitesimal for every time slots.
Heat map prediction. Next, we focus on predicting future heat maps using
the EWMA algorithm introduced in Section 2.3.2. We start by evaluating
the accuracy of EWMA-based prediction relying on the aggregates collected
without using the Count-Min Sketch. We perform the prediction over a subset
of 12 consecutive epochs having the maximum number of reported locations,
giving the past 24 hours observations as input to the EWMA algorithm. Fig-
ure 4.8 plots the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) in the prediction compared to
the ground truth over the most 100 popular cells, considering different values
of α, i.e., EWMA’s smoothing coefficient (cf. Section 2.3.2). The plot shows
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Figure 4.8: Mean absolute error in the prediction for different values of prediction
algorithm’s parameter α.
Figure 4.9: Mean absolute error introduced by the Count-Min Sketch on the
prediction accuracy.
that, in almost all slots, lower values of α lead to more accurate results.
We then perform the prediction over the approximate heat maps, i.e.,
using the sketches. We focus on the same time slot, and fix α= 0.1. Figure 4.9
shows the error introduced by the Count-Min Sketch in the prediction, for
each time slot considered, with respect to the prediction based on the “real”
heat maps. We observe that this error, while fluctuating, is appreciably low
for every prediction, thus confirming the feasibility of our techniques for the
problem of privately predicting future heat maps.
Once again, we have implemented our techniques in JavaScript, with the
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server-side running as a Node module, and client-side running as an Android
application built using Apache Cordova.
4.3 Tor Hidden Services Statistics
The privacy-preserving collection of statistics using efficient data struc-
tures, seeking a trade-off between accuracy and efficiency, has also interesting
applications in non-user facing settings such as collecting network statistics
from servers or routers. In this section, we present a novel mechanism geared
to privately gather statistics in the context of the Tor anonymity network [65].
The Tor project has recently received funding to improve monitoring of load
and usage of Tor hidden services.8 This motivates them to extract aggregate
statistics about the number of hidden service descriptors from multiple Hidden
Service Directory authorities. In order to ensure robustness, the Tor project
has determined that the median – rather than the mean – of these volumes
should be calculated, which is beyond privacy-friendly statistics approaches
like Privex [77].
In this section, we first describe the protocol for estimating median statis-
tics using Count Sketch, then, we present the design and deployment of its
prototype implementation, along with its performance evaluation.
4.3.1 Private median estimation using Count Sketch
We rely on the Count Sketch [44] data structure, which closely resembles
Count-Min Sketch, used in Sections 4.1–4.2. Recall from Section 2.2 that
building a Count Sketch follows the same process as a Count-Min Sketch, thus
leading to a d ·w table of positive integer values, whereas, the estimation of an
item’s frequency is slightly different: for each row, di, a hash function is applied
to the item leading to a column wj . An unbiased estimator of the frequency of
the item is the value at this position minus the value at an adjacent position
– and the median of those estimators is the final estimated frequency. What
is key to the success of our techniques is that the estimate of the frequency of
8https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en
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specific values, as well as sets of values, is a simple linear sum of Count Sketch
entries; computing it does not require non-linear (e.g., min) operations as for
the Count-Min Sketch.
For this application, we build on privacy-preserving data aggregation
based on threshold public-key encryption, specifically, an Additively Homo-
morphic Elliptic-Curve variant of El Gamal (AH-ECC) [22], summarized be-
low. This allows us to seamlessly tolerate missing contributions – following an
approached first proposed by Jawurek et al. [107].
AH-ECC consists of the following three algorithms (using a multiplicative
notation):
1. KeyGen(1τ ): Given a security parameter τ , choose an elliptic curve E
and (g1,g2) public generators on E, generating a group of order q. Choose
a random private key x ∈ Zq, define the public key as pk = g1x, and
output public parameters (E,g1,g2,pk) and private key x.
2. Encrypt(m,pk): The message m is encrypted by computing two ellip-
tic curve points as (A,B) := (g1r,pkrg2m), where r ∈ Zq is selected at
random. The ciphertext is thus the tuple of points (A,B).
3. Decrypt(A,B,x): Decryption is performed by computing the element
BA−x = g2m. We can achieve constant time decryption by pre-computing
a table of discrete logarithms which is then used to recover m from g2m
(this solution is practical for small values of m).
AH-ECC is additively homomorphic since an element-wise multiplication of
ciphertexts yields an encryption of their sum.
Setup. Our system relies on a set of authorities that can jointly decrypt a
ciphertext from the AH-ECC additively homomorphic public-key cryptosys-
tem. During setup, each authority generates their public and private key and
a group public key is computed by multiplying all the authorities’ public keys.
Note that we operate in a distributed system setting (i.e., the Tor network),
therefore, similar to PrivEx [77], one can easily instantiate decryption author-
ities.
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Protocol. Using Count Sketch, we can collect a number of private readings
from Hidden Service Directories (HSDir), and compute an approximation of
the median. Each HSDir builds a Count Sketch, inserts its private values into
it, encrypts it, and sends it to the authorities. These aggregate all sketches
by homomorphically adding them element-wise, yielding an encrypted sketch
summarizing the set of all HSDir values.
Once the authorities have computed the aggregate sketch, an interactive
divide-and-conquer algorithm is applied to estimate the median given the range
of its possible values is known. At each iteration, the number of sample values
in the range is known, starting with the full range and all values received. The
range is then halved and the sum of all elements falling in the first half of
the range is jointly decrypted. If the sum falls within first half of the range
it is retained for the next iteration, otherwise the second half of the range
is considered at the next iteration. The process stops once the range is a
single element. Following the master theorem [55], we know that this process
converges in O(logn) steps, for n elements in the domain of the values/median.
Due to frequency estimations for the ranges using Count Sketches that provide
noisy estimates, we expect this median to be close, but possibly not exactly the
same as the true sample median, depending on the Count Sketch parameters
δ and .
Output privacy. Note that this process is not “perfectly” private in a tra-
ditional secure computation setting, as the volume of reported values falling
within the intermediate ranges considered is leaked. This may be dealt with
in two ways: (1) the leakage may be considered acceptable and the algorithm
run as described, or (2) the technique can be enhanced to provide differential
privacy by adding noise to each intermediate value.
Differentially private estimates. The sensitivity [72] of the estimates in
any range of values using the Count Sketch is at most d, since each HSDir
contribution increases by at most 1 in at most d values into the d ·w Count
Sketch table. Therefore, we can achieve -differential privacy if we add, to
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each decrypted value, noise from a Laplace distribution with mean zero and
variance ξ ·d/, where ξ is the number of decrypted intermediate results and
 the differential privacy parameter. However, doing so may result in the
divide-and-conquer algorithm mis-estimating the range in which the median
lies, and results in further mistakes in the final median estimate. As discussed
in Section 2.1.3, although we use  to denote a parameter for both Count
Sketch and differential privacy, it is clear from the context which one it relates
to.
4.3.2 Implementation and evaluation
We implement and evaluate the proposed scheme aiming to: (i) estimate
the trade-off between size of the sketch and the accuracy of the median compu-
tation, (ii) evaluate the cost of cryptographic computation and communication
overheads, and (iii) assess the trade-off between the accuracy of the median
and the quality of protection that may be achieved through the differentially
private mechanism.
For our evaluation, we instantiate AH-ECC using the NIST-P224 curve
as provided by the OpenSSL library and its optimizations by Käsper [113].
Our implementation of the cryptographic core of the private median scheme
amounts to 300 lines of Python code using the petlib OpenSSL wrapper,9 and
another 350 lines of Python include unit tests and measurement code. All ex-
periments have been performed on a machine running Ubuntu Trusty (Ubuntu
14.04.2 LTS), equipped with a 2.4 GHz CPU i5-520M and 4GB RAM. Our
Python implementation is easily pluggable as part of the Tor infrastructure
and does not require changes within the Tor (C-based) core functionalities.
We first illustrate the performance and accuracy of estimating the median
using this technique with both sketch parameters  and δ equal to either 0.25
or 0.05 against the London Atlas Dataset10 in Table 4.2. The error rate is
computed as the absolute value of difference between the estimated and true
9https://github.com/gdanezis/petlib
10http://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/ward-profiles-and-atlas
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Figure 4.10: Count Sketch size versus estimation quality.
median divided by the true median.
Further results are presented on an experimental setup that uses as a
reference problem the median estimation in a set of 1,200 sample values, drawn
from a mixture distribution: 1,000 values from a Normal distribution with
mean 300 and variance 25, and 200 values drawn from a Normal distribution
with mean 500 and variance 200. This reference problem closely matches the
settings of the Tor project both in terms of the range of vales (assumed to be
within [0,1000]) and the number of samples [77].
Quality vs. Size. Figure 4.10 illustrates the trade-off between the quality
of the estimation of the median algorithm and the size overhead of the Count
Sketch. The size overhead (green slim line) is computed as the number of
encrypted elements in the sketch as compared with the number of elements
in the range of the median (1,000 for our reference problem). The estimation
accuracy (blue broader line) is represented as the fraction of the absolute
deviation of the estimate from the real value over the real sample median (light
blue region represents the standard deviation of the mean over 40 experiments
for each datapoint). Thus both qualities can be represented as percentages.
The trade off between the size of the sketch and the accuracy of the
estimate is evident: as the sketch size reaches a smaller fraction of the total
possible number of values, the error becomes larger than the range of the
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Figure 4.11: Quality versus differential privacy protection.
median. Thus, Count Sketch with parameters ,δ < 0.025 are unnecessary,
since they do not lead to a reduction of the information that needs to be
transmitted from each client to the authorities; conversely, for 0.15 < ,δ the
estimate of the median deviates by more than 20% of its true value making it
highly unreliable.
For all subsequent experiments, we consider a Count Sketch with values
 = δ = 0.05, leading to d = 3 and w = 55. As outlined in Figure 4.10, this
represents a good trade-off between the size of the Count Sketch (16.5% of
transmitting all values) and the error.
True size and performance. When implemented using NIST-P224 curves,
the reference Count Sketch may be serialized in 10,898 bytes. Each Count
Sketch takes 0.001 sec to encrypt at each HSDir, and it takes 1.456 seconds to
aggregate 1,200 sketches at each authority (0.001 sec per sketch). As expected,
from the range of the reference problem, 10 decryption iterations are sufficient
to converge to the median (therefore ξ = 10). The number of homomorphic ad-
ditions for each decryption round is linear in the range of the median and their
total computational cost is the same order of magnitude as a full Count Sketch
encryption. It is clear from these figures that the computational overhead of
the proposed technique is eminently practical, and the bandwidth overhead
acceptable.
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Quality vs. Differential Privacy protection. Figure 4.11 illustrates the
trade-off between the quality of the median estimation and the quality of differ-
ential privacy protection. The x-axis represents the  parameter of the differ-
entially private system, and the y-axis the absolute error between the estimate
and the true sample median. Differential privacy with parameter  = 0.5 can
be provided without significantly affecting the quality of the median estimate.
However, for  < 0.5 the volume of the error grows exponentially (note the
log scale of the x-axis). While the exact value of a meaningful  parameter is
often debated in the literature, we conclude that the mechanism only provides
a limited degree of protection, and no ability to readily tune up protection:
utility degrades very rapidly as the security parameter  decreases.
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Median (,δ = 0.25) Error (%) Median (,δ = 0.05) Error (%) Truth
Population - 2015 15143.2 11.3 13215.4 2.8 13600.0
Children aged 0-15 - 2015 2970.8 12.1 2627.6 0.8 2650.0
Working-age (16-64) - 2015 9592.0 2.0 8843.2 5.9 9400.0
Older people aged 65+ - 2015 1284.6 11.4 1345.0 7.2 1450.0
% All Children aged 0-15 - 2015 21.9 10.7 20.1 1.3 19.8
% All Working-age (16-64) - 2015 70.7 5.0 68.8 2.2 67.3
% All Older people aged 65+ - 2015 15.2 37.1 12.0 7.8 11.1
Mean Age - 2013 38.6 8.8 36.9 3.8 35.5
Median Age - 2013 37.7 10.8 35.7 5.1 34.0
Population density (persons per sq km) - 2013 10231.3 44.8 5792.9 18.0 7067.0
% BAME - 2011 45.6 26.3 35.7 1.0 36.1
% Not Born in UK - 2011 40.1 7.6 40.1 7.6 37.3
Male life expectancy -2009-13 84.1 5.7 79.6 0.0 79.6
Female life expectancy -2009-13 87.0 3.5 84.9 0.9 84.1
In employment (16-64) - 2011 6532.8 7.0 5843.7 4.2 6103.0
Employment rate (16-64) - 2011 68.5 2.0 70.8 1.3 69.9
Number of properties sold - 2013 169.3 1.4 149.8 10.3 167.0
Number of Household spaces - 2011 5619.1 5.4 5025.9 5.7 5332.0
% detached houses - 2011 2.4 44.7 1.6 62.2 4.3
% semi-detached houses - 2011 29.0 70.6 16.7 1.5 17.0
% terraced houses - 2011 29.4 39.8 21.1 0.6 21.0
% Flat, maisonette or apartment - 2011 53.1 15.1 49.7 7.9 46.1
% Households Social Rented - 2011 26.0 27.5 19.9 2.4 20.4
% dwellings in council tax bands A or B - 2011 21.2 79.9 10.4 12.2 11.8
% dwellings in council tax bands C, D or E - 2011 63.7 7.5 71.6 3.9 68.9
% dwellings in council tax bands F, G or H - 2011 0.3 96.7 1.4 82.6 8.1
Claimant Rate of Incapacity Benefit - 2014 1.8 80.0 0.9 10.0 1.0
Claimant Rate of Income Support - 2014 4.4 119.6 2.3 16.8 2.0
% of lone parents not in employment - 2011 51.9 11.2 47.5 1.6 46.7
(ID2010) % of LSOAs in worst 50% nationally - 2010 -6.4 107.7 99.2 19.5 83.0
Average GCSE capped point scores - 2013 369.0 6.0 349.4 0.4 348.0
Unauthorised Absence in All Schools (%) - 2013 1.7 53.5 0.8 26.2 1.1
% with no qualifications - 2011 20.8 19.1 18.8 7.2 17.5
% with Level 4 qualifications and above - 2011 44.4 25.1 39.1 10.1 35.5
A-Level Average Point Score Per Student - 2012/13 715.3 5.7 668.4 1.3 676.9
A-Level Average Point Score Per Entry; 2012/13 215.0 3.1 210.8 1.1 208.5
Violence against the person rate - 2013/14 1.2 92.5 10.5 35.6 16.3
Robbery rate - 2013/14 1.6 31.8 0.1 94.7 2.3
Theft and Handling rate - 2013/14 -3.5 113.7 11.4 55.6 25.6
Criminal Damage rate - 2013/14 9.1 43.8 5.9 6.6 6.3
% area that is open space - 2014 30.1 28.3 19.3 17.9 23.5
Cars per household - 2011 1.6 99.4 0.5 35.0 0.8
% travel by bicycle to work - 2011 12.0 343.9 3.0 12.5 2.7
Turnout at Mayoral election - 2012 38.1 11.5 35.0 2.3 34.2
Table 4.2: Median estimation with 22 ciphertexts (d= 2, w = 11, ,δ = 0.25) and
165 ciphertexts (d= 3, w = 55, ,δ = 0.05) on the London Atlas Dataset.
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Chapter 5
Privacy-Preserving Data
Release with Generative Neural
Networks
In Chapter 4, we showed how to train simple machine learning models
from aggregate data gathered from many sources.
We now present a novel approach supporting the privacy-preserving re-
lease of generative models that is a mixture of k generative neural networks.
These networks are trained together and collectively learn the generator dis-
tribution of a dataset. The data is first divided into k clusters using a differ-
entially private clustering approach, then each cluster is given to a separate
generative neural network, such as Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM) [86]
or Variational Autoencoders (VAE) [115] (cf. Section 2.3.4). These networks
are trained only on their own cluster using differentially private gradient de-
scent.
Training distinct generative models on different partitions of the dataset
has several benefits. First, multiple models can generate more accurate syn-
thetic samples than a single model trained on the whole dataset, as each neural
network is trained only on similar data samples. This prevents the mixture
model to generate unrealistic synthetic samples which may arise from the im-
plausible combination of multiple very different clusters. This scenario is much
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Figure 5.1: Overview of our differentially private generative model (DPGM) algo-
rithm.
more likely when the training is perturbed to guarantee differential privacy.
Second, each neural network models a different component of the generator
distribution, and hence learns any specifics of a cluster faster than a single
model. In other words, a single model would need more training epochs than
a mixture of generative models to achieve a comparably rich representation of
the clusters. As each iteration of the learning algorithm requires some pertur-
bation to guarantee privacy, a mixture model needs less noise which eventually
yields more accurate model parameters.
5.1 Differentially Private Generative Model
(DPGM)
In this section, we present our Differentially Private Generative Model
(DPGM) approach, which is detailed in Algorithm 3 and illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.1. In the rest of the chapter, we use the following notation: I denotes a
universe of items (e.g., set of visited locations, pixels in an image, etc.), where
|I| = m. A dataset X ⊆ 2I is the ensemble of all items of some set of indi-
viduals. A record, which is a non-empty subset of I, refers to all items of an
individual from X and is represented by a binary vector x of size m. Table 5.1
summarizes notation and symbols used throughout the chapter.
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Symbol Description
x binary vector
X dataset
k number of k-means clusters
TK k-means iterations
TS SGD iterations
Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆk data clusters
θ1, . . . , θk generative models
cˆ1, . . . , cˆk noisy cluster centers
σC,σK,σG noise scales
Cmax max. norm bound
w max. number of discretized norm bounds
κ kernel function
z randomized Fourier feature map
d number of features
Cb clipping threshold
L loss function
η learning rate
L batch size
Table 5.1: Notation and symbols used in this chapter.
A dataset X = {x1, . . . ,xN} is first partitioned into k clusters, denoted by
Xˆ1, Xˆ2, . . . , Xˆk, which are in turn used to train k distinct generative models,
where the parameters of the resulting models are denoted, respectively, by
θ1, θ2, . . . , θk. Data samples are similar within a cluster, thus, generative models
simultaneously trained on each partition converge faster than a single model
trained on the whole dataset X. As θ1, θ2, . . . , θk are learned using perturbed
gradient descent, they can be released and used to generate synthetic data
using the k generative models.
Our learning approach involves two main steps:
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Algorithm 3: DPGM: Differentially Private Generative Model
Input: Dataset: X = {x1, . . . ,xN}, # of custers: k, k-means
iterations: TK, SGD iterations: TS, Noise scales: σC,σK,σG
1 Cluster data records in X:
2 {Xˆ1, Xˆ2, . . . , Xˆk}= DPkmeans(k,TK,X,σC,σK) . see Algorithm 4
3 Initialize θ1, θ2, . . . , θk randomly
4 for t ∈ [TS] do
5 Select (Xˆb, θb) ∈ {(Xˆ1, θ1), . . . ,(Xˆk, θk)} with probability |Xˆb|/|X|
6 Update parameters of model θb:
7 θb = DP-SGD(Xˆb, θb,σC,σG) . see Algorithm 5
Output: θ1, θ2, . . . , θk
1. Records in X are clustered in a random feature space using differentially
private kernel k-means (see Section 5.1.1) into clusters Xˆ1, Xˆ2, . . . , Xˆk;
and
2. A generative model (e.g., RBM [86] or VAE [115]) with parameter θi
is trained on cluster Xˆi (see Section 5.1.2) using differentially private
gradient descent, where the training data are composed of the records of
Xˆi.
In each SGD iteration (Line 5-7 in Algorithm 3), a model θb is chosen uni-
formly at random along with corresponding training data Xˆb, and a single
SGD iteration is performed to update θb using a random sample B of Xˆb with
size L (Line 7 in Algorithm 3). The output of our algorithm are the parame-
ters of the trained generative models, i.e., θ1, θ2, . . . , θk. Finally, these privately
trained models can be used to generate synthetic records which resemble the
original ones, i.e., preserve their general characteristics that are not specific to
any single individual (as per ε and δ discussed in Section 5.2).
5.1.1 Private kernel k-means
In Section 2.3.3, we outlined the kernel k-means algorithm. We now
discuss our private kernel k-means algorithm, presented in Algorithm 4.
5.1. Differentially Private Generative Model (DPGM) 95
It first transforms the data X into a low-dimensional representation X ′ =
{z(x1), . . . , z(xN )} using randomized Fourier feature map z : Rm→ Rd [177],
and then applies standard differentially private k-means [29] on these low-
dimensional features. We rely on randomized Fourier features as they repre-
sent one of the most popular techniques for scaling up kernel methods with
impressive empirical results [16].
Specifically, z : Rm→ Rd is defined as:
z(x) =
√
2
d
[
cos(〈w˜1,x〉+ b˜1), . . . ,cos(〈w˜d,x〉+ b˜d)
]
(5.1)
where each w˜i ∈Rm is drawn independently from p(w˜) = 12pi
∫
Rm exp(−j〈w˜,x〉)κ(w˜)dx,
i.e., p(w˜) is the Fourier transform of kernel function κ, and b˜i ∈R is chosen from
[0,2pi) uniformly at random. In particular, Bochner’s theorem implies that
p(w˜) is a valid probability density function, if κ is continuous, positive-definite,
and shift-invariant kernel. Hence:
κ(x,y) = κ(x−y) =
∫
Rm
exp(j〈w˜,x−y〉)p(w˜)dw˜
= Ew˜,b˜[〈
√
2cos(〈w˜,x〉+ b˜),√2cos(〈w˜,y〉+ b˜)〉]
where the expectation is approximated with the empirical mean over d ran-
domly chosen values of w˜ and b˜ [177].
Standard DP k-means [29] releases the noisy cluster centers which are
computed iteratively using a noisy variant of Lloyd’s algorithm; in each iter-
ation, gaussian noise with scale
√
2σK is added to the size of all clusters, and
with scale
√
2σKCb to the sum of all cluster members in each cluster. These
noisy values are used to compute the noisy cluster centers {cˆ1, . . . , cˆk}.
At the beginning, we initialize clusters centers to random records drawn
from publicly available non-sensitive data which are generated by the same
distribution as the sensitive data. We only need k representative samples, and
such public datasets already exist for images, location, and medical data. To
determine the scale of the gaussian noise, the L2-sensitivity of the cluster size
and that of the sum of norms must be known within each cluster. Although
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Algorithm 4: DPkmeans: Private kernel k-means with Random
Fourier Features
Input: Data: X = {x1, . . . ,xN}, Cluster number: k, Iterations: TK,
Feature number: d, Kernel function: κ, Noise scales: σC,σK
1 Compute Features:
2 w˜i ∼iid p(w˜) for i ∈ [1,d], where p(w˜) = 12pi
∫
Rm exp(−j〈w˜,x〉)κ(w˜)dx
3 b˜i ∼iid U[0,2pi] for i ∈ [1,d]
4 X ′←{z(x1), . . . , z(xN )}, where
z(x) =
√
2/d[cos(〈w˜1,x〉+ b˜1), . . . ,cos(〈w˜d,x〉+ b˜d)]
5 Clip Features:
6 Cb←DPNorm(X ′,σC) . see Algorithm 6
7 Xˆ ′←{zˆ(x1), . . . , zˆ(xN )}, where zˆ(xi) = z(xi)/max(1, ||z(xi)||2/Cb)
8 Initialize cluster centers cˆ1, cˆ2, . . . , cˆk on public data
9 for t ∈ [1,TK] do
10 for i ∈ [1,k] do
11 Assign:
12 Xˆi←{x : argminj ||zˆ(x)− cˆj ||22 = i}
13 Update:
14 nˆi← |Xˆi|+N(0,
√
2σK)
15 cˆi← 1/nˆi
(∑
x∈Xˆi zˆ(x) +N(0,
√
2CbσKI )
)
Output: Xˆ1, Xˆ2, . . . , Xˆk
the L2-sensitivity of the set of cluster size is always
√
2 (a single record can
change the size of at most 2 clusters), such a priori bound does not exist for
the L2-norm of the feature vectors in general. Hence, we need to clip all feature
vectors in L2-norm before applying standard DP k-means, where the clipping
threshold Cb should be set to the average norm of the feature vectors (i.e.,
(1/N)∑x∈X ||z(xi)||2) and is approximated by Algorithm 6. Replacing z(xi)
with zˆ(xi) = z(xi)/max(1, ||z(xi)||2/Cb) guarantees that all feature vectors are
kept as long as their norm is less then Cb, or they are scaled down to have a
norm of Cb.
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Nevertheless, for kernel functions like the Radial Basis Function (RBF)1,
a small norm bound Cb can be used (see Theorem 3). This bound is constant
for any input data and feature size independently of the width γ of the RBF
kernel. Thus, as opposed to standard k-means [29], our approach can detect
linearly non-separable clusters, and, used with RBF kernel, add constant noise
to feature vectors independently of their size d.
Theorem 3. If κ(x,y) = exp(−γ||x− y||2), then E[||z(x)||2] ≤ 1 for any x ∈
{0,1}∗ and γ, where the expectation is taken on the randomness of z.
First, we introduce and prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Let N(0,σ) be a zero-centered normal random variable with stan-
dard deviation σ. Then:
1. E[cos(N(0,σ))] = exp(−σ2/2) and
E[sin(N(0,σ))] = 0,
2. E[cos2(N(0,σ))] = (1 + exp(−2σ2))/2 and
E[sin2(N(0,σ))] = (1− exp(−2σ2))/2
Proof of Lemma 2. Let exp(jN(0,σ)) denote a complex random variable. It
follows from the moment generating function of N(0,σ) that:
E[exp(jN(0,σ))] = exp((jσ)2/2) = exp(−σ2/2)
which means that:
E[cos(N(0,σ)) + j sin(N(0,σ))] = E[exp(jN(0,σ))]
= exp(−σ2/2)
This implies that E[cos(N(0,σ))] = exp(−σ2/2) and E[sin(N(0,σ))] = 0 due to
the linearity of expectation. Hence:
E[cos2(N(0,σ))] = E[(1 + cos(2N(0,σ)))/2]
= (1 + exp(−2σ2))/2
1If the kernel function is RBF, i.e., κ(x,y) = exp(−γ||x−y||2), then p(w˜) has zero cen-
tered gaussian distribution with standard deviation 2γI .
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and
E[sin2(N(0,σ))] = E[(1− cos(2N(0,σ)))/2]
= (1− exp(−2σ2))/2
where we used that 2N(0,σ) =N(0,2σ).
Proof of Theorem 3. If κ(x,y) = exp(−γ||x−y||2), then
p(w˜) = 12pi
∫
Rm
exp(−j〈w˜,x〉)κ(w˜)dx
has zero centered gaussian distribution with standard deviation 2γI .
E[||z(x)||2] = E

(2/d) d∑
i=1
cos2(〈N(0,2γI ),x〉+U[0,2pi])

1
2

≤
√
2
d
 d∑
i=1
E
[
cos2(〈N(0,2γI ),x〉+U[0,2pi])]
]
1
2
(by Jensen’s inequality and the linearity of expectation)
≤
√
2
d
 d∑
i=1
E
[
cos2(〈N(0,2γI ),x〉)/2 + sin2(〈N(0,2γI ),x〉)/2
]
1
2
≤
√
1
d
 d∑
i=1
E
[
cos2(N(0,2γ
√
||x||1)
]
+E
[
sin2(N(0,2γ
√
||x||1)
]
1
2
(by Lemma 2)
≤ 1
where, in the second inequality, we used that cos2(a+ b) = cos2(a)cos2(b)−
2cos(a)sin(a)cos(b)sin(b)+sin2(a)sin2(b), E[cos(U[0,2pi])] =E[sin(U[0,2pi])] =
0, E[cos2(U[0,2pi])] = E[sin2(U[0,2pi])] = 0.5.
Therefore, DP kernel k-means has two main advantages over standard DP
k-means [29]. First, kernel k-means can find linearly non-separable clusters.
Second, if it is used with RBF kernel, the added noise is independent of the
L2-norm of the data records. As we show in Section 5.3, this can lead to much
larger clustering accuracy especially for stringent privacy requirements (i.e.,
for ε < 0.5) even for large dimensional data.
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5.1.2 Private Stochastic Gradient Descent
We now present our private SGD technique, summarized in Algorithm 5,
considering a single SGD batch iteration. Our starting point is the work by
Abadi et al. [1]: similar to theirs, our solution provides differential privacy to
the training data by first clipping the norm of the gradient update of each
record, and then perturbing these clipped gradients by the Gaussian mecha-
nism. However, we achieve better accuracy as the clipping threshold is selected
adaptively in each SGD iteration.
In particular, in each SGD iteration, we also (1) compute the gradient of
the loss function L on a random subset B of records (denoted as “batch”) in
Line 2 of Algorithm 5, (2) clip the L2 norm of the gradient of each record in B
to have a norm at most Cb (in Lines 3-6), (3) add gaussian noise N(0,
√
2σGCbI )
to the average of these clipped gradient updates (Line 7), and finally (4) per-
form the descent step (Line 8). At the end, the updated model parameters θ
are returned. A complete training epoch on the whole dataset X consists of
(|X|/L) SGD iterations, which are required to process all records in every clus-
ter on average. Indeed, each record in a cluster Xˆb is selected with probability
(|Xˆb|/∑ki=1 |Xˆi|)× (L/||Xˆb|) = L/|X|, where ∑ki=1 |Xˆi|= |X|. Notice that the
L2-sensitivity of
∑
i gˆ(xi) is
√
2Cb, as the norm of every gˆ(xi) is at most Cb,
and one record can change at most two clusters.
5.1.3 Adaptive selection of the norm bound
Both our private kernel k-means (in Line 6 of Algorithm 4) and private
SGD method (in Line 5 of Algorithm 5) require the differentially private com-
putation of the average L2-norm in a given set of records, which is then used
as the clipping threshold Cb in both algorithms. For this purpose, these algo-
rithms invoke DPNorm which is detailed in Algorithm 6.
In fact, our SGD technique differs from the original private SGD method
by Abadi et al. [1] in the selection of the norm bound Cb (in Lines 4-6 of Al-
gorithm 5). In the original approach [1], Cb is provided as input to the private
SGD and no guideline is given how to compute its value without violating
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Algorithm 5: Private Stochastic Gradient Descent
Input: Data: Xˆ, Model parameters: weights and biases θ, Noise
scales: σC, σG, Loss function: L(θ) = 1|Xˆ|
∑
iL(θ,xci), Learning
rate: η, Batch size: L
1 Sampling: Take a random sample B = {xc1 , . . . ,xcL} of Xˆ with
sampling probability q = L/|Xˆ|
2 Compute Gradient: For each xci ∈B, compute g(xci)←∇L(θ,xci)
3 Clip Gradient:
4 B′←{g(xci), . . . ,g(xcL)}
5 Cb←DPNorm(B′,σC) . see Algorithm 6
6 gˆ(xci)← g(xci)/max
(
1, ||g(xci)||2Cb
)
7 Add noise: g˜← 1L
(∑L
i=1 gˆ(xci) +N(0,
√
2σGCbI )
)
8 Descent: θ← θ−ηg˜
Output: θ
differential privacy. Moreover, the selection of the norm bound Cb has a large
impact on the performance of the private SGD in general. If Cb is too small,
there will be slow convergence. Conversely, if it is too large, unnecessarily large
gaussian noise will be introduced on the gradient update. Intuitively, Cb should
be adjusted so that ||g(xci)||2 ≈ Cb for each record xci . This guarantees that
the contribution of xci to g˜ is maximally preserved with the smallest relative
error. Hence, instead of fixing Cb for the whole training, we aim to compute Cb
adaptively for each batch as Cb = (1/L)
∑
i ||g(xci)||2. This adaptive approach
would ensure fast convergence with small error, and also adapt to the gradient
update of every batch. Indeed, SGD is iterative, so the gradient update g˜ of a
batch/iteration depends on that of the previous batch/iteration, which means
that (1/L)∑i ||g(xci)||2 is different for each batch.
In DPNorm (see Algorithm 6), the computation of the average norm in
a set B of records is randomized to guarantee privacy. A naive solution is to
add gaussian noise to this average, i.e., Cb = (1/L)
∑
x∈B ||x||2 +N(0, s ·σ′/L),
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Algorithm 6: DPNorm: Private Approximation of Average Norm
Input: Data: B = {xc1 , . . . ,xcL}, Noise scale: σC, Max. norm bound:
Cmax, Max. number of discretized norm bounds: w
1 Cj ← j ·Cmax/w for 0≤ j ≤ w
2 Cb← argmaxj≥1{tj +N(0,
√
2σC)}, where
tj = |{x ∈B : Cj−1 < ||g(x)||2 ≤ Cj}|
Output: Cb
where s≥maxx∈B ||x||2. However, maxx∈B ||x||2 is data-dependent and can be
too large if there are outliers in B. Instead, we approximate Cb such that its
value is close to the norm of many records in B, i.e., it is a good approximator
of (1/L)∑x∈B ||x||2. In particular, we discretize the domain of Cb by dividing
(0,Cmax) uniformly into w intervals (Line 1 of Algorithm 6). Then, we use the
Gaussian mechanism (Line 2 of Algorithm 6) to select among the upper bounds
Cj = jCmax/w of these intervals (0 ≤ j ≤ w), which will be the norm bound
Cb for B. Specifically, we build a histogram where bin i equals the number of
records whose gradient norm falls within (Ci−1,Ci]. Then, the (noisy) mode of
this histogram is computed by adding independent gaussian noise N(0,
√
2σC)
to each count, and selecting the bin which has the greatest noisy count. Note
that the L2-sensitivity of the histogram is always bounded by
√
2 no matter
how large maxx∈B ||x||2 is.
5.1.4 Synthetic data generation
To generate an accurate synthetic dataset, data generation should mimic
the training process; in order to generate a synthetic sample, a model with
parameter θi is first selected randomly with probability 1/|Xˆi|, then a synthetic
sample is generated using the selected model. This process is repeated until
|X| samples are obtained.
The above generation process ensures that low quality models which were
not selected in training are also less likely to be used for data generation. In
particular, though each model is trained during the same number of epochs
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on its own cluster in expectation, there is no guarantee that all k models will
produce identical quality of synthetic samples due to randomization. Indeed,
a cluster can potentially contain dissimilar samples, or it may be too small to
be selected in Line 5 of Algorithm 3 and hence fail to converge.
5.2 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we present the formal privacy analysis of DPGM. Recall
that DPGM is the composition of private kernel k-means and private SGD.
Let K denote the private kernel k-means algorithm whose output is the noisy
mapped cluster centers after TK clustering iterations (i.e.,K(X) = {cˆ1, . . . , cˆk}).
K is composed of (1) selecting the norm bound using DPNorm and (2) TK
iterations of k-means. Let G1 denote the gaussian mechanism which selects
the norm bound as per Section 5.1.3. A single k-means iteration is the 2-fold
adaptive composition of two gaussian mechanisms G2 and G3 (in Lines 14-15
of Algorithm 4), where G2 perturbs the cluster size (Line 14), while G3 adds
noise to the sum of Fourier features of the cluster members (Line 15). The
L2-sensitivity of the size of every clusters is
√
2, as changing a single record
can change the size of at most two clusters. Similarly, the L2-sensitivity of
the sum of Fourier features of the cluster members is
√
2Cb as it is detailed in
Section 5.1.1.
Since K is the TK-fold adaptive composition of TK clustering iterations,
it follows from Theorem 2 and Lemma 1 (see Section 2.1.3):
βK(λ)≤ TK(βG1(λ) +βG2(λ) +βG3(λ))
≤ TK(λ2 +λ)(1/4σ2C+ 1/2σ2K) (5.2)
Note that if the RBF kernel is used in kernel k-means (i.e., κ(x,y) =
exp(−γ||x−y||2) in Algorithm 4), then βG1(λ) = 0 and βK(λ)≤TK(λ2+λ)/2σ2K
since Cb = 1 is a priori bound on the L2-norm of every feature vector (cf. The-
orem 3).
Let Sk denote the private SGD algorithm whose output is the noisy model
parameters after TS SGD iterations (i.e., S(X) = {θ1, . . . , θk}, computed in the
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last iteration of Algorithm 3), and the input is the cluster centers {cˆ1, . . . , cˆk}
provided by K. At the very beginning, S assigns each record to its closest
cluster center in feature space to obtain k non-overlapping training sets (this
is implemented by the last iteration in Algorithm 4). Changing a single record
alters at most a single record in at most 2 training sets (clusters), as the
modified record can be moved from one to another training set. Since all
training sets are non-overlapping, each record is selected in an SGD iteration
with probability q = (|Xˆb|/|X|)× (L/||Xˆb|) = L/|X| for any k. Moreover, each
of the k models are trained independently, so βSk(λ)≤ βS1(λ), where S1 denotes
the case when k = 1 (i.e., a single model is trained on the whole dataset X
during TS epochs).
The complete SGD training of S1 (Lines 4-7 in Algorithm 3) is the TS-fold
adaptive composition of TS SGD iterations, where we jointly use two pertur-
bation mechanisms G4 and G5 in each iteration; G4 selects a batch uniformly
at random and computes the norm bound Cb (Line 5 of Algorithm 5) for this
batch, then G5 selects the same batch and perturbs its gradient updates with
gaussian noise whose magnitude is calibrated to Cb (Line 7 of Algorithm 5).
The composition of these two mechanisms uses independent source of
randomness through different SGD iterations, hence we can use Theorem 2
to quantify the overall privacy. However, within a single iteration, G4 and G5
do not use independent source of randomness, although both mechanisms use
independent gaussian noise but select the same batch B from the dataset. The
following theorem computes βS1(λ), and is a generalization of Theorem 2 when
the component mechanisms can use dependent source of randomness.
Theorem 4 (General Moments Accountant). Let βAi(λ) be
maxX,X ′ logEO∼A(X)[exp(λP(A,X,X ′,O))], and A1:k be the k-fold adaptive
composition of A1,A2, . . . ,Ak. Then:
1. βA1:k(λ)≤
∑k
i=1 jiβAi(λ/ji)
2. A1:k is (ε,minλ exp(
∑k
i=1 ji ·βAi(λ/ji)−λε))-DP
for any ∑ki=1 ji = 1, where ji > 0 and A1,A2, . . . ,Ak can use dependent coin
tosses.
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Proof. We extend the proof of Theorem 2 in [1] to the case when the composite
mechanism A1:k consists of dependent mechanisms.
LetA1:k denote the composition ofA1,A2, . . . ,Ak andO= (O1,O2, . . . ,Ok).
Recall that, from Definition 1, A1:k is (ε,δ)-DP, if PrO∼A1:k(X)[P(A1:k,X,X
′,O)>
ε]≤ δ. Then:
P(A1:k,X,X ′,O)
= log Pr[A1:k(X) =O]Pr[A1:k(X ′) =O]
= log
k∏
i=1
Pr[Ai(X) =Oi|Ai−1(X) =Oi−1, . . . ,A1(X) =O1]
Pr[Ai(X ′) =Oi|Ai−1(X ′) =Oi−1, . . . ,A1(X ′) =O1]
(by the Chain rule)
=
k∑
i=1
log Pr[Ai(X) =Oi|Ai−1(X) =Oi−1, . . . ,A1(X) =O1]Pr[Ai(X ′) =Oi|Ai−1(X ′) =Oi−1, . . . ,A1(X ′) =O1]
=
k∑
i=1
P(Ai,X,X ′,Oi) (5.3)
for any neighboring datasets X and X ′. Hence,
βA1:k(λ) = maxX,X ′ logEO∼A(X)[exp(λP(A1:k,X,X
′,O))]
= max
X,X ′
logEO∼A(X)
exp
λ k∑
i=1
P(Ai,X,X ′,Oi)
 (by Eq. (5.3))
= max
X,X ′
logEO∼A(X)
 k∏
i=1
exp
(
λP(Ai,X,X ′,Oi)
)
≤max
X,X ′
log
k∏
i=1
(
EOi∼Ai(X)
[
exp
(
λP(Ai,X,X ′,Oi)/ji
)])ji
(by the generalization of Hölder’s inequality)
≤max
X,X ′
k∑
i=1
ji log
(
EOi∼Ai(X)
[
exp
(
λP(Ai,X,X ′,Oi)/ji
)])
≤
k∑
i=1
jimax
X,X ′
log
(
EOi∼Ai(X)
[
exp
(
λP(Ai,X,X ′,Oi)/ji
)])
≤
k∑
i=1
jiβAi(λ/ji) (5.4)
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where we can apply the generalization of Hölder’s inequality in the first in-
equality due to the fact that exp(·) is always positive. Therefore,
Pr[P(A1:k,X,X ′,O)≥ ε] = Pr[exp(λP(A1:k,X,X ′,O))≥ exp(λε)]
≤ EO∼A(X)[exp(λP(A1:k,X,X ′,O))]/exp(λε) (by Markov’s inequality)
≤ exp(βA1:k(λ)−λε)≤ exp
 k∑
i=1
jiβAi(λ/ji)−λε
 (by Eq. (5.4))
The claim follows from Definition 1.
Therefore, it follows from Theorem 2 and 4 that:
βSk(λ)≤ βS1(λ)
≤ TS · min
j1,j2∈(0,1):j1+j2=1
(j1βG4(λ/j1) + j2βG5(λ/j2)) (5.5)
We compute βG4(λ) and βG5(λ) similarly to [1]. That is, let µ0(x|σ) =
g(x|σ) and µ1(x|σ) = (1−q)g(x|σ)+qg(x−1|σ), where q = L/|X| is the prob-
ability that a record is included in the batch B of an SGD iteration and
g(x|σ) = 1√
2piσ2
e−x
2/2σ2 . Then, it holds:
βG3(λ) = logmax(E1(λ,σC),E2(λ,σC))
βG4(λ) = logmax(E1(λ,σG),E2(λ,σG))
where
E1(λ,σ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
µ0(x|σ) ·
(
µ0(x|σ)
µ1(x|σ)
)λ
dx
E2(λ,σ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
µ1(x|σ) ·
(
µ1(x|σ)
µ0(x|σ)
)λ
dx
The next theorem immediately follows from Theorem 2 and Theorem 4.
Theorem 5. Our differentially private generative model (DPGM) is
(min
λ
(
βK(λ) +βSk(λ)− logδ
)
/λ,δ)
-differentially private for any fixed δ, where βK(λ) and βSk(λ) are defined in
Eq. 5.2 and 5.5.
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Dataset |X| |I|=m max ||x||1 avg ||x||1
MNIST 60,000 784 311.69 102.44
CDR 4,427,486 1303 422 11.42
TRANSIT 1,200,000 342 57 5.26
Table 5.2: The datasets used in our experiments: MNIST (images), CDR (call
detail records), and TRANSIT (transport records).
We use the convention that δ= 1/|X|, and compute ε numerically. Specif-
ically, ε= minλ
(
βK(λ) +βSk(λ)− logδ
)
/λ is minimized over integer values of
λ, where λ is usually no more than 100 in practice. The computation of βG3
and βG4 are performed through numerical integration, and it suffices to con-
sider 10 different values of j1 and j2 in order to have a sufficiently small value
of j1βG3(λ/`1) + j2βG4(λ/`2) in Eq. 5.5. Therefore, in practice, given δ, an
accurate approximation of ε can be obtained with negligible overhead.
5.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we report the results of an experimental evaluation geared
to compute the exact privacy guarantees of DPGM (presented in Algorithm 3).
We also analyze its performance in terms of the quality of generated samples
as well as counting (linear) queries computed on the synthetic data. Count-
ing queries provide the basis of many data analysis and learning algorithms
(see [29] for examples). Finally, we measure the accuracy of our private kernel
k-means described in Algorithm 4.
5.3.1 Experimental setup
Datasets. We use three datasets for our evaluations, summarized in Table 5.2.
MNIST is a public image dataset [124], which includes 28× 28-pixel images
of hand-written digits, a total of 60,000 samples. We vectorize and binarize
each image to have binary data records with size m = 784. Throughout our
experiments, we assume that each of the 60,000 records originates from a
5.3. Experimental Evaluation 107
different person. We also use an anonymized CDR (Call Detail Record) dataset
provided to us by a cell phone operator. For this dataset, I represents the set
of cell towers of the operator in a large city with |X| = 4,427,486 customers.
We use a simplified version of the dataset, which contains the set of visited
cell towers per customer within the administrative region of the city over 128.1
km2, where the total number of towers is m= 1,303.
Finally, we experiment with a transit dataset, which we denote as TRAN-
SIT in the rest of the chapter. Due to non-disclosure agreement, we are unable
to provide specific details about the dataset, however, we can report that the
TRANSIT dataset include the transit history of passengers in the network
(with |X| = 1,200,000); here, I represents the set of m = 342 stations in a
public transportation network.
Experimental setup. For RBM, we set the number of hidden units to 200
and the learning rate is 0.01. The biases b and c are initialized to zeros, while
the initial values of the weights W are randomly chosen from a zero-mean
Gaussian with a standard deviation of 0.01. For VAE, the number of hidden
units is set to 200 with single layer encoder and decoder, and a bi-dimensional
latent space. We also used the rectifier activation function (ReLu) for all
neurons and the Adam optimizer [116]. For our purposes, it is enough to
compute β(λ) for λ≤ 32. We set the number of the private k-means iterations
to 20 and δ = 1/|X|. We also set Cmax = 10, w = 100 (in Algorithm 6), as
different values of these parameters do not have a strong impact on the results.
We implement DPGM with both RBM (in C++) and VAE (in Python).
Experiments are performed on a workstation running Ubuntu Server 16.04
LTS, with a 3.4 GHz CPU i7-6800K, 32GB RAM, and NVIDIA Titan X GPU
card.
5.3.2 Results with image dataset
Privacy guarantees. We report the privacy loss ε of DPGM (Algorithm 3)
in Figure 5.2 for the MNIST dataset. Recall that ε is computed from the noise
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Figure 5.2: ε value as a function of the number of SGD training epochs for MNIST
(δ = 10−5,TK = 20)
level σC, σK, and σG, the sampling probability q, the number of k-means iter-
ations TK, and the number of SGD iterations TS using Theorem 5. Figure 5.2
shows ε depending on the number of SGD training epochs, where one epoch
consists of d1/qe SGD iterations. In Figure 5.2(a)–5.2(c), we fix σC = 4.0, and
report the value of ε as a function of the number of epochs. We note that
larger sampling probabilities (q) and more epochs yield larger values of ε, i.e.,
worse privacy guarantee. Figure 5.2(b)– 5.2(c) show that larger values of σK
and σG yield stronger privacy guarantees.
Clustering accuracy. Next, in Figure 5.3, we compare the private kernel
k-means (Algorithm 4) with RBF kernel with standard DP k-means [29].
We evaluate the unsupervised clustering accuracy (ACC) [214], where ACC =
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Figure 5.3: Clustering accuracy as a function of ε on MNIST (δ = 10−5,TK = 20).
maxu |{x:x∈X∧label(x)=u(K(x))}||X| , label(x) is the ground-truth label of sample x
2,
K(x) is the cluster assignment obtained by clustering algorithm K, and u is a
one-to-one mapping between cluster assignments and labels. The best mapping
can be obtained using the Hungarian algorithm. To make a fair comparison,
we fix Cb to
√
m = 28 for standard private k-means without RFF features,
and Cb = 1 for private kernel k-means with RFF features based on Theorem 3
– i.e., we do not call DPNorm in either of the algorithms. We compute the
clustering accuracy for different values of d depending on σK, which directly
yields the privacy bound ε using Eq. 5.2 and Theorem 2. Finally, we plot
the average accuracy over 100 runs as function of ε in Figure 5.3.3 Private
kernel k-means is clearly superior to standard DP k-means, as the difference
in clustering accuracy can be as large as 20%, especially for smaller values of
ε. Shorter RFF features (i.e., smaller d) result in larger accuracy for smaller
values of ε, whereas the reverse holds for larger ε. The reason is that the clus-
tering error is determined by the trade-off between (1) the perturbation error
due to the Gaussian noise, which is added to the cluster centers in Line 15 of
Algorithm 4, and (2) the approximation error caused by the low-dimensional
2For MNIST, these are digits ranging from 0 to 9.
3Standard deviation of accuracy is < 0.05 for all values of ε and d.
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(a) Real samples (b) VAE w/o clustering
(c) VAE with clustering (d) RBM with clustering
Figure 5.4: Real MNIST samples and samples generated from DPGM with RBM
and VAE after 20 epochs (ε = 1.74,TK = 20). In (c) and (d), each row contains 8
samples generated from a cluster.
embedding z in Line 4 of Algorithm 4. In particular, the perturbation error
increases if ε decreases or d increases. Indeed, when the distance ||zˆ(x)− cˆj ||22
to each cluster center cˆj is computed in Line 12 of Algorithm 4, the total per-
turbation of this distance value is obtained by aggregating the noise values on
each coordinate of cˆj , and hence the perturbation error is proportional to the
size d of vector cˆj as well as to ε−1. On the other hand, larger d decreases the
approximation error introduced by z. One can find a good trade-off between
the approximation and the perturbation error by adjusting d and ε through
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(b) ε= 1.0
Figure 5.5: Average relative error vs. ε for the CDR dataset (q = 2.2 · 10−5, δ =
4.4 ·10−6)
experiments using publicly available data. For the rest of experiments, we set
d to 200.
Selecting the optimal number of clusters k for kernel k-means can be qual-
itatively and visually done by relying on dimensionality reduction algorithms
(e.g., t-SNE [136]). To this end, one can use public data sampled from the
same underlying distribution, and therefore not requiring to make the param-
eter selection step differentially private. For MNIST we set k = 10, while we
select only one cluster for the CDR dataset. We investigate the effects of
different values of k for the transit dataset.
Synthetic samples. As training progresses, the synthetic samples produced
by the generative models should resemble the true samples. To evaluate model
quality, we show the synthetic samples obtained at epoch 20 in Figure 5.4 from
a Restricted Boltzmann Machine and a Variational Autoencoder with k = 10
clusters on MNIST. For this experiment, we set q = 0.0017 for a final privacy
budget ε of 1.74, and performed TK = 20 clustering iterations before training
the generative neural networks. Overall, the samples generated from VAE
(Figure 5.4(c)) provide better visual quality than the ones generated from the
RBM (Figure 5.4(d)). Note that the samples generated from the VAE without
our private clustering technique (Figure 5.4(b)) have bad visual quality.
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(b) ε= 1.0
Figure 5.6: Average relative error vs. ε for the transit dataset (q = 10−4, δ = 10−6)
5.3.3 Results with CDR and transit dataset
We consider counting queries, which are specified by a predicate function
p : X → {0,1} and return the number of users in the dataset which satisfy
the given predicate p, i.e., Qp(X) =
∑
x∈X p(x). We evaluate the accuracy
of counting queries on a synthetic dataset generated by DPGM from our call-
data-record (CDR) dataset with roughly 4 million users and the transit dataset
with roughly 1 million users (see Table 5.2). A single query is defined by a
subset of tower cells, and returns the number of users in X who visited these
cells. We compare DPGM with MWEM [93], which is a de facto standard
differentially private mechanism to answer counting queries.
As done in previous work [213], we measure the utility of a counting query
Qp over the sanitized dataset Xˆ by its relative error with respect to the actual
result over the raw dataset X. The relative error of Qp is thus computed
as |Qp(Xˆ)−Qp(X)|max{Qp(X),s} , where s is a sanity bound that weight the influence of the
queries with small selectivities. Following the convention, the sanity bound is
set to 0.1% of the dataset size.
First, we examine the relative error of counting queries with respect to
privacy loss ε. 1,000 counting queries are randomly generated with different
number of tower cells, which we refer as the length of the query. Each query
set is divided into 5 subsets such that the query length of the i-th subset is
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uniformly distributed in
[
1, i·max ||x||15
]
and each item is randomly drawn from
universe of items. Figure 5.5 reports the average relative error for each query
set. This shows that our approach clearly outperforms MWEM. We think this
is due to the use of advanced generative machine learning models, which learn
a better approximation of the real dataset than the Multiplicative Weight
update rule of MWEM. Furthermore, our approach relies on the moments
accountant [1], which provides a tighter bound on the privacy loss than the
one provided by the Exponential Mechanism in MWEM.
The error of DPGM ranges from 0.017 for 20% query length to 0.0012
for 100% when ε = 1.0. Weaker privacy guarantee (larger values of ε) lead to
slightly smaller errors (Figure 5.5(b)). By contrast, the error of MWEM ranges
from 0.11 to 0.05 even for ε = 2. After clipping each record to have L1-norm
avg||x||1 = 12, the sensitivity of queries is set to 12, and the iterations of the
MWEM algorithm is set to 50 [93]. Also note that the synthetic data produced
by DPGM allows the evaluation of arbitrary number of type of queries, not
only linear counting queries.
Finally, Figure 5.6 reports the average relative error for the transit dataset
with different number of clusters k. Our approach, whose average relative
error ranges from 0.09 to 0.02, significantly outperforms MWEM. However,
the number of clusters does not affect the error of counting queries on transit
dataset due to the fact that the private clustering fails to find meaningful
clusters for this type of data.
5.3.4 Multi-layer Variational Autoencoder
Finally, we report additional results for a VAE with a double layer encoder
and decoder. In Figure 5.7, we show the synthetic samples obtained at epoch
20 from a VAE with k = 10 clusters on MNIST.
Then, Figure 5.8(a) reports the average relative error for the CDR dataset,
while Figure 5.8(b) shows the average relative error for the transit dataset with
different number of clusters k.
Overall, we can observe that increasing the number of layers, and thus
114Chapter 5. Privacy-Preserving Data Release with Generative Neural Networks
(a) ε= 1.74 (b) ε= 2.0
Figure 5.7: Samples generated from a double layer VAE after 20 epochs. Each
row contains 8 samples generated from a cluster.
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Figure 5.8: Average relative error with ε= 1.0 for the CDR and transit datasets.
the capacity of the VAE, does not lead to better performance for this dataset.
Chapter 6
Evaluating Privacy Leakage of
Generative Models
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, previous work proposed passive and active
membership inference attacks – i.e., the presence of exact data points in train-
ing data – against machine learning classifiers [189, 222]. By contrast, in this
chapter, we set out to study how generating synthetic samples through gener-
ative models may lead to information leakage, hence, to violating privacy of
individuals contributing their (sensitive) data to train these models.
More specifically, aiming to perform membership inference, we train a
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), described in Section 2.3.4, on samples
generated from the model under attack. Our intuition is that, if a generative
model overfits, then a GAN, which combines a discriminator and a generator,
should be able to detect this overfitting, even if it is not observable to a human,
since the discriminator is trained to learn statistical differences in distributions.
We leverage the ability of GANs to classify real and synthetic records in order
to recognize differences in the samples generated from the model, on inputs on
which it was trained versus those on which it was not.
We test our attacks on several state-of-the-art models such as Deep
The research presented in this chapter was joint work with a fellow PhD student Jamie
Hayes. The author equally contributed to the design of the attacks presented in Section 6.1,
and lead the work on the experimental evaluation of the attacks on the LFW dataset in Sec-
tions 6.2 and 6.3, as well as the evaluation of potential defenses described in Section 6.3.3.
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Convolutional GAN (DCGAN) [176], Boundary Equilibrium GAN (BE-
GAN) [25], and the combination of DCGAN with a Variational Autoencoder
(DCGAN+VAE) [122], using datasets with complex representations of faces
(LFW), objects (CIFAR-10), and medical images (Diabetic Retinopathy), con-
taining rich details both in the foreground and background. This represents a
much more challenging task for the attacker compared to simple datasets such
as MNIST, where samples from each class have very similar features.
6.1 Attacks Outline
In this section, we present our membership inference attacks against gen-
erative models.
6.1.1 Threat model
We consider an adversary that aims to infer whether a single known record
was included in the training set of a generative model. We distinguish between
two settings, namely, black-box and white-box attacks. In the former, the
attacker can only make queries to the target model under attack – which we
denote as the target model – and has no access to the internal parameters of
the model; in the latter, they also have access to the parameters of a trained
target model. In both settings, we allow the adversary to know the size of the
training set, but not its original data-points. Variants of the attack allow the
adversary to access some further side information, as discussed below. The
accuracy of the attack is measured as the fraction of the records correctly
inferred as members of the training set.
Note that, in order to evaluate the accuracy of our attacks, we will consider
an attacker attempting to distinguish data-points used to train the target
model, thus, we consider an attacker that has access to a dataset they suspect
contains the original training records. However, the construction of the attack
does not depend on access to any dataset. We assume the attacker knows the
size of the training set – as part of the information included with the target
model metadata or leaked following a data breach – but does not know how
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data-points are split into training and test sets.
In the black-box attack setting, we assume the attacker does not have prior
or side information about training records or the target model. In particular,
the attack proceeds with no knowledge of the following:
1. Target model parameters and hyper-parameters: No access to network
weights from the trained target model, nor to hyper-parameters such as
regularization parameters or number of epochs used to train the target
model.
2. Target model architecture: The attacker has no knowledge of the archi-
tecture of the target model.
3. Dataset used to train the target model: No knowledge of data-points used
to train the target model, or the type of data-points used in training, since
this is inferred from sampling the target model at inference time. Note
that, by contrast, the membership inference attack on discriminative
models by Shokri et al. [189] does require some information about the
dataset, e.g., the syntactic format of data records used in training, in
order to generate synthetic samples used in the attack.
4. Prediction values: Shokri et al. [189] show that predictions scores leak
information used to perform membership inference attacks. However,
due to the very nature of generative models, the attacker cannot generate
prediction scores directly from the target model.
6.1.2 White-box attack
We now present our white-box attack, illustrated in Figure 6.1. To
evaluate the attack, here we assume that an attacker Awb has access to the
trained target model, namely, a GAN – i.e., a generator Gtarget and a dis-
criminator Dtarget. We also assume the attacker has access to a dataset,
X = {x1, . . . ,xm+n}, which they suspect contains data-points used to train
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Figure 6.1: High-level Outline of the White-Box Attack.
Figure 6.2: White-Box Prediction Method: The attacker inputs data-points to the
Discriminator D (1), extracts the output probabilities (2), and sorts them (3).
the target model, where n is the size of the training set, and m is the number
of data-points that do not belong to the training set.
The target model has been trained to generate samples that resemble
the training set samples. Awb creates a local copy of Dtarget, which we
refer to as Dwb. Then, as shown in Figure 6.2, Awb inputs all samples
X = {x1, . . . ,xm+n} into Dwb, which outputs the resulting probability vector
p = [Dwb(x1), . . . ,Dwb(xm+n)]. If the target model overfitted on the training
data, Dwb will place a higher confidence value on samples that were part of the
training set. Awb sorts their predictions, p, in descending order and takes the
samples associated with the largest n probabilities as predictions for members
of the training set.
Note that the attacker does not need to train a model; rather, it relies on
internal access to the target model, from which the attack can be launched.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.3: High-level overview of the (a) black-box attack with no auxiliary
knowledge, and (b) Discriminative and (c) Generative black-box attack with limited
auxiliary attacker knowledge.
6.1.3 Black-box attack with no auxiliary knowledge
In the black-box setting, we assume that the attacker Abb does not have
access to the target model parameters. Thus, Abb cannot directly steal the
discriminator model from the target as in the white-box attack. Furthermore,
while in the white-box attack we restrict the target model to be a GAN, here
we do not, and the target model may not have an associated discriminative
model (as with VAEs). Again, to evaluate the attack, we assume the attacker
has access to a dataset, X = {x1, . . . ,xm+n}, which they suspect contains data-
points used to train the target model, where n is the size of the training set.
However, the attacker has no knowledge of how the training set was constructed
from X, thus, they do no have access to the true labels of samples from the
dataset and so cannot train a model using a discriminative approach. Instead,
Abb trains a GAN in order to re-create the target model locally and, in the
process, creates a discriminator Dbb, which detects overfitting in the generative
target model Gtarget. We illustrate the attack in Figure 6.3(a).
More specifically, Abb locally trains a GAN (Gbb, Dbb) using queries from
the target, i.e., Abb trains the local GAN on samples generated by Gtarget.
Note that as the black-box attack depends only on samples generated by the
target model, Gtarget can be any generative model. We assume Abb has nei-
ther knowledge nor control over the source of randomness used to generate the
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samples generated by Gbb. After the GAN has been trained, the attack pro-
ceeds to the white-box setting, i.e., Abb inputs data-points X into Dbb, sorts
the resulting probabilities, and takes the largest n points as predictions for the
training set (as shown in Figure 6.2).
6.1.4 Black-box attack with limited auxiliary knowledge
In the black-box attack presented above, we assume that Abb has no ad-
ditional knowledge about subsets of members of the dataset. However, we
also study the case where an attacker could leverage limited additional side
information about the training set. This is a realistic setting, which has been
considered extensively in the literature. For instance, social graph knowl-
edge has been used to de-anonymize social networks [156]. Overall, auxil-
iary/incomplete knowledge of sensitive datasets is a common assumption in
literature [175, 108].
Access to side information about the training set means that the attacker
can “augment” the black-box attack. We consider two attack settings: a gener-
ative and a discriminative one. In both settings, we consider a scenario where
the attacker has incomplete knowledge of members of the test dataset, the
training dataset, or both.
Discriminative setting. We consider an attacker that trains a simple dis-
criminative model to infer membership of the training set, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 6.3(b). This is feasible since the attacker now has access to membership
binary labels, i.e., whether data points belong to the training set or not. Thus,
they do not need to train a generative model to detect overfitting. Within this
setting, we consider two scenarios:
(1) The attacker has limited auxiliary knowledge of samples that were not
used to train the target model.
(2) The attacker has limited auxiliary knowledge of both training set and
test set samples.
In both cases, the general method of attack is the same: an attacker trains a
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local model to detect overfitting in the target model. In (1), the discriminator,
D, is fed samples from this auxiliary set, labeled as fake samples, and samples
generated by the target model, labeled as real samples. If the target model
overfits the training set, D will learn to discriminate between training and
non-training samples. In (2), D is fed both target generated samples and
the auxiliary training samples, labeled as real samples, and samples from the
auxiliary test set, labeled as fake samples. Once the attacker has trained
a discriminator, the attack again proceeds as described in Figure 6.2. Note
that we have to consider that the attacker knows some test samples (i.e., fake
samples) in order to properly train a binary discriminator.
Generative setting. We also consider a generative attack, as outlined in Fig-
ure 6.3(c), again, as per two scenarios:
(1) The attacker has limited auxiliary knowledge of samples that were used
to train the target model.
(2) The attacker has limited auxiliary knowledge of both training set and
test set samples.
With both, the attacker trains a local model – specifically, a GAN – that
aims to detect overfitting in the target model. In (1), the discriminator of
the attacker GAN, Dbb, is trained using samples generated by Gbb, labeled
as fake samples, and both samples from the auxiliary training set and target
generated samples, labeled as real samples. Intuitively, we expect the attacker
model to be stronger at recognizing overfitting in the target model, if it has
auxiliary knowledge of samples on which it was originally trained. In (2), Dbb
is trained on samples generated by Gbb and samples from auxiliary set of test
ones, labeled as fake samples, and samples generated by the target model and
samples from the auxiliary training set, labeled as real ones. The attacker GAN
is trained to learn to discriminate between training and non-training samples
directly. Again, once the attacker has trained their model, data-points from
X are fed into Dbb, and their predictions are sorted as described in Figure 6.2.
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(a) LFW,
top ten classes
(b) LFW,
random 10%
(c) CIFAR-10,
random 10%
Figure 6.4: Real samples.
6.2 Evaluation
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of the attacks de-
scribed above.
6.2.1 Experimental setup
Testbed. Experiments are performed using PyTorch1 on a workstation run-
ning Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS, equipped with a 3.4GHz CPU i7-6800K, 32GB
RAM, and an NVIDIA Titan X GPU card.
Settings. For white-box attacks, we measure membership inference accuracy
at successive epochs of training the target model, where one epoch corresponds
to one round of training on all training set inputs.2 For black-box attacks, we
fix the target model and measure membership inference accuracy at successive
training steps of the attacker model, where one training step is defined as one
iteration of training on a mini-batch of inputs. The attacker model is trained
using soft and noisy labels as suggested in [183], i.e., we replace labels with
random numbers in [0.7,1.2] for real samples, and random values in [0.0,0.3]
for fake samples. Also, we occasionally flip the labels when training the dis-
criminator. These modifications to the GAN have been shown to stabilize
training in practice [52].
1https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch
2We update model weights after training on mini-batches of 32 samples.
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Datasets. We start by testing our attacks on two popular machine learning
datasets, namely, Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) [102] and CIFAR-10 [119],
then, in Section 6.2.7, we present a case-study evaluation on a medical image
dataset, i.e., the diabetic retinopathy (DR) dataset [110]. LFW includes 13,233
images of faces collected from the Web, while CIFAR-10 consists of 60,000
32x32 color images in 10 classes, with 6,000 images per class. For both of them,
we randomly choose 10% of the dataset for the training set. Note that LFW
is unbalanced, i.e., some people appear in multiple images, while others only
appear once. We also perform experiments so that the training set is chosen
to include the ten most popular classes of people in terms of number of images
they appear in, which amounts to 12.2% of the LFW dataset. Intuitively, we
expect that models trained on the top ten classes will overfit more than the
same models trained on random 10% subsets, as we are training on a more
homogeneous set of images. Figure 6.4 shows real samples from LFW and
CIFAR-10.
Finally, the DR dataset consists of 88,702 high-resolution retina images
taken under a variety of image conditions. From DR, we select images that
labeled as having moderate to proliferate diabetic retinopathy presence, and
use them to train the generative target model.
Models. Since the introduction of GANs [87], a few variants have been pro-
posed to improve training stability and sample quality. In particular, deep
convolutional generative adversarial networks (DCGANs) [176] combine the
GAN training process with convolutional neural networks (CNNs). CNNs are
considered the state-of-the-art for a range image recognition tasks and, by
combining CNNs with the GAN training processes, DCGANs perform well
at unsupervised learning tasks such as generating complex representations of
objects and faces [176].
GANs have also been combined with VAEs [122], by collapsing the gener-
ator (of the GAN) and decoder (of the VAE) into one, the model uses learned
feature representations in the GAN discriminator as the reconstructive error
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term in the VAE. Experimentally, it has been shown that combining the DC-
GAN architecture with a VAE yields more realistic generated samples [164].
More recently, Boundary Equilibrium GAN (BEGAN) [25] have been proposed
as an approximate measure of convergence. Loss terms in GAN training do not
correlate with sample quality, making it difficult for a practitioner to decide
when to stop training. This decision is usually performed by visually inspect-
ing generated samples. BEGAN proposes a new method for training GANs by
changing the loss function. The discriminator is an autoencoder and the loss
is a function of the quality of reconstruction achieved by the discriminator on
both generated and real samples. BEGAN produces realistic samples [25], and
is simpler to train since loss convergence and sample quality is linked with one
another.
We evaluate our attacks using, as the target model, DCGAN, DC-
GAN+VAE, and BEGAN, while fixing DCGAN as the attacker model. This
choice of models is supported by recent work by Lucic et al. [135], who show
that no other GAN model performs significantly better than our choices. Fur-
thermore, they show VAE models perform significantly worse than any GAN
variant.
6.2.2 Naïve approaches
We begin our evaluation with a naïve Euclidean distance based attack,
which further motivates the use of more sophisticated machine learning tech-
niques. Given a sample generated by a target model, the attacker computes
the Euclidean distance between the generated sample and every real sample
in the dataset. Repeating this multiple times for newly generated samples,
the attacker computes an average distance from each real sample, sorts the
average distances, and takes the smallest n distances (and the associated real
samples) as the guess for the training set, where n is the size of the training
set.
We perform this attack on a target model (DCGAN) trained on a random
10% subset of CIFAR-10 and a random 10% subset of LFW. Figure 6.5 clearly
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Figure 6.5: Euclidean attack results for DCGAN target model trained on a random
10% subset of CIFAR-10 and LFW.
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Figure 6.6: Black-box attack results with 10% auxiliary attacker training set knowl-
edge used to train a DCGAN shadow model for DCGAN target model trained on a
random 10% subset of LFW.
shows that this Euclidean attack does not perform better than if the attacker
were to randomly guess which real samples were part of the original training
set.
We also report on the results of a black-box setting where 10% of training
set samples from LFW are used to train a shadow model, inspired by the
techniques of Shokri et al. [189] – see Figure 6.6. Samples generated by this
model are then injected into the attacker model together with the samples
generated by the target model. More specifically, at training time, each mini-
batch is composed of synthetic samples generated either by the target model
or by the shadow model. However, this attack, only yields around 18% of
accuracy, with no improvements during training.
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Figure 6.7: Accuracy of white-box attack with different datasets and training sets.
6.2.3 White-box attack
We now present the results of our evaluation of the white-box attack de-
scribed in Section 6.1.2 on LFW and CIFAR-10. For the LFW dataset, we
build the training set either as a random 10% subset of the dataset or the top
ten classes. For CIFAR-10, the training set is a random 10% subset of the
dataset. The target models we implement are DCGAN, DCGAN+VAE, and
BEGAN. In the rest of this section, we will include a baseline in the plots (red
dotted line) that corresponds to the success of an attacker randomly guessing
which samples belong to the training set. We observe that both DCGAN and
DCGAN+VAE are vulnerable to the white-box attack. For DCGAN and DC-
GAN+VAE target models trained for 100 epochs, the attacker infers training
set membership with 80% accuracy, and for models trained for 400 epochs –
with 98% and 97% accuracy, respectively. The BEGAN target model does
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overfit, although to a lesser extent: after 400 epochs, an attacker with white-
box access to the BEGAN target model can infer membership of the training
set with 60% accuracy. In Figure 6.7(b), we report the results of white-box
attacks against a target model trained on a random 10% subset of the LFW
dataset. Similar to Figure 6.7(a), both DCGAN and DCGAN+VAE are vul-
nerable: when these are trained for 250 epochs, an attacker can achieve perfect
training set membership inference. BEGAN performs similar to the top ten
classes white-box experiment, achieving 62% accuracy after 400 epochs. Fi-
nally, Figure 6.7(c) plots the accuracy of the white-box attack against a target
model trained on a random 10% subset of CIFAR-10.
For DCGAN, results are similar to DCGAN on LFW, with perfect train-
ing set membership inference after 400 epochs. However, DCGAN+VAE does
not leak information (does not overfit) until around 250 epochs, where accu-
racy remains relatively steady, at 10-20%. Instead, after 250 epochs, the model
overfits, with accuracy reaching 80% by 400 epochs. BEGAN, while producing
quality samples, does not overfit, with final training set membership inference
accuracy of 19%, i.e., only 9% better than random guess. Due to the lim-
ited accuracy of BEGAN in comparison to other models, we discard it as a
target model for black-box attacks as it does not seem to be vulnerable to
membership inference attacks. Note that GAN models need to be trained for
hundreds of epochs before reaching good samples quality. Indeed, the original
DCGAN/BEGAN papers report 2x and 1.5x the number of network updates
(when adjusted for training set size) as our white-box attack, to train DCGAN
and BEGAN, respectively.
In summary, we conclude that white-box attacks infer the training set
with up to perfect accuracy when DCGAN and DCGAN+VAE are the target
models. On the other hand, BEGAN is less vulnerable to white-box attacks,
with up to 62% accuracy.
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Figure 6.8: Accuracy of black-box attack on different datasets and training sets.
6.2.4 Black-box attack with no auxiliary knowledge
Next, we present the results of the black-box attacks (cf. Section 6.1.3)
on LFW and CIFAR-10. We assume the attacker has no knowledge of the
training or test sets other than the size of the original training set. Once
again, for LFW, the training set is either a random 10% subset of the dataset
or the top ten classes, while, for CIFAR-10, the training set is always a ran-
dom 10% subset of the dataset. The target models we implement are DCGAN
and DCGAN+VAE (fixed at epoch 400), and the attacker model uses DC-
GAN. Figure 6.8(a) plots the results of a black-box attack against a target
model trained on the top ten classes of the LFW dataset. After training the
attacker model on target queries, the attack achieves 63% training set member-
ship inference accuracy for both DCGAN and DCGAN+VAE target models.
Surprisingly, the attack performs equally well when the target model differs
6.2. Evaluation 129
from the attack model as when the target and attack model share the same
architecture. This highlights the fact that the attacker does not need to have
knowledge of the target model architecture in order to perform the attack.
In Figure 6.8(b), the results are with respect to a target model trained on
a random 10% subset of the LFW dataset. Once again, we find that DCGAN
and DCGAN+VAE target models are equally vulnerable to a black-box attack.
An attacker with no auxiliary information of the training set can still expect
to perform membership inference with 40% (38%) accuracy for the DCGAN
(DCGAN+VAE) target model.
Finally, Figure 6.8(c) plots the accuracy of a black-box attack against a
target model trained on a random 10% subset of the CIFAR-10 dataset. For
the DCGAN+VAE target model, accuracy reaches 20% after 1,000 training
steps and stays flat. For the DCGAN target model, the attacker can infer
training set membership with 37% accuracy, with accuracy improving steadily
throughout the attacker model training process.
We observe that the difference in attack success between the DCGAN and
DCGAN+VAE target models with CIFAR-10 and the similar success of the
two models with LFW occur in both white-box and black-box attacks. As ex-
pected, the best results are obtained when the attacker and target model have
the same architecture. However, the attack does not overwhelmingly suffer
under differing architectures. In fact, in LFW experiments there is a negligible
difference in attack success, and, in the CIFAR-10 black-box experiments, the
difference in accuracy is approximately 17%.
In summary, we conclude that our black-box attacks are less successful,
compared to white-box attack, in inferring membership, but perform similarly
against different target model architectures.
6.2.5 Black-box attack with limited auxiliary knowledge
As discussed in Section 6.1.4, we also consider black-box attacks where the
attacker has some limited auxiliary knowledge of the dataset. We now present
the results of these attacks on random 10% subsets of LFW and CIFAR-10
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Figure 6.9: Membership inference accuracy using a discriminative model, when the
attacker has knowledge of (i) 20% of the test set, or (ii) 30% of both training and
test sets. In (i), randomly guessing the training set corresponds to 14% accuracy, in
(ii), to 12% accuracy.
with DCGAN attacker and target models (fixed at epoch 400).
We consider different scenarios where the attacker has knowledge of 20–
30% of the training set, 20-30% of the test set, or both. Nonetheless, the total
number of samples of which the attacker has knowledge is quite modest. For
LFW, 20% of the random 10% training set corresponds to 264 out of 1,323
images, 20% of the test set to 2,382 out of 11,910 images, whereas, for CIFAR-
10, 20% of the random 10% training set amounts to 1,200 out of 6,000 images,
and 20% of the test set to 10,000 out of 50,000 images. An attacker with
auxiliary information of the training and test set has access to labels, and
therefore may not need to train a generative model to perform a membership
inference attack on a generative model. We also show that, while the attacker
can train a discriminative model to perform membership inference, such an
approach produces worse results than the generative method.
If an attacker has access to true labels within the dataset, they can train
a discriminative model on these samples in order to learn to classify train-
ing samples correctly. For both LFW and CIFAR-10 DCGAN target models,
trained on a random 10% subset of the dataset, we consider two settings:
(i) the attacker has 20% knowledge of the test set;
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(b) DCGAN+VAE
Figure 6.10: Black-box attack results with 20% attacker training set knowledge for
DCGAN/DCGAN+VAE target models, trained on a random 10% subset of LFW,
for different delays at which auxiliary knowledge is introduced into the attacker
model training.
(ii) the attacker has 30% knowledge of both the training and test set.
We use the discriminator from DCGAN as the discriminative model trained
by the attacker. In (i), we pass test set samples to the discriminator labeled as
fake samples, and target generated ones labeled as real ones. In (ii), we pass
test set samples to the discriminator labeled as fake ones, and target generated
and training set samples labeled as real ones.
In Figure 6.9, we plot the accuracy results for both settings, showing that
the attack fails with both datasets when the attacker has only test set knowl-
edge, performing no better than random guessing. Whereas, if the attacker
has both training and test knowledge, with LFW, the attacker achieves 50%
accuracy, while, for CIFAR-10, accuracy reaches 33%. Note that this approach
does not improve on CIFAR-10 black-box results with no auxiliary knowledge,
and only marginally improves on LFW results. As a result, we also experi-
ment with generative approaches to black-box attacks with auxiliary attacker
knowledge, as discussed next.
We consider the same set of experiments with similar settings for attacker
knowledge as in the discriminative approach; the only difference is that in
setting (i) we now assume the attacker has 20% knowledge of the training set
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Figure 6.11: Black-box results when the attacker has (a) knowledge of 20% of
the training set or (b) 30% of the training set and test set. The training set is a
random 10% subset of the LFW or CIFAR-10 dataset, and the target model is fixed
as DCGAN.
rather than the test set. We use DCGAN as the generative attacker model.
Specifically, we consider two settings in which:
(1) the attacker has 20% knowledge of the training set,
(2) the attacker has 30% knowledge of both the training and test set.
In all the experiments, we introduce a delay of 1000 training steps before the
attacker model uses the auxiliary attacker knowledge. We found that intro-
ducing the auxiliary knowledge early in training process of the attacker model
resulted in a weaker discriminator – see Figure 6.10. Figure 6.11(a) shows
results for setting (1): clearly, there is a substantial increase in accuracy for
the LFW dataset, from 40% attack accuracy to nearly 60%. However, there
is no increase in accuracy for the CIFAR-10 dataset. Thus, we conclude that
setting (1) does not generalize. Figure 6.11(b) shows results for setting (2); for
both LFW and CIFAR-10 there is a substantial improvement in accuracy. Ac-
curacy for the LFW experiment increases from 40% (with no auxiliary attacker
knowledge) to 60%, while, for CIFAR-10, from 37% to 58%.
Thus, we conclude that, even a small amount of auxiliary attacker knowl-
edge can lead to greatly improving membership inference attacks.
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(a) White-box attack. (b) Black-box attack.
Figure 6.12: Accuracy curves and samples at different stages of training on top ten
classes from the LFW dataset, showing a clear correlation between higher accuracy
and better sample quality.
(a) Real samples (b) Target samples (c) Attacker samples
Figure 6.13: Various samples from the real dataset, target model, and black-box
attack using the DCGAN target model on LFW, top ten classes.
6.2.6 Analysis
Aiming to better understand the relationship between membership infer-
ence and training performance, we report, in Figure 6.12, the attack accuracy
and samples generated at different training stages by the target DCGAN gen-
erator in the white-box attack Figure 6.12(a)) and the attacker DCGAN gen-
erator in the black-box attack Figure 6.12(b)) on the top ten classes from the
LFW dataset. The plots demonstrate that accuracy correlates well with the
visual quality of the generated samples. In particular, samples generated by
the target yield a better visual quality than the ones generated by the attacker
generator during the black-box attack, and this results in higher member-
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ship inference accuracies. Overall, the samples generated by both attacks at
later stages look visually pleasant, and fairly similar to the original ones. Our
attacks have been evaluated on datasets that consist of complex representa-
tions of faces (LFW) and objects (CIFAR-10). As shown in Figure 6.13(a),
real samples from LFW contain rich details both in the foreground and back-
ground. We do not observe any large deviations in images within datasets,
excluding the possibility that the attack performs well due to some training
samples being more easily learned by the model, and so predicting with higher
confidence. Learning the distribution of such images is a challenging task com-
pared to simple datasets such as MNIST. In fact, our black-box attack is able
to generate realistic samples (see differences between the target model samples
in Figure 6.13(b) and the attacker samples in Figure 6.13(c)).
6.2.7 Evaluation on Diabetic Retinopathy dataset
Finally, we present a case study of our attacks on the Diabetic Retinopa-
thy (DR) dataset, which consists of high-resolution retina images, with an
integer label assigning a score of how much the participant suffers from di-
abetic retinopathy. Diabetic retinopathy is a leading cause of blindness in
the developed world, with detection currently performed manually by highly
skilled clinicians. The machine learning competition site kaggle.com has eval-
uated proposals for automated detection of diabetic retinopathy, and submis-
sions have demonstrated high accuracies, thus removing the need for the time-
consuming process of manual detection. We choose this additional dataset
since the generation of synthetic medical images through generative models is
nowadays a powerful method to produce large numbers of high-quality sample
data on which machine learning models can be trained. Thus, our attacks
can raise serious privacy concerns, in practice, in sensitive settings like those
involving medical data.
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, the DR dataset consists of 88,702 high-
resolution retina images under various imaging conditions. Each image has an
associated integer label assigning how present diabetic retinopathy is within
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(a) Real sample with no pres-
ence of diabetic retinopathy.
(b) Real sample with high
presence of diabetic retinopa-
thy.
(c) Selection of target gen-
erated samples classified with
high confidence as belonging
to the training set by both
white-box and black-box at-
tacks.
Figure 6.14: Real and generated diabetic retinopathy dataset samples.
the retina, from 0 to 4. We train the generative target model on images with
labels 2, 3 and 4, i.e., images with mild to severe cases of diabetic retinopa-
thy. These make up 19.7% of the dataset. Figure 6.14 shows real and target
generated samples of retina images.
The results of the white-box attack are reported in Figure 6.15(a): the
attack is overwhelmingly successful, nearing 100% accuracy at 350 training
epochs. Then, Figure 6.15(b) shows the black-box attacks results, when an
attacker has no auxiliary knowledge, and when the attacker has 30% training
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Figure 6.15: Accuracy curves of attacks against a DCGAN target model on the
Diabetic Retinopathy dataset.
Attack LFW CIFAR-10 DR
White-box 100% 100% 95%
Black-box with no knowledge 40% 37% 22%
Black-box with limited knowledge 60% 58% 81%
Table 6.1: Accuracy of the best attacks on random 10% training set for LFW and
CIFAR-10, and for the diabetic retinopathy (DR) experiments.
and test set auxiliary knowledge. A no-knowledge black-box attack does not
perform very well, while, with some auxiliary knowledge, it approaches the
accuracy of the white-box attack, peaking at over 80% after 35K training
steps.
6.3 Discussion
Overall, our analysis shows that state-of-the-art generative models are
vulnerable against membership inference attacks. In Table 6.1, we summarize
the best accuracy results obtained for experiments on random 10% training
sets (LFW, CIFAR-10) and the diabetic retinopathy (DR) dataset experi-
ments. We note that, for white-box attacks, the attacker successfully infers
the training set with 100% accuracy on both the LFW and CIFAR-10 datasets,
and 95% accuracy for DR dataset. Accuracy drops to 40% on LFW, 37% on
CIFAR-10 and 22% on DR for black-box attacks with no auxiliary knowledge,
however, even with a small amount of auxiliary knowledge, the attacker boost
performance up to 60% on LFW, 58% on CIFAR-10 and 81% on DR. (A ran-
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dom guess corresponds to 10% accuracy on LFW and CIFAR-10, and 20%
on DR.) Furthermore, our attacks are robust against different target model
architectures.
In this section, we first discuss the computational costs of our attacks,
then, we measure the sensitivity of the attacks to training set size and predic-
tion ordering, and study their robustness against possible defenses.
6.3.1 Cost of the attacks
Finally, we quantify the cost of the attacks in terms of computational and
time overhead, and estimate monetary costs.
To perform the attacks, the attacker needs a GPU, which can be obtained
for a cost in the order of $100. The attacks have minimal running time over-
heads: for the white-box attack, complexity is negligible as we only query a
pre-trained target model to steal discriminator model parameters, whereas,
for black-box, one step of training the attacker model takes 0.05 seconds in
our testbed. Black-box attacks with no auxiliary attacker knowledge yield the
best results after 50,000 training steps, therefore, an attacker can expect best
results after approximately 42 minutes with 32 × 50,000 queries to the target
model (since we define one training step as one mini-batch iteration, with 32
inputs per mini-batch). For attacks with auxiliary knowledge, the best results
are reached after 15,000 training steps, thus, approximately 13 minutes.
We also estimate monetary cost based on current discriminative MLaaS
pricing structures from Google.3 At a cost of $1.50 per 1,000 target queries,
after an initial 1,000 free monthly queries, the black-box attack with no aux-
iliary knowledge would cost $2,352, while the black-box attack with auxiliary
knowledge $672. Therefore, we consider our attacks to have minimal costs,
especially considering the potential severity of the information leakage they
enable.
3https://cloud.google.com/vision/pricing
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Figure 6.16: Improvements over random guessing, in a black-box attack, as we vary
the size of the training set, and consider smaller subsets for training set predictions.
6.3.2 Sensitivity to training set size and prediction or-
dering
Aiming to measure the dependency between attack performance and the
training set size, we also experiment with varying training set sizes in the DC-
GAN target and attacker model setting. Figure 6.16 shows how the improve-
ment of the attack degrades as the relative size of the training set increases.
Note that we only include black-box attack results, as all white-box attacks
achieve almost 100% accuracy regardless of training set size. Overall, we find
that there is a commonality in the experiments: black-box attacks on 10%
of the dataset achieve an improvement of 40–55%, and, as we increase the
number of data-points used to train the target model, the attack has smaller
and smaller improvements over random guessing. The largest increases are in
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the setting of Figure 6.16(a), where data-points are more homogeneous and
so overfitting effects are compounded. When the training set is 90% of the
total dataset used in the evaluation of the attack, the attack has negligible
improvements over random guessing.
We believe that this is due to: (1) the larger number of training data-
points yields a well-fitted model that does not leak information about training
records, and (2) a small number of data-points within the training set do not
leak information, therefore, as we increase the size of the training set, the
inability to capture these records becomes more costly, resulting in smaller
improvements in attack performance. If (1) were true, we would see smaller
improvements for larger training sets, regardless of the total size of the dataset;
however, experiments on both LFW and CIFAR-10, which consist of different
training sizes, report similar improvements over random guessing. Addition-
ally, white-box attacks are not affected by increasing the training set size,
which would be the case if the model did not overfit and thus leak information
about training records. Hence, we believe that a small number of training
records are inherently difficult to capture, and so improvements over random
guessing for larger training set sizes are more difficult to achieve since the
majority of samples are used to train the target model. We also examine the
attack sensitivity to the ordering of the data-point predictions. So far, the only
prior knowledge the attacker has is the approximate size of the training set. If
there is a clear ordering of data-points predictions, with training records sitting
at the top of the ordering, and non-training records lower down, an attacker
can use this information to identify training records without side knowledge of
training set size. They can simply place a confidence score relative to where
in the ordering a data-point predictions sits. Figure 6.16 shows, for varying
training set sizes, how many training records lie in the top 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, and 100% of the guessed training set. We observe that, in all experi-
mental settings, accuracy for the top 20% is highest, with scores decreasing
as the attacker considers a larger number of data-points as candidates for the
140 Chapter 6. Evaluating Privacy Leakage of Generative Models
training set. Thus, training to non-training samples follow a structured order-
ing in the attacker’s predictions, which can be exploited to infer membership
when the attacker has no knowledge of the original training set size by setting
a threshold on the minimum confidence of a training point.
6.3.3 Defenses
Possible defense strategies against membership inference discussed
in [189], such as restricting the prediction vector to the top k classes, coarsen-
ing and increasing the entropy of the prediction vector, are not well suited to
our attacks, since generative models do not output prediction vectors. How-
ever, regularization techniques could possibly be applied to generative models
to produce more robust and stable training as well as more diverse and visually
pleasant samples.
Weight Normalization and Dropout. To this end, we consider two tech-
niques, namely, Weight Normalization [184] and Dropout [194], as possible
defense mechanisms and evaluate their impact on our attacks.4 The former is
a re-parameterization of the weights vectors that decouples the length of those
weights from their direction, and it is applied to all layers in both generator
and discriminator in the target model. Whereas, the latter can be used to pre-
vent overfitting by randomly dropping out (i.e., zeroing) connections between
neurons during training. In particular, we apply Dropout, with probability
0.5, to all the layers in the discriminator.
In Figure 6.17, we measure the improvement over random guessing for the
white-box attack against the target model trained on LFW using either Weight
Normalization or Dropout. We find that Dropout is more effective, with im-
provements over random guessing ranging from 70% on top 10 classes to 23%
on top 500 classes. Weight Normalization only yields improvements of, respec-
tively, 88% and 46%, which are very close to the target model trained with no
4Note that we do not compare models with and without Batch Normalization [104],
as its inclusion has shown to improve sample quality and is nearly always used in model
construction of GANs [176].
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Figure 6.17: Improvement over random guessing for Weight Normalization and
Dropout defenses against white-box attacks on models trained over different number
of classes with LFW.
defenses (resp., 89% and 52%). However, we also find that Weight Normaliza-
tion often results in training instability (i.e., the discriminator outperforms the
generator, or vice-versa), while Dropout significantly slows down the training
process, requiring more epochs to get qualitatively plausible samples.
Using our attacks as defense. Also note that, our attacks can actually
be used as a defense mechanism. The difference in white-box and black-box
accuracy provides information about how well the local model approximates
the target model, thus, one could use this information to train a target model
which cannot be well approximated. Furthermore, similarly to early-stopping
criteria in model training, one can stop training when visual sample quality is
high but white-box attack accuracy is still low.
In our experiments, we also observe the benefits of a more regularized
model in increasing the robustness against information leakage in the case of
BEGAN. For instance, in white-box attacks on CIFAR-10, BEGAN produces
quality samples without overfitting, with membership inference performing
only 9% better than random guessing (see Figure 6.7(c)).
Differentially private GANs. Finally, we evaluate our attack against a
recently proposed technique for (ε,δ)-Differentially Private GANs [202], where
gaussian noise [70] is injected in the discriminator forward pass during train-
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Figure 6.18: Accuracy curve and samples for different privacy budgets on top ten
classes from the LFW dataset, showing a trade-off between samples quality and
privacy guarantees.
ing. Figure 6.18 shows the results of a white-box attack against Differentially
Private DCGAN trained on top ten classes for different values of the privacy
budget ε (with δ set to 10−4). For all experiments, the target model is trained
for 500 epochs and the final privacy budget is computed using moments ac-
countant [1]. The attack does no better than random guessing for ε= 1.5 (first
tick in the plot), while accuracy increases up to 85% for ε = 28.3. However,
note that acceptable levels of privacy (i.e., values of ε < 10) yield very bad
samples quality.
Chapter 7
Evaluating Privacy Leakage of
Collaborative Learning
In collaborative and federated learning, participants’ training data may
not be identically distributed. In fact, federated learning is explicitly designed
to take advantage of the fact that participants may have private training data
that is different from the publicly available data for the same class [143].
In this chapter, we focus on inferring information that is true specifically
about certain subsets of the data used to train collaborative learning models.
The basic privacy violation in this setting is membership inference. In Chap-
ter 6, we presented some novel results on inferring membership in generative
models, but collaborative learning presents interesting new avenues for such
inferences.
As discussed in Section 3.2.4, prior work [84, 96, 15] aimed to infer prop-
erties that characterize an entire class: for example, given a facial recognition
model where one of the classes is Bob, infer what Bob looks like. By contrast,
in this work, we aim to infer properties that are true of a specific subset of
the training inputs but not of the class as a whole. For instance, when Bob
The research presented in this chapter was joint work with a fellow PhD student Con-
gzheng Song. The author equally contributed to the design of the attacks presented in Sec-
tion 7.1, and lead the work on the experimental evaluation of the attacks on the CSI Corpus
and FourSquare datasets in Section 7.2, as well as the evaluation of potential defenses de-
scribed in Section 7.3.
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uses his photos to collaboratively train a gender classifier, we infer that Alice
appears in some of the photos. We especially focus on the properties that are
independent of the class’ characteristic features. For example, in the gender
classifier example, we infer whether people in Bob’s photos wear glasses, even
though wearing glasses has no correlation with gender. There is no legitimate
reason for a model to leak this information; this is purely an artifact of the
collaborative learning process.
A participant’s contribution to each iteration of collaborative learning is
based on a batch of his training data. We infer single-batch properties, i.e., de-
tect that the data in a given batch has the property but other batches do not.
We also infer when a property appears in the training data. This has poten-
tially serious privacy implications. For instance, we can infer when a certain
person starts appearing in a participant’s photos or when the participant starts
visiting a certain type of doctors. Finally, we infer properties that characterize
a participant’s entire dataset (but not the entire class), e.g., authorship of the
texts used to train a sentiment analysis model.
7.1 Inference Attacks
This section describes our inference methodology.
7.1.1 Threat model
We assume that K participants (where K ≥ 2) jointly train a machine
learning model using one of the collaborative learning algorithms described
in Section 2.3.5. Note that, although we only experiment with joint models
trained with SGD, our inference methodology is not specific to SGD. One of
the participants is the adversary. His goal is to infer information about the
training data of another, target participant by analyzing periodic updates to
the joint model during training. Multi-party (K > 2) collaborative learning
also involves honest participants who are neither the adversary nor the target.
Depending on how collaborative learning is done, their updates or models may
be aggregated with those of the target.
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Figure 7.1: Overview of inference attacks against collaborative learning.
In the multi-party case, the identities of the participants may not be
known to the adversary. If the identities are known but the models are ag-
gregated, the adversary may infer something about the training data but not
trace it to a specific participant. In general, tracing requires auxiliary infor-
mation specific to the leakage. For example, after inferring that photos of a
certain person have started appearing in the training data, the adversary may
have enough auxiliary and contextual information about the participants to
guess which of them has included these photos in the training data. This type
of leakage is outside the scope of our work, which focuses solely on the leakage
from the collaborative learning process itself.
7.1.2 Overview of the attacks
Figure 7.1 gives a high-level overview of our inference attacks. At each
iteration t of training, the adversary downloads the current joint model, calcu-
lates gradient updates as prescribed by the collaborative learning algorithm,
and sends his own updates to the server. The adversary saves the snapshot of
the joint model parameters θt. The difference between the consecutive snap-
shots ∆θt = θt− θt−1 = ∑k∆θkt is equal to the aggregated updates from all
participants, hence ∆θt−∆θadvt are the aggregated updates from all partici-
pants other than the adversary.
Leakage from the embedding layer. For machine learning tasks involving
text or location data, where the input space is discrete and sparse, the standard
approach is to apply an embedding layer that transforms sparse inputs into
a lower-dimensional vector representation. For convenience, we use word to
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denote discrete tokens: words in the case of text data, specific locations in the
case of location data. Let vocabulary V be the set of all words. Each word
in the training data is mapped to a word-embedding vector via an embedding
matrix Wemb ∈ R|V |×d, where |V | is the size of the vocabulary and d is the
dimensionality of the embedding.
During training, the embedding matrix is treated as a parameter of the
model and optimized collaboratively. The gradient of the embedding layer is
sparse with respect to the input words: given a batch of text, the embedding
is updated only with the words that appear in the batch. The other words
get zero gradients. This difference directly reveals which words occur in the
training batches used by the honest participants during collaborative learning.
Leakage from the gradients. In deep learning models, the gradients are
computed using the back-propagation algorithm which propagates the loss
through the entire network from the last to the first layer. Gradients of a
given layer are computed using this layer’s features and the error from the layer
above. In the case of sequential fully connected layers hl,hl+1 (hl+1 =Wl ·hl,
where Wl is the weight matrix), the gradient of error E with respect to Wl is
computed as ∂E∂Wl =
∂E
∂hl+1
·hl. The gradients of Wl are inner products of the
error from the layer above and the features hl. Similarly, for a convolutional
layer, the gradients of the weights are convolutions of the error from the layer
above and the features hl.
Gradients are based on features, thus observations of the participants’
gradient updates can be used to infer the feature values, which are in turn
based on these participants’ private training data.
7.1.3 Membership inference
As explained above, the non-zero gradients of the embedding layer reveal
which words appear in a batch. The adversary can use this information to
infer membership of a given text or location, i.e., whether this record was part
of the training set or not.
Let Vt be the words included in the updates ∆θt. During training, the
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Algorithm 7: Batch Property Classifier
Input: Attacker’s auxiliary data Xadvprop,Xadvnonprop
Output: Batch property classifier fprop
1 Gprop←∅ . Positive training data for property inference
2 Gnonprop←∅ . Negative training data for property inference
3 for i= 1 to T do
4 Receive θt from server
5 Run ClientUpdate(θt)
6 Sample Badvprop ⊂Xadvprop,Badvnonprop ⊂Xadvnonprop
7 Calculate gprop =∇L(Badvprop;θt),gnonprop =∇L(Badvnonprop;θt)
8 Gprop←Gprop∪{gprop}
9 Gnonprop←Gnonprop∪{gnonprop}
10 Label Gprop as positive and Gnonprop as negative
11 Train a binary classifier fprop given Gprop,Gnonprop
attacker collects a vocabulary sequence [V1, . . . ,VT ]. Given a text record r,
with words Vr, he can test if Vr ⊆ Vt, for some t in the vocabulary sequence. If
r is in target’s dataset, then Vr will be included in at least one vocabulary from
the sequence. The adversary can use this to decide whether r was a member
or not.
Finally, note that in case of a network initialized with pre-trained word
embeddings, and then jointly trained without updating the embedding layer
parameters, the adversary would not be able to observe any non-zero gradients
for the embedding layers.
7.1.4 Passive property inference
We assume that the adversary has auxiliary data consisting of the data
points that have the property of interest (Xadvprop) and data points that do not
have the property (Xadvnonprop). These data points need to be sampled from the
same class as the target participant’s data, but otherwise can be unrelated.
The intuition behind this attack is that the attacker can leverage the
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snapshots of the global model to generate aggregated updates based on the
data with the property and updates based on the data without the property.
This produces labeled examples, which enable the adversary to train a binary
batch property classifier that determines if the observed gradient updates are
based on the data with or without the property.
Batch property classifier. Algorithm 7 shows how to build a batch property
classifier during collaborative training. Given a model snapshot θt, calculate
the gradients gprop based on a batch with the property Badvprop ⊂ Xadvprop and
gnonprop based on a batch without the property Badvnonprop ⊂ Xadvnonprop. Once
enough labeled gradients have been collected, train a binary classifier fprop.
For the property inference attacks that exploit the embedding-layer gra-
dients (e.g., the attack on the Yelp dataset in Section 7.2.3), we use a logistic
regression classifier.
For all other property inference attacks, we experimented with logistic re-
gression, gradient boosting, and random forests and found that random forests
(with 50 trees) performed the best. The input features in this case correspond
to the observed gradient updates. The number of the features is thus equal
to the model’s parameters, which can be very large for a realistic model. To
downsample the features representation, we apply the global max pooling op-
erator [86] on the observed gradient updates.
Property inference. As collaborative training progresses, the adversary ob-
serves gradient updates gobs = ∆θt−∆θadvt . The basic attack is single-batch
inference: the adversary simply feeds the observed gradient updates to the
batch property classifier fprop.
This inference attack can be extended from the properties of a single
batch to the target’s entire training dataset. The batch property classifier
fprop outputs a score in [0,1], indicating the probability that a batch has the
property. The adversary can use the average score across all iterations to
decide whether the target’s entire dataset has the property in question.
This inference attack is passive. The adversary observes the gradient
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Figure 7.2: Active property inference attack.
updates and performs inference without changing anything in the local or
global collaborative training procedure.
7.1.5 Active property inference
An active adversary can perform a more powerful property inference at-
tack by using multi-task learning.
The adversary extends his local copy of the main, collaboratively trained
model with an augmented property classifier connected to the last layer. This
local model is trained simultaneously to perform well on the main task and
to recognize batch properties. On the training data where each record has a
main label y and a property label p, the model’s joint loss is calculated as
Lmt = α ·L(x,y;θ) + (1−α) ·L(x,p;θ)
During collaborative training, the adversary uploads the updates ∇Lmt
based on this joint loss. These updates optimize the main model and simul-
taneously learn separable representations for the data with and without the
property. As a result, the gradients will be separable, too (e.g., see Figure 7.6
in Section 7.2.5), enabling the adversary to tell if the training data has the
property. Figure 7.2 shows an example of active property inference attack
with gender classification as the main task and author identification as the
inference task.
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This adversary is still “honest-but-curious” in the cryptographic parlance.
He faithfully follows the collaborative learning protocol and does not submit
any malformed messages. The only difference with the passive attack is that
this adversary performs additional local computations and submits the result-
ing values into the collaborative learning protocol. Note that the “honest-
but-curious” model does not constrain the parties’ input values, only their
messages.
7.2 Experiments
Our experiments encompass a few different machine learning tasks and
few datasets, which we review next.
7.2.1 Datasets and model architectures
We now describe the datasets, collaborative learning tasks, and adversar-
ial inference tasks used in our experiments—see the summary in Table 7.1.
Our choices of hyper-parameters are based on the standard models from the
machine learning literature.
Labeled Faces In the Wild (LFW). LFW [102] contains 13,233 62x47 RGB
face images for 5,749 individuals with different facial-attribute labels such as
gender, race, age, hair color, and eyewear.
FaceScrub. This dataset [159] contains 76,541 50x50 RGB images for 530
individuals with the gender label: 52.5% are labeled as male, the rest as female.
For our experiments, we select a subset of 100 individuals with the most images,
for a total of 18,809 images.
On both LFW and FaceScrub, the collaborative models are convolutional
neural networks (CNN) with three spatial convolution layers with 32, 64, and
128 filters, kernel size set to (3,3), and max pooling layers with pooling size set
to 2, followed by two fully connected layers of size 256 and 2. We use rectified
linear unit (ReLU) as the activation function for all layers. Batch size is 32
(except in the experiments where we vary it), SGD learning rate is 0.01.
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Dataset #Records Main Tasks Inferences
LFW 13.2k Gender/Smile/Age Race/Eyewear
Eyewear/Race/Hair
FaceScrub 18.8k Gender Identity
PIPA 18.0k Age Gender
CSI 1.4k Sentiment Membership,
Region/Gender/Veracity
FourSquare 15.5k Gender Membership
Yelp-health 17.9k Review score Membership,
Doctor specialty
Yelp-author 16.2K Review score Author
Table 7.1: Datasets and tasks used in our experiments.
People in Photo Album (PIPA). PIPA [226] contains over 60,000 photos
of 2,000 individuals collected from public Flickr photo albums. Each image
includes one or more people and is labeled with attributes such as the number
of people and their gender, age, and race. For our experiments, we select a
subset of 18,000 images with three or fewer people and scaled the raw images
to 128x128.
The collaborative model for PIPA is a VGG-style [191] 10-layer CNN with
five convolution blocks. The first two consist of one convolutional layer and
max pooling, the next three of two convolutional layers and max pooling. After
the block, there are two fully connected layers. Batch size is 32, SGD learning
rate is 0.01.
Yelp-health. We extract health care-related reviews from the Yelp dataset1
of 5 million reviews of businesses listed on Yelp, tagged with numeric ratings
(1-5) and attributes such as business type and location. Our subset contains
17,938 reviews for 10 types of medical specialists (see the leftmost column of
1https://www.yelp.com/dataset
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Table 7.4).
Yelp-author. We also extract a subset of the Yelp dataset with the reviews
of the top 10 most prolific reviewers, 16,207 in total.
On both Yelp datasets, the model is a recurrent neural network with a
word-embedding layer of dimension 100. Words in a review are mapped to a
sequence of word-embedding vectors, which is fed to a gated recurrent unit
(GRU [54]) layer that maps it to a sequence of hidden vectors. We add a fully
connected classification layer to the last hidden vector of the sequence. SGD
learning rate is 0.05.
FourSquare. In [217, 218], Yang et al. collect a global dataset of FourSquare
location “check-ins” (userID,time,location,activity) from April 2012 to Septem-
ber 2013. For our experiments, we select a subset of 15,548 users who checked
in at least 10 different locations in New York City and for whom we know their
gender [219]. This yields 528,878 check-ins. The model is a gender classifier,
a task previously studied by Pang et al. [165] on similar datasets.
CLiPS Stylometry Investigation (CSI) Corpus. This annually expanded
dataset [208] contains student-written essays and reviews. The 1,412 reviews
are equally split between Truthful/Deceptive or Positive/Negative and labeled
with the attributes of the author (gender, age, sexual orientation, region of ori-
gin, personality profile) and the document (timestamp, genre, topic, veracity,
sentiment). 80% of the reviews are written by females, 66% by authors from
Antwerpen and the rest from other parts of Belgium and the Netherlands.
On the FourSquare and CSI datasets, the model, which is based on [114],
first uses an embedding layer to turn non-negative integers (locations indices
and word tokens) into dense vectors of dimension 320, then applies three spatial
convolutional layers with 100 filters and variable kernel windows of size (3,320),
(4,320) and (5,320) and max pooling layers with pooling size set to (l−3,1),
(l−4,1), and (l−5,1) where l is the fixed length to which input sequences are
padded. The hyper-parameter l is 300 on CSI and 100 on FourSquare. After
this, the model has two fully connected layers of size 128 and 2 for FourSquare
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Yelp-health FourSquare
Batch Size Precision Batch Size Precision
32 0.92 100 0.99
64 0.84 200 0.98
128 0.75 500 0.91
256 0.66 1,000 0.76
512 0.62 2,000 0.62
Table 7.2: Precision of membership inference (recall is 1).
and one fully connected layer of size 2 for CSI. We use RELU as the activation
function. Batch size is 100 for FourSquare, 12 for CSI. SGD learning rate is
0.01.
Experimental setup. Our experiments have been performed on a work-
station running Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS equipped with a 3.4GHz CPU i7-
6800K, 32GB RAM, and an NVIDIA TitanX GPU card. We use MxNet [50]
and Lasagne [64] to implement deep neural networks and Scikit-learn [169] for
conventional machine learning models. Training our inference models takes
less than 60 seconds on average and does not require a GPU.
Metrics. We use AUC scores to evaluate the performance of the collaborative
model and of our property inference. For membership inference, we report only
precision because our decision rule from Section 7.1.3 is binary and does not
produce a probability score.
7.2.2 Two-party membership inference
The adversary first builds a Bag of Words (BoW) representation for the
input whose membership in the target’s training data he aims to infer. We
denote this as the test BoW. During training, as explained in Section 7.1.3, the
non-zero gradients of the embedding layer reveal which “words” are present
in each batch of the target’s data, enabling the adversary to build a BoW. If
the test BoW is a subset of the batch BoW, the adversary concludes that the
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input in question is included in this batch.
To demonstrate membership inference, we choose Yelp-health and
FourSquare datasets and set the vocabulary to the 5,000 most frequent words
and 30,000 most popular locations, respectively. We split the data evenly be-
tween the target and the adversary and train a collaborative model for 3,000
iterations.
Table 7.2 shows the precision of membership inference for different batch
sizes. As batch sizes increase, the adversary observes more words in each batch
BoW and the attack produces more false positives. Recall is always perfect,
i.e., there are no false negatives, because any true test BoW must be contained
in at least one of the batch BoWs observed by the adversary.
7.2.3 Two-party single-batch property inference
Next, we infer properties of the target participant’s training batches. We
call a batch Bnonprop if none of the inputs in it have the property, Bprop other-
wise. The adversary’s goal is to identify, by observing gradient updates, which
of the batches are Bprop.
We split the training data evenly between the target and the adversary and
assume that same fraction in both subsets has the property. During training,
1
m of the target’s batches include only inputs with the property (m= 2 in the
following experiments).
LFW. Table 7.3 reports the results of single-batch property inference on the
LFW dataset. For the inference tasks, we choose properties that are uncorre-
lated with the main classification label that the collaborative model is trying
to learn. The attack has perfect AUC when the main task is gender classifica-
tion and the inference task is “race:black” (these labels are independent; their
Pearson correlation is -0.005). The attack also achieves almost perfect AUC
when the main task is “race: black” and the inference task is “eyewear: sun-
glasses”. It also performs well on several other properties, including “eyewear:
glasses” when the main task is “race: Asian”.
These results demonstrate that gradients observed during training leak
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Main T. Infer T. Corr. AUC Main T. Infer T. Corr. AUC
Gender Black -0.005 1.0 Gender Sunglasses -0.025 1.0
Gender Asian -0.018 0.93 Gender Eyeglasses 0.157 0.94
Smile Black 0.062 1.0 Smile Sunglasses -0.016 1.0
Smile Asian 0.047 0.93 Smile Eyeglasses -0.083 0.97
Age Black -0.084 1.0 Race Sunglasses 0.026 1.0
Age Asian -0.078 0.97 Race Eyeglasses -0.116 0.96
Eyewear Black 0.034 1.0 Hair Sunglasses -0.013 1.0
Eyewear Asian -0.119 0.91 Hair Eyeglasses 0.139 0.96
Table 7.3: AUC score of single-batch property inference on LFW. We also report
the Pearson correlation between the main task label and the property label.
more than the characteristic features of each class. In fact, collaborative
learning leaks properties of the training data that are uncorrelated with class
membership. To understand why, we plot the t-SNE projection [136] of the
features from different layers of the joint model in Figure 7.3. Observe that the
feature vectors are grouped by property in the lower layers pool1, pool2 and
pool3, and by class label in the higher layer. Intuitively, this shows that the
model does not just learn to separate inputs by class. The lower layers of the
model learn to separate inputs by various properties that are irrelevant for the
model’s designated task. Our inference attack exploits this unintended extra
functionality, which also shows the effective model capacity of neural networks
to memorize the dataset [223].
Yelp-health. On this dataset, we use review score classification (specifically,
sentiment analysis) as the main task and the specialty of the doctor being
reviewed as the property inference task. Obviously, the latter is more sensitive
from the privacy perspective.
We use 3,000 most frequent words in the corpus as the vocabulary and
train the model for 3,000 iterations. Using BoWs from the embedding-layer
gradients, the attack achieves almost perfect AUC for inferring the doctor
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(a) pool1 (b) pool2
(c) pool3 (d) fc
Figure 7.3: t-SNE projection of the features from different layers of the joint model
on LFW gender classification; 0 is female, 1 is male. The property (i.e., the blue
points denoted by p-0 and p-1) is “race: black”, while the red points without the
property are denoted by np-0 and np-1
specialty. Table 7.4 shows the words that have the highest predictive power in
our logistic regression.
Fractional properties. We also investigate if it is possible to infer the prop-
erty when only some of the inputs in a batch have it. For these experiments,
we use FaceScrub’s top 5 face IDs and Yelp-author (the latter with the 3,000
most frequent words as the vocabulary). The model is trained for 3,000 itera-
tions. As before, 1/m of the target’s batches include inputs with the property
(m= 2 in the experiments), but here we vary the fraction of the inputs in the
batch that have the property among 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9.
Figure 7.4 reports the results. On FaceScrub for IDs 0, 1, and 3, AUC
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Health Service Top Words in Positive Class
Obstetricians pregnancy, delivery, women, birth, ultrasound
Pediatricians pediatrics, sick, parents, kid, newborn
Cosmetic Surgeons augmentation, plastic, breast, facial, implants
Cardiologists cardiologist, monitor, bed, heart, ER
Dermatologists acne, dermatologists, mole, cancer, spots
Ophthalmologists vision, LASIK, contacts, lenses, frames
Orthopedists knee, orthopedic, shoulder, injury, therapy
Radiologists imaging, SimonMed, mammogram, CT, MRI
Psychiatrists psychiatrist, mental, Zedek, depression, sessions
Urologists Edgepark, pump, supplies, urologist, kidney
Table 7.4: Words with the largest positive coefficients in the property classifier for
Yelp-health.
scores are above 0.8 even if only 50% of the batch contain that face. This
means that the adversary can successfully infer that photos of a particular
person appear in a batch even though (a) the model is trained for generic
gender classification, and (b) half of the photos in the batch are of other
people. If the fraction is higher, AUC scores approach 1.
On Yelp-author, AUC scores are above 0.95 for all identities even when
the fraction is 0.3. This means that we can successfully identify the authors
of reviews even though (a) the model is trained for generic sentiment analysis,
and (b) more than 2/3rd of the reviews in the batch are from other authors.
Both results concretely illustrate that collaborative learning leaks much
more than the characteristic features of each class.
7.2.4 Inferring when a property occurs
Continuous training, when new training data is added to the process as
it becomes available, presents interesting opportunities for inference attacks.
If the occurrences of a property in the training data can be linked to events
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(a) FaceScrub (b) Yelp-author
Figure 7.4: AUC vs. the fraction of the batch that has the property on FaceScrub
and Yelp-author.
(a) PIPA (b) FaceScrub
Figure 7.5: Detecting occurrence of a single-batch property.
outside the training process, privacy leakage is exacerbated. For example, if the
adversary can infer that a certain third person started appearing in another
participant’s training data immediately after that participant uploaded his
photos from a trip, this may constitute a serious privacy breach.
PIPA. Images in the PIPA dataset have between 1 to 3 faces. We train
the collaborative model to detect if there is a young adult in the image; the
adversary’s inference task is to determine if the people in the image are of
the same gender. The latter property is a stepping stone to inferring social
relationships, and thus is sensitive. We train the model for 2,500 iterations
and let the batches with the “same gender” property appear in iterations 500
to 1500.
Figure 7.5(a) shows, for each iteration, the probability output by the
adversary’s classifier that the batch in that iteration has the property. The
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appearance and disappearance of the property in the training data are clearly
visible in the plot.
FaceScrub. For the gender classification model on FaceScrub, the adver-
sary’s objective is to infer whether and when a certain person appears in a
participant’s photos.
The joint model is trained for 2,500 iterations. We arrange the target’s
training data so that two specific identities appear during certain iterations:
ID 0 in iterations 0 to 500 and 1500 to 2000, ID 1 in iterations 500 to 1000
and 2000 to 2500. In the other iterations, the batches are mixtures of other
identities. The adversary trains three property classifiers, for ID 0, ID 1, and
a third ID that does not appear in the target’s dataset (ID 2).
Figure 7.5(b) reports the scores of all three classifiers. ID 0 and 1 receive
the highest scores in the iterations where they appear, whereas ID 2, which
never appears in the training data, receives very low scores in all iterations.
These experiments show that our attacks can successfully infer dynamic
properties of the training dataset as collaborative learning progresses.
7.2.5 Active property inference
To show the additional power of the active attack from Section 7.1.5, we
use FaceScrub. The main task is gender classification, the adversary’s task is
to infer the presence of ID 4 in the training data. We assume that this ID
occurs in a single batch, where it constitutes 50% of the photos. We evaluate
the attack with different choices of α, which controls the balance between the
main-task loss and the property-classification loss in the adversary’s objective
function.
Figure 7.6(a) shows that AUC increases as we increase α. Figure 7.6(b)
and Figure 7.6(c) show the t-SNE projection of the final fully connected layer,
with α= 0 and α= 0.7, respectively. Observe that the data with the property
(blue points) is grouped tighter when α= 0.7 than in the model trained under a
passive attack (α= 0). This illustrates that as a result of the active attack, the
joint model learns a better separation for data with and without the property.
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(a) ROC for different α (b) t-SNE of the final layer for α= 0
(c) t-SNE of the final layer for α=0.7
Figure 7.6: Active property inference attack on FaceScrub.
7.2.6 Multi-party with synchronized SGD
As the number of honest participants in collaborative learning (cf. Algo-
rithm 1) increases, the adversary’s task becomes harder because the observed
gradient updates are aggregated across multiple participants. Furthermore,
the inferred information may not directly reveal the identity of the participant
to whom the data belongs, although auxiliary information can help in this case
(see Section 7.1.1).
We evaluate our attacks on LFW and Yelp-author datasets. We split
the training data evenly across all participants, but in such a way that only
the target and the adversary have the data with the property. The joint
model is trained with the same hyper-parameters as in the two-party case.
Similar to the two-party setting (see Section 7.2.3), the adversary’s goal is to
identify which aggregated gradient updates are based on batches Bprop with
the property.
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(a) LFW (b) Yelp-author
Figure 7.7: Multi-party with synchronized SGD: attack AUC score vs. the number
of participants.
LFW. We experiment with (1) gender classification as the main task and
“race: black” as the inference task, and (2) smile classification as the main
task and “eyewear: sunglasses” as the inference task.
Figure 7.7(a) shows that the attack still achieves reasonably high perfor-
mance, with AUC score around 0.8, when the number of participants is 12.
Performance then degrades for both tasks.
Yelp-author. The inference task is again author identification. In the multi-
party case, the gradients of the embedding layer leak the batch BoWs of all
honest participants, not just the target.
Figure 7.7(b) reports the results. For some authors, the AUC scores do
not degrade significantly even with many participants. This is likely due to
some unique combinations of words used by these authors, which identify them
even in multi-party settings.
7.2.7 Multi-party with model averaging
In every round t of multi-party federated learning with model averaging,
the adversary observes θt− θt−1 = ∑k nkn θkt −∑k nkn θkt−1 = ∑k nkn (θkt − θkt−1),
where θkt − θkt−1 are the aggregated gradients computed on the k-th partici-
pant’s local dataset. To simplify our experiments and because we do not care
about the computational efficiency of the learning protocol for the purposes of
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(a) Face ID 1, K = 3 (b) Face ID 1, K = 5
(c) Face ID 3, K = 3 (d) Face ID 3, K = 5
Figure 7.8: Multi-party collaborative training with model averaging: box plots
show the distribution of the adversary’s scores in each trial. In the 8 trials on the
left, one of the participants’ data has the property; in the 8 trials on the right, none
of the honest participants have the data with the property.
our analysis, we set C = 1, i.e., the server takes updates from all clients in all
rounds (see Algorithm 2 in Section 2.3.5).
In our experiments, we split the training data evenly among honest par-
ticipants but ensure that in the target participant’s subset, pˆ% of the inputs
have the property while none of the other honest participants’ data has the
property. During each epoch of local training, every honest participant splits
his local training data into 10 batches and performs one round of training.
We assume that the adversary has the same number of inputs with the
property as the target. As before, when the adversary trains his binary clas-
sifier, he needs to locally “emulate” the collaborative training process, i.e.,
sample data from his local dataset, compute aggregated updates, and learn
to distinguish between the aggregates based on the data without the property
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and aggregates where one of the underlying updates was based on the data
with the property.
We perform this experiment for 8 trials. For the control experiments, we
set pˆ= 0% and also perform them 8 times. We want to see if it is possible to
distinguish the trials where there is a subset in the training data that has the
property from the control trials where there are no training inputs with the
property.
Detecting presence of a face in the training data. We use FaceScrub
and select two face IDs (1 and 3) whose presence we want to infer. In the
“property” case, pˆ = 80%, i.e., 80% of one honest participant’s training data
consist of the photos that depict the person in question. In the “control” case,
pˆ = 0%, i.e., the person does not occur in the training data of any honest
participants.
Figure 7.8 shows the scores assigned by the adversary’s classifier to the
aggregated updates with 3 and 5 total participants. When the face of interest
is present in the training dataset, the scores are much higher than when it is
absent.
Inference is a probabilistic process and there are no guarantees. Success
of the attack depends on the property being inferred, distribution of the data
across participants, and other factors. For example, the classifiers for Face IDs
2 and 4, which were trained in the same fashion as the classifiers for Face IDs
1 and 3, failed to infer the presence of “their” faces in the training data.
Inferring when a property occurs. In this experiment, we aim to infer
when a participant whose local data has a certain property joined collaborative
training. We first let the adversary and the rest of the honest participants train
the joint model for 250 rounds. The target participant then joins the training
at round t= 250 with the local data that consists of photos depicting ID 1.
Figure 7.9 shows the results. The adversary’s AUC scores are around 0
when images with face ID 1 are not present and then increase almost to 1.0
right after the target participant joins the training.
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Figure 7.9: Detecting when a participant whose local data has the property of
interest joins the training. K = 2 for rounds 0 to 250, K = 3 for rounds 250 to 500.
Figure 7.10: Uniqueness of user profiles with respect to the number of top loca-
tions.
7.3 Defenses
We now discuss and evaluate possible defenses.
7.3.1 Selective gradient sharing
As suggested in [190], participants in collaborative learning could share
only a fraction of their gradients during each update. This reduces communi-
cation overhead and, potentially, leakage, since the adversary observes fewer
gradients.
To evaluate this defense, we measure the performance of single-batch in-
ference against a sentiment classifier collaboratively trained on the CSI Corpus
by two parties who exchange only a fraction of their gradients. Table 7.5 shows
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Property / % parameters update 10% 50% 100%
Top region (Antwerpen) 0.84 0.86 0.93
Gender 0.90 0.91 0.93
Veracity 0.94 0.99 0.99
Table 7.5: Inference attacks against the CSI Corpus for different fractions of gra-
dients shared during training.
the resulting AUC scores. When inferring the region of the texts’ authors, our
attack still achieves 0.84 AUC when only 10% of the updates are shared during
each iteration, compared to 0.93 AUC when all updates are shared.
7.3.2 Dimensionality reduction
As discussed in Section 7.1.2, if the input space of the model is very
sparse and the inputs must be embedded into a lower-dimensional space, non-
zero gradient updates in the embedding layer reveal which input tokens are
present in the training batch.
One plausible defense is to only use inputs that occur many times in the
training data. This does not work in general: for example, Figure 7.10 shows
that restricting inputs to the top locations in the FourSquare dataset eliminates
most of the training data.
A smarter defense is to restrict the model so that it only uses “words” from
a pre-defined vocabulary of common words. For example, Google’s federated
learning for predictive keyboards uses a fixed vocabulary of 5,000 words [143].
In Table 7.6, we report the accuracy of our membership inference at-
tack and of the joint model on its main task—gender classification for the
FourSquare dataset, sentiment analysis for the CSI Corpus—for different sizes
of the common vocabulary (locations in the case of FourSquare, words in the
case of CSI). Overall, this approach partially mitigates our attacks but also
has a significant negative impact on the quality of the collaboratively trained
models.
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CSI FourSquare
Top N Attack Model Top N Attack Model
words Precision AUC locations Precision AUC
4,000 0.94 0.91 30,000 0.91 0.64
2,000 0.92 0.87 10,000 0.86 0.59
1,000 0.92 0.85 3,000 0.65 0.51
500 0.82 0.84 1,000 0.52 0.50
Table 7.6: Membership inference against the CSI Corpus and FourSquare for dif-
ferent vocabulary sizes.
7.3.3 Dropout
Another possible defense is to employ dropout [194], a popular technique
often used as a regularizer to mitigate overfitting in neural networks. Dropout
randomly deactivates activations between neurons, with probability pdrop ∈
[0,1]. Random deactivations may weaken our attacks because the adversary
observes fewer gradients corresponding to the active neurons.
To evaluate this approach, we add dropout after the max pool layers
in the joint model. Table 7.7 reports the accuracy of inferring the region
of the reviews in the CSI Corpus, for different values of pdrop. Increasing
the randomness of dropout actually makes our attacks stronger while slightly
decreasing the accuracy of the joint model. We believe this is due to the
increased variance between participants’ updates, which yields more robust
features for the adversary’s inference model.
7.3.4 Participant-level differential privacy
Record-level ε-differential privacy, by definition, bounds the success of
membership inference but does not prevent property inference. Any applica-
tion of differential privacy entails application-specific tradeoffs between privacy
of the training data and accuracy of the resulting model. The participants must
also somehow choose the parameters (e.g., ε) that control this tradeoff.
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Dropout Prob. Attack AUC Model AUC
0.1 0.94 0.87
0.3 0.97 0.87
0.5 0.98 0.87
0.7 0.99 0.86
0.9 0.99 0.84
Table 7.7: Inference of the top region (Antwerpen) on the CSI Corpus for different
values of dropout probability.
In theory, participant-level differential privacy bounds the success of all
inference attacks described in this work. We implemented the participant-level
differentially private federated learning algorithm by McMahan et al. [144] and
attempted to train a gender classifier on LFW. However, the model did not
converge for any number of participants (we tried at most 30). This is due to
the magnitude of noise needed to achieve differential privacy with the moments
accountant bound [1], which is inversely proportional to the number of users
(the model in [144] was trained on thousands of users). Another participant-
level differential privacy mechanism, presented in [85], also requires a very
large number of participants.
Therefore, it remains an open research question whether or not it is pos-
sible to (1) prevent our inference attacks and (2) obtain high-quality models
by training with participant-level differential privacy and relatively few (e.g.,
dozens) participants.
7.3.5 Sensitivity to number of training epochs
Finally, we measure the sensitivity of our attacks to the number of training
epochs. Figure 7.11 reports the accuracy of inferring the author’s gender in
the CSI Corpus vs. the number of full training epochs (in a two-party setting).
We find that our attack is very effective, reaching 0.98 AUC after only
2 epochs and improving as the training progresses and the adversary collects
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Figure 7.11: Attack performance with respect to the number of collaborative
learning epochs.
more gradient updates, while the performance of the main model is not af-
fected.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Large-scale data collection efforts open the door to possible privacy
breaches, while fears of privacy harm often prevent the development of useful
machine learning applications. To address the tension between the utility of
extracting knowledge from data and the duty to protect individuals’ sensitive
information, this dissertation presented several results in the design, develop-
ment, and evaluation of privacy-aware data processing systems.
First, we introduced efficient techniques for privately and efficiently col-
lecting statistics (Chapter 4). By relying on private data aggregation protocols
and succinct data structures, we showed how to reduce the communication and
computation complexity incurred by each data source from linear to logarith-
mic in the size of the input, while only introducing a limited, upper-bounded
error in the quality of the statistics. Our techniques support different trust,
robustness, and deployment models and can be applied to a number of inter-
esting real-world problems where aggregate statistics are used to train machine
learning models.
Then, we presented a novel differentially private generative model, relying
on a mixture of k generative neural networks (Chapter 5). The training data is
first partitioned into k parts using a differentially private kernel k-means, then
each cluster is given to a separate generative neural network, such as RBM
or VAE, which are trained only on their own cluster using differentially pri-
vate gradient descent. The trained models can be used to generate and share
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synthetic high-dimensional data with provable privacy. We have evaluated the
performance of the model on real-world datasets, showing that our approach
provides accurate representation of large datasets with strong privacy guaran-
tees and high utility.
Next, we proposed a first-of-its-kind evaluation of information leakage in
generative models, showing that a variety of models are vulnerable to member-
ship inference attacks, i.e., the presence of exact data points in training data
(Chapter 6). We showed that our attacks can be used to detect overfitting
in generative models and help selecting an appropriate model that will not
leak information about samples on which it was trained. Moreover, we demon-
strated that we can infer membership using a novel method for training GANs,
and that an attacker with limited auxiliary knowledge of dataset samples can
remarkably improve their accuracy.
Finally, we proposed and evaluated several inference attacks against col-
laborative deep learning (Chapter 7). These attacks enable a malicious par-
ticipant to not only infer membership, but also properties that characterize
subsets of the training data and are independent of the properties that the
joint model aims to capture. We found that the root cause of these attacks
is that when a deep learning model is trained, it internally learns to recog-
nize many more features of the data than is necessary for the task that it is
being trained for. Consequently, model updates during collaborative learning
leak information about these extra, “unintended” features to adversarial par-
ticipants. Active attacks are potentially very powerful in this setting because
they enable the adversary to trick the joint model into learning features of the
adversary’s choosing without a significant impact on the model’s performance
on its main task.
Progress in machine learning has been enabled by the ability of analyzing
massive amounts of data and refining model parameters to better encode the
patterns within that data. On the one hand, machine learning models should
learn general patterns of the training data in order to be able to generalize
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with new unseen data. On the other hand, properties of single training data-
points or subsets of data-points belonging to specific individuals should not be
memorized and then revealed to avoid violating users’ privacy. Unfortunately,
prior work [189], as well as novel contributions presented in this dissertation,
show that machine learning models lead to information leakage about users’
training data. However, strong connections between privacy breaches and
overfitting lead to the conclusion that privacy mechanisms such as differential
privacy can work together with training regularization techniques to achieve
common objectives between the fields of Privacy Enhancing Technologies and
Machine Learning.
We conclude this dissertation by highlighting some open problems and
items for future work.
Privately training machine learning models. In Chapter 4, we showed
how to privately and efficiently collect data from large streams, and then use
the aggregate to extract useful estimates of statistics and train simple machine
learning models. One interesting research direction is to investigate scenarios in
which different succinct data structures could lead to better accuracy-efficiency
tradeoffs, thus allowing the training of more sophisticated statistical models,
e.g., learning word embeddings [150].
In Chapter 5, we introduced a two-step training process for clustering
generative neural network models. However, clustering algorithms are often
dependent on the type of the input data, thus limiting the performance of our
proposal to different domains. Therefore, the design of general frameworks that
jointly optimize the generative network model and clustering assignments [10],
albeit with strong privacy guarantees, remains a challenging topic for further
research. Also, the effective privacy-preserving training of more advanced deep
neural networks is also desirable in order to generate more complex data such
as high-resolution photos [112].
Finally, it would be interesting to deploy our techniques in the wild,
with the release of open-source frameworks supporting large-scale privacy-
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preserving aggregation and generative machine learning as a service.
Privacy leakage in machine learning. Results presented in Chapters 6
and 7 suggest that inference attacks are a realistic threat in both generative
neural network models and collaborative learning. Nonetheless, we identify
some limitations that motivate the need for further research. For instance, our
attacks against generative models assume the attacker knows the size of the
training set, which limits their application to only specific scenarios. Relaxing
this assumption remains an interesting topic to be explored, along with evalu-
ating inference attacks on (differentially private) generative models which are
not based on GANs. Moreover, our membership inference attacks against col-
laborative learning can only be applied to embedding layers, thus motivating
the need for evaluating different layers in neural networks.
We also showed that defenses such as selective gradient sharing, reducing
dimensionality, and dropout are not always effective. This should motivate
future work on better defenses. For instance, techniques that learn only the
features relevant to a given task [76, 163] can potentially serve as the basis
for “least-privilege” collaboratively trained models. Further, methods could be
developed to spot active attacks that manipulate the model into learning extra
features. Finally, it remains an open question if participant-level differential
privacy mechanisms can produce accurate models when collaborative learning
involves relatively few participants.
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